Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Origin of the Work of Art', 'Is Mathematics purely Linguistic?' and 'Rechnungsmethoden (dissertation)'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs'
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Quantity is inconceivable without the idea of addition [Frege]
     Full Idea: There is so intimate a connection between the concepts of addition and of quantity that one cannot begin to grasp the latter without the former.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Rechnungsmethoden (dissertation) [1874], p.2), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics 22 'Quantit'
     A reaction: Frege offers good reasons for making cardinals prior to ordinals, though plenty of people disagree.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Geometry appeals to intuition as the source of its axioms [Frege]
     Full Idea: The elements of all geometrical constructions are intuitions, and geometry appeals to intuition as the source of its axioms.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Rechnungsmethoden (dissertation) [1874], Ch.6), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics
     A reaction: Very early Frege, but he stuck to this view, while firmly rejecting intuition as a source of arithmetic. Frege would have known well that Euclid's assumption about parallels had been challenged.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Numbers are just verbal conveniences, which can be analysed away [Russell]
     Full Idea: Numbers are nothing but a verbal convenience, and disappear when the propositions that seem to contain them are fully written out.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Is Mathematics purely Linguistic? [1952], p.301)
     A reaction: This is the culmination of the process which began with his 1905 theory of definite descriptions. The intervening step was Wittgenstein's purely formal account of the logical connectives.