98 ideas
| 22223 | Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| Full Idea: Being-in-the-world is a phenomenon of 'care' with a tripartite structure: a) projection towards its possibilities, b) thrownness among those possibilities, so Dasein is not free, and c) fallenness among worldly possibilities, to neglect of its own. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227 | |
| A reaction: Sounds a bit Californian to me. Just living among the world's possibilities is evidently a bad thing, because you could be concentrating on yourself and your own development instead? |
| 22158 | Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: 'Phenomenology' can be formulated as 'To the things themselves!' It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings, and to conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated. It is opposed to traditiona' pseudo-problems. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro II.07) | |
| A reaction: It sounds as if we are invited to look at the world the way a dog might look at it. I am not at all clear what it to be gained from this approach. |
| 15574 | 'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| Full Idea: Heidegger concludes that 'logos' essentially means 'making something manifest'. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 56/33) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§7 | |
| A reaction: It would at least seem to involve revealing the truth of something, though truth doesn't seem to be central to Heidegger's thought. 'Logos' is often translated as 'an account', as well as a 'reason', so Heidegger may be right. |
| 3807 | Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], II.III.3) |
| 15569 | Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| Full Idea: Heidegger is a relentless enemy of ahistorical, absolutist concepts of truth. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 1 | |
| A reaction: I presume that if truth is not absolute then it must be relative, but Polt is a little coy about saying so. For me, anyone who says truth is relative doesn't understand the concept, and is talking about something else. |
| 8649 | Two numbers are equal if all of their units correspond to one another [Hume] |
| Full Idea: When two numbers are so combin'd, as that the one has always a unit answering to every unit of the other, we pronounce them equal. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.III.1) | |
| A reaction: This became known as Hume's Principle after Frege made use of it for logicism (Foundations §63). It reduces equality to something fairly simple and visual (one-to-one correspondence). But we also say that two logicians or musicians are 'equal' in ability. |
| 21291 | There is no medium state between existence and non-existence [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Betwixt unity and number there can be no medium; no more than betwixt existence and non-existence. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.2) | |
| A reaction: Just to confirm that, as you would expect, the great empiricist has no time for 'subsistence', or shadows and holes having lower grade existece. |
| 21897 | Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May] |
| Full Idea: Continental philosophers, following Heidegger, see in the attempt to reduce the question of being to that of beings a symptom of an age that is too ready to accept the terms in which science conceives the world. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 1.04 | |
| A reaction: Interesting. I take the idea that this is a failing of the modern age to be ridiculous, since I take it to be the key metaphysical move made by Aristotle. Neverthless, Aristotle is closely in tune with modern science. For 'beings', read 'objects'. |
| 15573 | For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: We are Dasein - the entity who possesses - as constitutive for its understanding of existence - an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 34/13), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§4 | |
| A reaction: This seems to connect to the emerging 'externalist' view of mind that comes with the external view of content coming from Purnam's Twin Earth idea. |
| 9273 | Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray] |
| Full Idea: Heidegger turns to 'Being' for the same reason that Christians turn to God - to affirm the unique place of humans in the world. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.4 | |
| A reaction: This is the first remark I have encountered that makes sense of Heidegger's Being to me! It places Heidegger as a modernist philosopher, trying to grapple with the decline of religion. I'll stick with Bertrand Russell on that. |
| 22157 | Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro I.04) | |
| A reaction: How do you distinguish the Being of normal humans from the Being of someone in a deep coma, who has no existential issues? Has that Dasein ceased to be? Why does angst create a new mode of Being, but flying doesn't? |
| 8137 | Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: The formal existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole is: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6 41) | |
| A reaction: If you find that thought really illuminating, you are probably on the wrong website. However, the thought that we exist 'ahead of ourselves' might be a fruitful line for existentialists to explore. |
| 21951 | In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: This being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of being of 'the others', in such a way, indeed, that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.164), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 5 | |
| A reaction: He seems to be describing the psychology of someone who joins a small crowd which gradually increases in size. I take this relation to others to be the basic existential dilemma, of retaining individual authenticity within a community. |
| 20745 | 'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: When we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein' we are expressing not its 'what' (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but its being. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.297), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 2 'Phenomenology' | |
