8 ideas
| 15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs' |
| 13831 | Logic is based on transitions between sentences [Prawitz] |
| Full Idea: I agree entirely with Dummett that the right way to answer the question 'what is logic?' is to consider transitions between sentences. | |
| From: Dag Prawitz (Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs [1974], §04) | |
| A reaction: I always protest at this point that reliance on sentences is speciesism against animals, who are thereby debarred from reasoning. See the wonderful Idea 1875 of Chrysippus. Hacking's basic suggestion seems right. Transition between thoughts. |
| 13825 | Natural deduction introduction rules may represent 'definitions' of logical connectives [Prawitz] |
| Full Idea: With Gentzen's natural deduction, we may say that the introductions represent, as it were, the 'definitions' of the logical constants. The introductions are not literally understood as 'definitions'. | |
| From: Dag Prawitz (Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs [1974], 2.2.2) | |
| A reaction: [Hacking, in 'What is Logic? §9' says Gentzen had the idea that his rules actually define the constants; not sure if Prawitz and Hacking are disagreeing] |
| 13823 | In natural deduction, inferences are atomic steps involving just one logical constant [Prawitz] |
| Full Idea: In Gentzen's natural deduction, the inferences are broken down into atomic steps in such a way that each step involves only one logical constant. The steps are the introduction or elimination of the logical constants. | |
| From: Dag Prawitz (Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs [1974], 1.1) |
| 19896 | It is not a law if not endorsed by the public [Hooker,R] |
| Full Idea: Laws they are not which public approbation hath not made so. | |
| From: Richard Hooker (Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity [1593], I s.10), quoted by John Locke - Second Treatise of Government 134 n1 | |
| A reaction: Margaret Thatcher's Poll Tax, rejected by public rebellion, illustrates the point. |
| 19891 | Rule of law is superior to autonomy, because citizens can see what is expected [Hooker,R] |
| Full Idea: Men saw that to live by one man's will became the cause of all men's misery. This contrained them to come unto laws wherein all men might see their duty beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. | |
| From: Richard Hooker (Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity [1593], I s.10), quoted by John Locke - Second Treatise of Government 111 n1 | |
| A reaction: One British school has a single rule, that pupils 'shall always treat other people with respect'. Presumably the rulers, as well as the pupils, must decide when this is transgressed. The rule of law may be preferable. |
| 19897 | Human laws must accord with the general laws of Nature [Hooker,R] |
| Full Idea: Laws human must be made according to the general laws of Nature. | |
| From: Richard Hooker (Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity [1593], III s.9), quoted by John Locke - Second Treatise of Government | |
| A reaction: The point simply seems to be that they won't get assent from the public if they are not in accord with natural justice. Positivists say you can make any damned law you like. |
| 17005 | Natural things observe certain laws, and things cannot do otherwise if they retain their forms [Hooker,R] |
| Full Idea: Things natural …do so necessarily observe their certain laws, that as long as they keep those forms which give them their being they cannot possibly be apt or inclinable to do otherwise than they do. | |
| From: Richard Hooker (Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity [1593], 1.3.4), quoted by Marc Lange - Laws and Lawmakers 1.2 | |
| A reaction: Cited by some as the beginnings of the idea of 'laws of nature', but it is striking that Hooker says the laws are controlled by 'forms' (which are Aristotelian essences). This is an essentialist view of laws, not a regularity or divine power one. |