79 ideas
| 22223 | Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| Full Idea: Being-in-the-world is a phenomenon of 'care' with a tripartite structure: a) projection towards its possibilities, b) thrownness among those possibilities, so Dasein is not free, and c) fallenness among worldly possibilities, to neglect of its own. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227 | |
| A reaction: Sounds a bit Californian to me. Just living among the world's possibilities is evidently a bad thing, because you could be concentrating on yourself and your own development instead? |
| 22158 | Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: 'Phenomenology' can be formulated as 'To the things themselves!' It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings, and to conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated. It is opposed to traditiona' pseudo-problems. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro II.07) | |
| A reaction: It sounds as if we are invited to look at the world the way a dog might look at it. I am not at all clear what it to be gained from this approach. |
| 15574 | 'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| Full Idea: Heidegger concludes that 'logos' essentially means 'making something manifest'. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 56/33) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§7 | |
| A reaction: It would at least seem to involve revealing the truth of something, though truth doesn't seem to be central to Heidegger's thought. 'Logos' is often translated as 'an account', as well as a 'reason', so Heidegger may be right. |
| 9955 | Contextual definitions replace a complete sentence containing the expression [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: A contextual definition shows how to analyse an expression in situ, by replacing a complete sentence (of a particular form) in which the expression occurs by another in which it does not. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This is a controversial procedure, which (according to Dummett) Frege originally accepted, and later rejected. It might not be the perfect definition that replacing just the expression would give you, but it is a promising step. |
| 10031 | Impredicative definitions quantify over the thing being defined [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: When a definition contains a quantifier whose range includes the very entity being defined, the definition is said to be 'impredicative'. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Presumably they are 'impredicative' because they do not predicate a new quality in the definiens, but make use of the qualities already known. |
| 15569 | Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| Full Idea: Heidegger is a relentless enemy of ahistorical, absolutist concepts of truth. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 1 | |
| A reaction: I presume that if truth is not absolute then it must be relative, but Polt is a little coy about saying so. For me, anyone who says truth is relative doesn't understand the concept, and is talking about something else. |
| 10098 | The 'power set' of A is all the subsets of A [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: The 'power set' of A is all the subsets of A. P(A) = {B : B ⊆ A}. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) |
| 10099 | The 'ordered pair' <a, b>, for two sets a and b, is the set {{a, b},{a}} [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: The 'ordered pair' <a, b>, for two sets a and b, is the set {{a, b},{a}}. The existence of this set is guaranteed by three applications of the Axiom of Pairing. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 10100 for the Axiom of Pairing. |
| 10101 |
Cartesian Product A x B: the set of all ordered pairs |
| Full Idea: The 'Cartesian Product' of any two sets A and B is the set of all ordered pairs <a, b> in which a ∈ A and b ∈ B, and it is denoted as A x B. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) |
| 10103 | Grouping by property is common in mathematics, usually using equivalence [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: The idea of grouping together objects that share some property is a common one in mathematics, ...and the technique most often involves the use of equivalence relations. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) |
| 10104 | 'Equivalence' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation; 'same first letter' partitions English words [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: A relation is an equivalence relation if it is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. The 'same first letter' is an equivalence relation on the set of English words. Any relation that puts a partition into clusters will be equivalence - and vice versa. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a key concept in the Fregean strategy for defining numbers. |
| 10096 | Even the elements of sets in ZFC are sets, resting on the pure empty set [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: ZFC is a theory concerned only with sets. Even the elements of all of the sets studied in ZFC are also sets (whose elements are also sets, and so on). This rests on one clearly pure set, the empty set Φ. ..Mathematics only needs pure sets. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This makes ZFC a much more metaphysically comfortable way to think about sets, because it can be viewed entirely formally. It is rather hard to disentangle a chair from the singleton set of that chair. |
| 10097 | Axiom of Extensionality: for all sets x and y, if x and y have the same elements then x = y [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: The Axiom of Extensionality says that for all sets x and y, if x and y have the same elements then x = y. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems fine in pure set theory, but hits the problem of renates and cordates in the real world. The elements coincide, but the axiom can't tell you why they coincide. |
| 10100 | Axiom of Pairing: for all sets x and y, there is a set z containing just x and y [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: The Axiom of Pairing says that for all sets x and y, there is a set z containing x and y, and nothing else. In symbols: ∀x∀y∃z∀w(w ∈ z ↔ (w = x ∨ w = y)). | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 10099 for an application of this axiom. |
| 17900 | The Axiom of Reducibility made impredicative definitions possible [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility ...had the effect of making impredicative definitions possible. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) |
| 10109 | ZFC can prove that there is no set corresponding to the concept 'set' [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: Sets, unlike extensions, fail to correspond to all concepts. We can prove in ZFC that there is no set corresponding to the concept 'set' - that is, there is no set of all sets. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This is rather an important point for Frege. However, all concepts have extensions, but they may be proper classes, rather than precisely defined sets. |