| A reaction: Presumably analytic discussions of persons try to be too objective. Heidegger is trying to capture the thought at the heart of Kierkegaard's existentialism. Objectivity and subjectivity are never in conflict. Is there really a different mode of existence? |
| 8134 | The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| Full Idea: Heidegger borrows a common German word 'dasein', meaning 'being' or 'existence', to refer both to 'the manner of Being which... man... possesses', and to the creature which possesses it. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.32) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: This just strikes me as an elementary ontological mistake. Because something has startling properties it doesn't follow that we have a different type of Being. Magnets don't have a different type of being from ordinary iron. |
| 8135 | 'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| Full Idea: We each of us not only have Dasein (our kind of Being), but we can lay claim to it. Also the Dasein of a thing 'is an issue for it' - we care about the kinds of creatures we can make ourselves into. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.67) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: Heidegger says other more puzzling things about Dasein. The second half of the idea is what makes Heidegger an existentialist, and an inspiration for Sartre. |
| 21948 | Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which, in its very being, comports itself understandingly towards that being. ...Mineness belongs to an existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.78), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1 | |
| A reaction: He might eventually persuade me that Dasein is so different from mere material being that it deserves a category of its own. But a reductive account of mind is also a reductive account of being. |
| 7680 | Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Ontology is possible only as phenomenology. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.31), quoted by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: Jacquette argues against this claim. The idea seems to be the ultimate extension of Kant, and it is not a big move to say that the only real phenomenology we can discuss is our semantics. Wrong, wrong, wrong. |
| 22161 | Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in themselves' are defined ontologico-categorially. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15) | |
| A reaction: I assume this is a direct reference to the problem idealists had with the thing-in-itself. It seems that the reality of a thing consists of the strengthened relationship it has with Dasein, which sounds fairly idealist to me. |
| 11942 | Power is the possibility of action, as discovered by experience [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Power consists in the possibility or probability of any action, as discovered by experience and the practice of the world. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], p.313), quoted by George Molnar - Powers 5 | |
| A reaction: [page in OUP edn] This strikes me as blatantly false, and typical of those who confuse epistemology with ontology. It implies that a power that takes everyone by surprise is impossible, by definition. |
| 11949 | There may well be powers in things, with which we are quite unacquainted [Hume] |
| Full Idea: I am, indeed, ready to allow, that there may be several qualities both in material and immaterial objects, with which we are utterly unacquainted; and if we please to call these powers and efficiency, 'twill be be of little consequence to the world. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], p.168), quoted by George Molnar - Powers 7.2.1 | |
| A reaction: A delightful air of casual indifference. What the classic empiricists needed was a notion of 'best explanation', which would allow them to leap beyond immediate experience. They made plenty of other leaps beyond experience, though Hume hated them. |
| 11950 | We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume] |
| Full Idea: We never have any impression that contains any power or efficacy. We never therefore have any idea of power. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], p.161), quoted by George Molnar - Powers 7.2.1 | |
| A reaction: [page in Selby-Bigges edn] It seems to me plausible that Hume is utterly wrong, because our own mental lives are a direct and constant experience of the physical powers and efficacies of material objects. |
| 11941 | The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The distinction which we sometimes make betwixt a power and the exercise of it is entirely frivolous, and ... neither man nor any other being ought ever to be thought possesst of any ability, unless it be exerted and put into action. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], p.311), quoted by George Molnar - Powers 5 | |
| A reaction: [page in OUP] Molnar says this strong intuition is shared by most of us, but I take the world to be full of people who can play the piano or speak Spanish, but never actually do it. [but see Idea 11942] Most wasps never sting anything. |
| 11098 | Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine] |
| Full Idea: Momentary impressions, according to Hume, are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance. | |
| From: report of David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Willard Quine - Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis 3 | |
| A reaction: I don't have a Hume quotation for this yet, but Quine is plausibly claiming Hume as a resemblance nominalist, equipped with an error theory about universals. |
| 7954 | If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume] |
| Full Idea: When we have found a resemblance among several objects, that often occur to us, we apply the same name to all of them, whatever differences we may observe in the degrees of their quantity and quality, and whatever other differences may appear among them. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.I.7) | |
