4 ideas
| 15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs' |
| 15453 | The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The leading rivals to a theory of universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory. | |
| From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.110) | |
| A reaction: If that is the complete menu, I choose resemblance nominalism. All discussion of properties in terms of classes is wildly misguided (because properties come first). Why not 'natural' tropes? |
| 15452 | We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: We could not, without structures, uphold the principle that every truth has a truthmaker. If Fa is true, the truthmaker is not F, not a, nor both together; not their mereological sum; not a set-theoretic construction. These would exist just the same. | |
| From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.109) | |
| A reaction: This point ought to trouble Lewis, as well as Armstrong and Forrest. If we assert 'Fa', we must (in any theory) have some idea of what unites them, as well as of their separate existence. It must a fact about 'a', not a fact about 'F'. |
| 1863 | If the soul achieves well-being in another life, it doesn't follow that I do [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: Even if soul achieves well-being in another life, that doesn't mean I do or any other human being does. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Super Epistolam Pauli Apostoli [1272]) |