Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Origin of the Work of Art', 'Letters to Leibniz' and 'An Essay on Free Will'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


3 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs'
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
No one can conceive of a possible substance, apart from those which God has created [Arnauld]
     Full Idea: I am much mistaken if there is anyone who dares to say that he can conceive of a purely possible substance, …for although one talks so much of them, one never conceives them except according to the notion of those which God has created.
     From: Antoine Arnauld (Letters to Leibniz [1686], 1686.05.13), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance 4.2
     A reaction: This idea cashes out in the 'necessitism' of Tim Williamson, and views on the Barcan formulae in modal logic.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Determinism clashes with free will, as the past determines action, and is beyond our control [Inwagen, by Jackson]
     Full Idea: I find compelling Peter van Ingwagen's argument that because the past is outside our control, and any action fully determined by something outside our control is not free, determinism is inconsistent with free will.
     From: report of Peter van Inwagen (An Essay on Free Will [1983]) by Frank Jackson - From Metaphysics to Ethics Ch.2
     A reaction: I am puzzled by anyone who even dreamt that full blown free will (very free indeed) could be compatible with the view that past events impose a necessity on future events. So called 'compatibilists' strike me as being determinists.