| A reaction: This must to some extent by right, whatever objections can be found. Russell's objection (Idea 4441) wouldn't alter the truth of Hume's observation, thought Hume is attacking universals and Russell defending them. |
| 21293 | Individuation is only seeing that a thing is stable and continuous over time [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The principle of individuation is nothing but the invariableness and uninterruptedness of any object through a supposed variation of time, by which the mind can trace it in the different periods of its existence. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.2) | |
| A reaction: Not convinced by this. I can individuate something by an almost instantaneous glimpse. I don't increasingly individuate it as time passes. Instant viewing of type and structure may be enough. |
| 12048 | The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume] |
| Full Idea: We have no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.I.6) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard empiricist view of such things, firmly stated. It is tempting to say that Hume has simply misunderstood the word, since it is precisely intended to mean not the qualities, but what underlies them, and persists. |
| 13424 | Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The peripatetic philosophers carry their fictions still further, and both suppose a substance supporting, which they do not understand, and an accident supported, of which they have as imperfect an idea. The whole system is entirely incomprehensible. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.3) | |
| A reaction: It seems to me that if you put it to Aristotle that he didn't understand 'substantial form', he would concede the point, but nevertheless say that it was ideal at which knowledge aimed. Locke is much more astute than Hume on this. |
| 15576 | Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| Full Idea: Heidegger tries to develop a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' ('wesen' as a verb). | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§25-7 |
| 21299 | Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Though the change of any considerable part of a mass of matter destroys the identity of the whole, yet we must measure the greatness of the part, not absolutely, but by its proportion to the whole. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: This seems to nicely demonstrate that the wholeness is in the mind of the perceiver, and does not simply depend on objective facts. Compare the proportion needed to change my pile of mud and my pile of gold. |
| 21300 | A change more obviously destroys an identity if it is quick and observed [Hume] |
| Full Idea: A change in any considerable part of a body destroys its identity; but 'tis remarkable that where the change is produced gradually and insensibly we are less apt to ascribe to it the same effect. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: Broad spotted that landscapes change too, but so slowly that we barely admit any change at all. The type of change also matters. If my car slowly changes to chocolate the speed of change is a minor factor. |
| 1321 | If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The objects which are variable or interrupted, and yet are supposed to continue the same, are such only as consist of a succession of parts, connected together by resemblance, contiguity, or causation. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) |
| 1330 | If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual [Hume] |
| Full Idea: As the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) |
| 21302 | If a ruined church is rebuilt, its relation to its parish makes it the same church [Hume] |
| Full Idea: If a church which was formerly of brick fell to ruin, the parish can build the same church of free-stone, with modern architecture. Neither the form nor materials are the same, but their relation to the parishioners is sufficient to say they are the same. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: The clearly invites the question of whether this is type-identity or token-identity. If the parish decided they wanted two churches they obviously wouldn't be the same (even if they then demolished the first one). |
| 21303 | We accept the identity of a river through change, because it is the river's nature [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Where the objects are in their nature changeable and inconstant, we admit of a more sudden transition. The nature of a river consists in the motion and change of parts. What is expected appears of less moment than what is unusual and extraordinary. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: Aha! Little does Hume realise how Aristotelian he is! Aristotle may have a more objective view of the 'nature' of a thing, but making inferences about identity over time from a thing's essential nature is pure Aristotle. |
| 21301 | The purpose of the ship makes it the same one through all variations [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The common end [of a ship], in which the parts conspire, is the same under all variations, and affords an easy transition of the imagination from one situation of the body to another. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: It is not true that a ship remains the same under ALL variations. Consider gradually changing a yacht into a racing powerboat. You might say the purpose is then changed, but the slight variations in a yacht can slightly change its purpose. |
| 21290 | Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume] |
| Full Idea: A mutiplicity of objects can never convey the idea of identity. The mind always pronounces the one not to be the other. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.2) | |
| A reaction: However, if we are talking on the phone about two objects we are viewing, such as two buildings, our descriptions might lead us to conclude that our objects are identical. Thus experience might imply identity. |
| 1207 | Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.2) |
