Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Origin of the Work of Art', 'On the Heavens' and 'On the Nature of Moral Values'

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17 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs'
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The man who, though exceedingly hungry and thirsty, and both equally, yet being equidistant from food and drink, is therefore bound to stay where he is.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 296b33)
     A reaction: This is, of course, Buridan's famous Ass, but this quotation has the advantage of precedence, and also of being expressed in an original quotation (which does not exist for Buridan).
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation [Quine]
     Full Idea: Science, thanks to its links with observation, retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth.
     From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.63)
     A reaction: I would describe what he is affirming as a 'robust' theory of truth. An interesting aside, given his usual allegiance to disquotational, and even redundancy, accounts of truth. You can hardly rely on observations if you think they contain no truth.
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method [Quine]
     Full Idea: Our inductions become increasingly explicit and deliberate, and in the fulness of time we even rise above induction, to the hypothetico-deductive method.
     From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.57)
     A reaction: This seems to defer to Hempel's account of scientific theorising. I wander what exactly 'rising above' means?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices [Quine]
     Full Idea: Altruistic values attach to satisfactions of other persons, without regard to ulterior satisfactions accruing to oneself. Ceremonial values attach to practices of one's society, without regard to satisfactions accruing to oneself.
     From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.58)
     A reaction: An interesting distinction, but probably as blurred and circular as (according to Quine) the analytic/synthetic distinction.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 286a08)
     A reaction: This is the central idea of Aristotle's Ethics. Did it originate with Plato, or Socrates, the young pupil Aristotle? I suspect the strong influence of Aristotle on later Plato. A major idea. Functions link the facts to life.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love seems to diminish with distance from oneself [Quine]
     Full Idea: One cannot reasonably be called upon to love even one's neighbour quite as oneself. Is love to diminish inversely as the square of the distance? Is it to extend to other species than one's own?
     From: Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.65)
     A reaction: Quine isn't actually saying that love is inherently egoistic, but that is the implication. The power of my love is at its most powerful when it is closest to home.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: We say of a sandal which is not worn that it is in vain; God and nature, however, do nothing in vain.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 271a33)
There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 277a26)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: For Aristotle, aether and the four sublunary elements obey different physical laws. Aether moves naturally in a circle and, unlike its lower counterparts, is not a source of perishability. The four sublunary elements move naturally in straight lines.
     From: report of Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.2
     A reaction: I think it is anachronistic for Gill to talk of 'obeying' and 'laws'. She should have said that they have different 'natures'. We can be amused by Greek errors, until we stare hard at the problems they were trying to solve.
An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: An element is a body into which other bodies may be analyzed, present in them potentially or in actuality (which of these is still disputable), and not itself divisible into bodies different in form. That is what all men mean by element.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 302a05), quoted by Weisberg/Needham/Hendry - Philosophy of Chemistry 1.1
     A reaction: This is the classic definition of an element, which endured for a long time, and has been replaced by an 'actual components' view. Obviously analysis nowadays goes well beyond the atoms.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If you raise some earth and release it, it moves and won't stay put, and the more you raise it the faster it moves, so why does the whole earth not move?
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 294a12)
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is absurd to explain place by the void, as though this latter were not itself some kind of place.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 309b24)
     A reaction: Presumably this is aimed at Democritus.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A lunar eclipse always has a convex dividing line, so, if it is eclipsed by the interposition of the earth, the circumference of the earth, being spherical, is responsible for the shape.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 297b29)
The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Clearly the earth is round and not of great size, because when we move north or south we find that very different stars are visible.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 297b30)
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: All thinkers agree that the world had a beginning, but some claim that, having come into existence, it is everlasting.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 279b12)
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: One might indeed be puzzled whether, just as the world about us exists, nothing prevents there being others as well, certainly more than one, though not an unlimited number
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 274a26)