Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Origin of the Work of Art', 'The Nature of Thought' and 'How there could be a private language'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent

15585	Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt]
	Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science.
	From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs'

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence

2764	Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J]
	Full Idea: Blanshard says that in a fully coherent system there would not only be consistency, but every proposition would be entailed by the others, and no proposition would stand outside the system.
	From: report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], 2:265) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 8.1
	A reaction: Hm. If a proposition is entailed by the others, then it is a necessary truth (given the others) which sounds deterministic. You could predict all the truths you had never encountered. See 1578:178 for quote.

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth

19080	Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO]
	Full Idea: Blanshard said that coherent justification leads to coherence truth. It might be said that coherence is a test for truth, but truth is correspondence. But coherence doesn't guarantee correspondence, and coherence is a test, so truth is not correspondence.
	From: report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], Ch.26) by James O. Young - The Coherence Theory of Truth §2.2
	A reaction: [compression of Young's summary] Rescher (1973) says that Blanshard's argument depends on coherence being an infallible test for truth, which it isn't.

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought

2604	We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language [Fodor]
	Full Idea: I am denying that one can learn a language whose expressive power is greater than that of a language that one already knows.
	From: Jerry A. Fodor (How there could be a private language [1975], p.389)
	A reaction: I presume someone who had a native language of limited vocabulary could learn a new language with a vast vocabulary. I can increase my expressive power with a specialist vocabulary (e.g. legal).