| 21289 | 'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity [Hume] |
| Full Idea: In that proposition 'an object is the same with itself', if the idea expressed by the word 'object' were no way distinguished from that meant by 'itself', we should really mean nothing. ...One single object conveys the idea of unity, not that of identity. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.2) | |
| A reaction: As far as I can see it is mathematicians who like self-identity, to justify x=x, which they need. To say 'this vase is identical with itself' is an empty locution. It expresses either unity or stability over time. See Idea 21292. |
| 21292 | Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume] |
| Full Idea: We cannot, in any propriety of speech, say that an object is the same with itself, unless we mean that the object existent at one time is the same with itself at another time. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems correct, but the strict language of identity is superfluous when identifying stolen goods. 'This is my watch', not 'this watch is identical with my watch'. |
| 9428 | Nothing we clearly imagine is absolutely impossible [Hume] |
| Full Idea: 'Tis an established maxim in metaphysics, that whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.II.2) | |
| A reaction: It is important to note that this empiricist approach to what is impossible requires that we 'clearly' conceive the possibility - but how do we evaluate whether we are being clear or not? |
| 4766 | Necessity only exists in the mind, and not in objects [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Necessity …is nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.III.16) | |
| A reaction: The classic statement of the empiricist position. Personally I don't believe it. Non-mental necessities are likely to be natural, or to be features of 'Platonic' objects. A big issue… |
| 15578 | Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| Full Idea: Propositions are not a good clue to the essence of understanding, because we must already understand things before we formulate propositions about them. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.31) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3 | |
| A reaction: I like this, because I think the most important aspects of our thought and understanding are entirely non-verbal - even in cases where they seem to be highly specific and verbal. We don't understand ourselves at all! |
| 22159 | If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: One of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an 'I' or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.1.10) | |
| A reaction: Descartes had thrown doubt on the informativeness of the phenomena, so presumably your phenomenologist is not interested in whether they reveal any truth. So why are unreliable phenomena of any interest? |
| 22160 | Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: The less we stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become. ...The kind of Being which equipment possesses... we call 'readiness-to-hand' [Zuhandenheit]. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15) | |
| A reaction: This example would be well at home in the writings of the pragmatists. It is also an important example for existentialists. In analytic philosophy we might say the experience combines perception with direct exerience of causation. |
| 6526 | Hume says objects are not a construction, but an imaginative leap [Hume, by Robinson,H] |
| Full Idea: Hume's idea is that we move from private impressions to the physical world, not by an unconscious analytical construction but by a spontaneous imaginative leap. | |
| From: report of David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.6 | |
| A reaction: The idea that objects are 'constructions' seems to have originated with Russell. Hume seems closer to the actual process, which is virtually instantaneous. They both forget that you can follow up the construction or leap with a cool evaluation. |
| 15580 | There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: We always take a noise as the sound of something; we always take a hue as the color of something. We simply do not experience raw, uninterpreted sense-data - these are the inventions of philosophers. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 207/163-4), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3 | |
| A reaction: This is something like the modern view of sense-data as promoted by John McDowell, rather than the experiential atoms of Russell and Moore. Experience is holistic, but that doesn't mean we can't analyse it into components. |
| 20749 | Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: The perceptual 'something' is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a 'field'. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.4), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 3 'Perceptual' | |
| A reaction: Sounds like our knowledge of electrons. Nice point. Standard analytic discussions of perceiving a glass always treat it in isolation, when it is on an expensive table near a brandy bottle. Or near a hammer. |
| 3648 | Empiricists are collecting ants; rationalists are spinning spiders; and bees do both [Bacon] |
| Full Idea: Empiricists are like ants; they collect and put to use; but rationalists, like spiders, spin threads out of themselves. (…and bees follow the middle way, of collecting material and transforming it). | |
| From: Francis Bacon (Cogitata et Visa [1607]) | |
| A reaction: Nice (and so concisely expressed). Bees seem to be just more intelligent and energetic empiricists. |
| 6489 | Associationism results from having to explain intentionality just with sense-data [Robinson,H on Hume] |
| Full Idea: The limited theories of Berkeley and Hume have to be reductive, because they have to explain intentionality in terms of some kind of relation between sense-data; this predicament gives rise to the associationist accounts of psychology and meaning. | |
| From: comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.4 | |
| A reaction: An illuminating explanation. Robinson seems to be implying that we should accept something like Searle's 'intrinsic' intentionality as basic, rather than intentionality built up from smaller components as Hume and Dennett suggest. |
| 6182 | Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism [Hume, by Kant] |
| Full Idea: Even Hume did not make empiricism so universal as to include mathematics in it. | |
| From: report of David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Practical Reason Pref | |
| A reaction: Hume didn't actually exclude mathematics, and the notion of 'relations of ideas' is a pointer. Subsequent empiricist have offered promising accounts. Personally I like the idea that patterns are the key idea. |
| 12417 | Mathematicians only accept their own proofs when everyone confims them [Hume] |
| Full Idea: There is no Mathematician so expert as to place entire confidence in any truth upon his discovery of it. ..Every time he runs over his proofs his confidence encreases, ..and is rais'd to perfection by the applause of the learned world. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], IV.1.4) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Quoted by Kitcher, and a nice example of the social nature of 'warrants', even in mathematics. It was illustrated well in the 1990s by the story of the proof of Fermat's Last Theorem by Andrew Wiles. |
| 5548 | Hume became a total sceptic, because he believed that reason was a deception [Hume, by Kant] |
| Full Idea: David Hume gave way entirely to scepticism, since he believed himself to have discovered in what is generally held to be reason a deception of our faculty of cognition. | |
| From: report of David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason B128 | |
| A reaction: Unfair to Hume, who was very opposed to global scepticism (see Ideas 2240 and 2241), and voted only for 'mitigated scepticism' (see Idea 2242). On the other hand, there is no greater opposition in philosophy than Kant and Hume on 'pure reason'. |
| 22163 | The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof [of external things] has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. ...The kind of Being of the entity which does the proving has not been made definite enough. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.43a) | |
| A reaction: The 'scandal' was a remark of Kant's. Presumably Heidegger's exploration of Dasein aims to establish the Being of the prover sufficiently to solve this problem (via phenomenology). |
| 7446 | The idea of inductive evidence, around 1660, made Hume's problem possible [Hume, by Hacking] |
| Full Idea: Hume's sceptical problem of induction could not have arisen much before 1660, for there was no concept of inductive evidence in terms of which to raise it. | |
| From: report of David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Ian Hacking - The Emergence of Probability Cont 19 | |
| A reaction: Hacking is the expert, but Ideas 1683 and 1886 suggest there was some thinking on the problem in the ancient world. The worry about whether the future would be like the past must occasionally have bothered someone. |
| 21949 | Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| Full Idea: Heidegger argues that having thoughts and feelings is only possible for entity that is actually engaged in the world. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be an a priori exclusion of the possibility of a brain in a vat. I guess the ancestor of this idea is Schopenhauer. |
| 22222 | Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| Full Idea: The world is a world shared with others, so that far from being a solipsistic ego ...Dasein finds itself already amongst others. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.226 | |
| A reaction: Phenomenologists don't seem bothered about the problem of knowing other minds. If you take something for granted, it ceases to be a problem to be solved! |
| 8136 | If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| Full Idea: How do I know that other people have minds? The question is a bad one. Precisely because I encounter them at work, play and the like, it is guaranteed that they, too, are Dasein, intelligent agents. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.153-) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: I've seen film of someone playing peek-a-boo with a bonobo ape, so presumably they have Dasein. It might be easier for the AI community to aim at building a robot with Dasein, than one which was simply conscious. |
| 22164 | When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.2.13) | |
| A reaction: This is the first plausible fruit of phenomenology I have been able to discover. Analysing the passive mind is not very promising, but seeing what happens when we become more proactive is revealing. |
| 21806 | Memory, senses and understanding are all founded on the imagination [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The memory, senses, and understanding are all of them founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.7.3), quoted by Stephan Schmid - Faculties in Early Modern Philosophy 5 | |
| A reaction: He seems to have in mind his theory of associations, which are not rational. |
| 3819 | Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume] |
| Full Idea: Hume's thought that each perception is separate and distinct cannot be right, because then we can't distinguish between one consciousness with ten experiences and ten different consciousnesses. | |
| From: comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by John Searle - Rationality in Action Ch.3.VI | |
| A reaction: Why can't the only connection between them be that they all occur to the speaker who reports to them? How would I know if one of 'my' mental events actually belonged to a neighbour and had strayed. If it was coherent, I would accept it. |
| 1317 | A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume] |
| Full Idea: I affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: Note that Hume is not just saying what we can know of ourselves, but is asserting a view of what we actually are. The minimal objection to this is to ask how we know that a perception is a member of one big bundle rather than several small ones. |
| 1331 | The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Whatever changes a person endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: However, the opposite ends of the universe are linked together by causation, so that will not suffice for a theory of personal identity. One might try to specify a complex and tight network of causation (like a brain!) instead of just 'connection'. |
| 1388 | Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume] |
| Full Idea: I believe Hume offers an interesting if sketchy theory of personal identity, a causal theory, disguised as the revolutionary discovery that there is no such thing as personal identity | |
| From: comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) by John Perry - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' Intro | |
| A reaction: There is certainly a theory there, even though Hume ceased to believe in it, which is nowadays covered by the idea that personal identity is a 'fiction', an arbitrary idea that reifies the focus and direction of a bundle of mental events. |
| 21297 | A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume] |
| Full Idea: [People] are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a continual flux and movement. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: Nowadays we must say that this misses the huge non-conscious aspect of what a person is. He seems to see all mental events as equal. Isn't the experience of deciding to focus on this sentence more 'central' than awareness of your feet? |
| 22162 | There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: The self of everyday Dasein is the they-self [das Man-selbst], which we distinguish from the authentic self - that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27) | |
| A reaction: To a novice this sounds like a requirement for increased self-consciousness during daily activity. 'Be a good animal, true to your animal self' said one of Lawrence's characters. |
| 1316 | Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions [Hume] |
| Full Idea: I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: The first half can hardly be denied, but I think the second half is just false. What you observe is not just a raw neutral sense-datum, floating in nothing, but a sense-datum that is deeply coloured by MY interests, interpretations and values. |
| 1333 | Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Memory does not so much produce as discover personal identity, by showing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: This is a rather strained proposal, as the revelation of a network of cause and effect seems to have no implications for personal identity (unless only 'I' could be the cause). |
| 1332 | We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten [Hume] |
| Full Idea: We can extend the chain of causes acquired from memory, and consequently the identity of our persons beyond our memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we have entirely forgot. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: If the principle is just that 'I am my consciousness' (including of my past), then why should not my consciousness of other people's pasts by included in my identity. How do I know that images in my consciousness are MY memories? |
| 21305 | Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The memory not only discovers the identity [of the mind], but also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: This is Hume battling to explain personal identity by his principles of association. He discount 'contiguity'. He doesn't explain how memory creates resemblances. Is not resemblance of idea to fact required in order to remember? |
| 21307 | Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Who will affirm, because he has entirely forgot the incidents of past days, that the present self is not the same person with the self of that time? And by that means overturn all the most established notions of personal identity? | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: This is a swipe at one of Locke's most controversial claims (especially when applied to incidents of criminal behaviour). Hume says memory constitutes this identity, but Locke's view says it merely reveals identity. |
| 21306 | Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume] |
| Full Idea: As to causation, the true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of different perceptions, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence and modify each other. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: He suggests that the associations of memory and causation might be sufficient to produce identity of the mind, and he gives the priority to memory. Eventually the good empiricist despairs because you cannot experience the links. |
| 21294 | A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have [Hume] |
| Full Idea: If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: This is a rather dogmatic application of the requirement that all knowledge must be founded in experience. It fails to recognise that knowledge of the thing having the experiences is a rather special case. We must ask for the best explanation. |
| 21295 | When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them [Hume] |
| Full Idea: When I enter most intimately into myself I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never observe any thing but the perception. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: It isn't like looking for your car in the car park. The prior question should be: assuming you do have a persisting self, what would you expect introspection to reveal about it? |
| 20114 | Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Everyone is other, and no one is himself. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.165), quoted by Rüdiger Safranski - Nietzsche: a philosophical biography 09 | |
| A reaction: Safranski describes this as the idea of 'structural self-evasion'. He detects the same idea in Nietzsche's 'Daybreak'. |
| 21298 | We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps [Hume] |
| Full Idea: We feign the continued existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove their interruption; and run into the notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to disguise the variation. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: Modern neuroscience (according to Dennett) endorses this, because the brain continually fills in gaps in experience (as it fills in the blindspot during normal vision). |
| 21304 | Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same [Hume] |
| Full Idea: The identity we ascribe to the mind is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies. It cannot therefore have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: Sustained purpose is Hume's common factor. Is the identity over time ascribed to the body of a single animal nothing more than a fiction? It is a wise ascription, compared to stupid ascriptions to gerrymandered objects. |
| 15577 | Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| Full Idea: For Heidegger moods are disclosive; they show us things in a more fundamental way than theoretical propositions ever can. For example, fear reveals something as a threat. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.30) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§30 | |
| A reaction: Most modern students of emotion seem to agree. Even though they may not have specific content, it is always possible to consider the underlying cause of the mood. |
| 20030 | If one event causes another, the two events must be wholly distinct [Hume, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: Hume's maxim is that if one event cause another, then the two events must be wholly distinct. | |
| From: report of David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 3 | |
| A reaction: [Anyone know the original reference?] So we are not allowed to say that one part of an event caused another. The charged caused the victory, so they are two events, but in another context the whole battle is one event. |
| 6692 | For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Hume, by Graham] |
| Full Idea: In Hume's account of action, practical reason is not a very forceful guide to conduct, since we can escape its demands by abandoning or modifying our desires. | |
| From: report of David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Gordon Graham - Eight Theories of Ethics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Presumably a desire can be a good reason, and we can passionately desire to be rational, etc., so this is a rather complex issue. 'Pure reason' is not 'all-or-nothing', and neither is pure desire. |
| 8257 | Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], II.III.3) | |
| A reaction: This is Hume's notorious total rejection of Socratic intellectualism, a stilleto in the back of the 'age of reason'. Hume thinks desire is the motivator. He's probably right. Why should truth motivate? See Idea 4421. |
| 22374 | You can only hold people responsible for actions which arise out of their character [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Where actions proceed not from some cause in the characters and dispositions of the person who performed them, they infix not themselves upon him, and can neither redound to his honour if good, nor infamy if evil. The action in itself may be blameable. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], II.III.2), quoted by Philippa Foot - Free Will as Involving Determinism p.70 | |
| A reaction: I agree with Foot that this is wrong. Uncharacteristic actions still reflect on the person. The last sentence is wrong too. If you ignore the agent of an action, it can't be distinguished from a flash of lightning. |
| 22382 | We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Examine wilful murder and see if you can find the matter of fact called vice. You only find certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no matter of fact in the case. You can never find it till you turn your reflexion into your own breast. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], III.I.2), quoted by Philippa Foot - Hume on Moral Judgement p.77 | |
| A reaction: [...In you breast you find 'disapprobation'] The question Foot asks is whether the facts of the case are relevant to the disapprobation. If they are not, as Hume implies, then it would be rational to feel the same disapprobation about drinking coffee. |
| 4008 | Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Hume, by Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: From our modern perspective, the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and moral insight lies irrecoverably shattered by the rise of natural science. | |
| From: report of David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §3.2 | |
| A reaction: Modern attempts to challenge Hume's separation of fact from value have failed, but a return to the Greek perspective presents a plausible alternative. |
| 8067 | The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe on Hume] |
| Full Idea: Hume's objection to passing from 'is' to 'ought' would equally apply to passing from 'is' to 'owes' or from 'is' to 'needs'. | |
| From: comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by G.E.M. Anscombe - Modern Moral Philosophy p.176 | |
| A reaction: Profound and important. The empirical and emotivist (nay, nihilist) clinging to the total independence of duties from facts crumbles when looking at facts of human nature or of social groups. Creatures ought to feed; societies ought to flourish. |
| 4578 | You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction [Hume] |
| Full Idea: In many writers I find that instead of the usual propositions 'is' and 'is not', I then find no proposition that is not connected with an 'ought' or an 'ought not'. It is necessary that a reason be given for how one can be a deduction from the other. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], III.1.1) | |
| A reaction: A huge claim, the basis of the value-free modern scientific world view. Possible escapes are Greek virtue theory, or Kantian principles, or some sort of a priori values (as in Charles Taylor). |
| 20748 | We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: We do not throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something is encountered as such, the thing in question has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.190-1), quoted by George Dickie - The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude 3 'Undoing' | |
| A reaction: Analytic philosophy and science have tried to dismantle experience, and Heidegger wants to put it back together. I would say there is a big difference between encountering a thing (which is a bit facty), and understanding it (which is more valuey). |
| 3650 | Total selfishness is not irrational [Hume] |
| Full Idea: It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], II.III.ii) | |
| A reaction: A famous idea, and the embodiment of moral nihilism. I say nothing could ever refute someone who held such a view. No moral theory can force someone to care, if they just don't. |
| 22166 | Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Because Dasein is lost in the 'they', it must first find itself. It must be 'shown' to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], II.2.54) | |
| A reaction: I wish there was some criterion for knowing when you are being yourself and when you are not. |
| 22165 | Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualised in individualisation. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.40) | |
| A reaction: Is sounds like insecurity, as a sort of trauma that shocks one into self-realisation. The idea means very little to me personally. |
| 21952 | Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| Full Idea: For Heidegger, as a consequence of my anxiety in the face of death, I am set free to live my life as my own rather than doing things merely because others expect me to do them. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 7 | |
| A reaction: Contrary to Epicurus, Heidegger thinks anxiety about death is a good thing. The point is, I suppose, that we all die alone, and people who are very socially contrained need to face up to death in order to grasp their autonomy. |
| 22224 | Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| Full Idea: Anxiety [angst] is the disturbing sense of uncanniness by which Dasein is overtaken (thrownness) when it discovers there is nothing other than its own freedom to sustain its projects (projection), and from which Dasein constantly takes flight (falling). | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be Kierkegaard's idea, unamended. In my experience anxiety only comes when I am forced into making decisions by worldly situations. An 'existential crisis' is a sort of blankness appearing where a future life was supposed to be. |
| 15572 | Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Dasein's Being-what-it-is (essentia) must….be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia). | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 67/42), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the origin of Sartre's famous slogan 'existence before essence'. It seems to be a rebellion against Husserl's quest for essences. |
| 20453 | Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley] |
| Full Idea: Heidegger says you must choose your hero; either you choose 'das Man', the inauthentic life, or you choose yourself - the point being that you have to choose yourself as your hero in order to be authentic. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Simon Critchley - Impossible Objects: interviews 5 | |
| A reaction: If Nietzsche's 'Ecce Homo' is the model for choosing yourself as hero, I am not too sure about this idea. Needing a hero seems awfully German and romantic. Ein Heldenleben. Be your own anit-hero (like a standup comedian)? |
| 14301 | We have no good concept of solidity or matter, because accounts of them are all circular [Hume] |
| Full Idea: In order to form an idea of solidity, we must conceive two bodies pressing on each other without penetration. ..The ideas of secondary qualities are excluded, and the idea of motion depends on extension. This leaves us no just idea of solidity or matter. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.4), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 02.3 | |
| A reaction: [compressed] For me these kind of strict empiricist arguments always recede when you accept the notion of an inference to be best explanation. We have some sort of notion of 'matter', but here the physicist seems to take over. |
| 8382 | For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane] |
| Full Idea: Hume held that constant conjunction between As and Bs is both necessary and sufficient for a causal relation. If As and Bs are conjoined that is sufficient for a causal relation; if A and B are causally related, necessarily they are constantly conjoined. | |
| From: report of David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Tim Crane - Causation 1.2.2 | |
| A reaction: A helpful connection between Hume and the modern debate about conditions for causation (e.g. Mackie). It sounds as if, to spot the necessary condition, you need to independently see that A and B are causally related, which regularity does not allow. |
| 19274 | Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke on Hume] |
| Full Idea: A well-known objection to Hume's analysis of causation is that he presupposes necessary connections between mental events in the theory. | |
| From: comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Saul A. Kripke - Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language n 87 | |
| A reaction: Are these the associations that occur within the mind? I'm not clear about the objection, but record it for interest. |
| 21296 | If all of my perceptions were removed by death, nothing more is needed for total annihilation [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Were all my perceptions removed by death, and I could I neither think nor feel nor see nor love nor hate, after the dissolution of my body, I should be enitrely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is further requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6) | |
| A reaction: 'A perfect non-entity'. How about that for an eighteenth century rejection of immortality of the soul? In the context, his point is that the has no enduring self, apart from this range of experiences. |