| 10108 | As a reduction of arithmetic, set theory is not fully general, and so not logical [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: The problem with reducing arithmetic to ZFC is not that this theory is inconsistent (as far as we know it is not), but rather that is not completely general, and for this reason not logical. For example, it asserts the existence of sets. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: Note that ZFC has not been proved consistent. |
| 10111 | Asserting Excluded Middle is a hallmark of realism about the natural world [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: A hallmark of our realist stance towards the natural world is that we are prepared to assert the Law of Excluded Middle for all statements about it. For all statements S, either S is true, or not-S is true. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: Personally I firmly subscribe to realism, so I suppose I must subscribe to Excluded Middle. ...Provided the statement is properly formulated. Or does liking excluded middle lead me to realism? |
| 10129 | A 'model' is a meaning-assignment which makes all the axioms true [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: A 'model' of a theory is an assignment of meanings to the symbols of its language which makes all of its axioms come out true. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: If the axioms are all true, and the theory is sound, then all of the theorems will also come out true. |
| 10105 | Differences between isomorphic structures seem unimportant [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: Mathematicians tend to regard the differences between isomorphic mathematical structures as unimportant. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a pointer towards Structuralism as the underlying story in mathematics. The intrinsic character of so-called 'objects' seems unimportant. How theories map onto one another (and onto the world?) is all that matters? |
| 10119 | Consistency is a purely syntactic property, unlike the semantic property of soundness [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: Consistency is a purely syntactic property, unlike the semantic property of soundness. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.6) |
| 10126 | A 'consistent' theory cannot contain both a sentence and its negation [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: If there is a sentence such that both the sentence and its negation are theorems of a theory, then the theory is 'inconsistent'. Otherwise it is 'consistent'. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.7) |
| 10120 | Soundness is a semantic property, unlike the purely syntactic property of consistency [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: Soundness is a semantic property, unlike the purely syntactic property of consistency. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.6) |
| 10127 | A 'complete' theory contains either any sentence or its negation [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: If there is a sentence such that neither the sentence nor its negation are theorems of a theory, then the theory is 'incomplete'. Otherwise it is 'complete'. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: Interesting questions are raised about undecidable sentences, irrelevant sentences, unknown sentences.... |
| 10106 | Rational numbers give answers to division problems with integers [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: We can think of rational numbers as providing answers to division problems involving integers. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Cf. Idea 10102. |
| 10102 | The integers are answers to subtraction problems involving natural numbers [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: In defining the integers in set theory, our definition will be motivated by thinking of the integers as answers to subtraction problems involving natural numbers. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Typical of how all of the families of numbers came into existence; they are 'invented' so that we can have answers to problems, even if we can't interpret the answers. It it is money, we may say the minus-number is a 'debt', but is it? Cf Idea 10106. |
| 10107 | Real numbers provide answers to square root problems [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: One reason for introducing the real numbers is to provide answers to square root problems. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the other main reasons is to deal with problems of exact measurement. It is interesting that there seem to be two quite distinct reasons for introducing the reals. Cf. Ideas 10102 and 10106. |
| 9946 | Logicists say mathematics is applicable because it is totally general [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: The logicist idea is that if mathematics is logic, and logic is the most general of disciplines, one that applies to all rational thought regardless of its content, then it is not surprising that mathematics is widely applicable. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Frege was keen to emphasise this. You are left wondering why pure logic is applicable to the physical world. The only account I can give is big-time Platonism, or Pythagoreanism. Logic reveals the engine-room of nature, where the design is done. |
| 10125 | The classical mathematician believes the real numbers form an actual set [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: Unlike the intuitionist, the classical mathematician believes in an actual set that contains all the real numbers. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.6) |
| 17899 | Second-order induction is stronger as it covers all concepts, not just first-order definable ones [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: The first-order version of the induction axiom is weaker than the second-order, because the latter applies to all concepts, but the first-order applies only to concepts definable by a formula in the first-order language of number theory. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.7 n7) |
| 10128 | The Incompleteness proofs use arithmetic to talk about formal arithmetic [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: The idea behind the proofs of the Incompleteness Theorems is to use the language of Peano Arithmetic to talk about the formal system of Peano Arithmetic itself. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: The mechanism used is to assign a Gödel Number to every possible formula, so that all reasonings become instances of arithmetic. |
| 17902 | A successor is the union of a set with its singleton [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: For any set x, we define the 'successor' of x to be the set S(x) = x U {x}. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This is the Fregean approach to successor, where the Dedekind approach takes 'successor' to be a primitive. Frege 1884:§76. |
| 10133 | Frege's Theorem shows the Peano Postulates can be derived from Hume's Principle [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: The derivability of Peano's Postulates from Hume's Principle in second-order logic has been dubbed 'Frege's Theorem', (though Frege would not have been interested, because he didn't think Hume's Principle gave an adequate definition of numebrs). | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.8 n1) | |
| A reaction: Frege said the numbers were the sets which were the extensions of the sets created by Hume's Principle. |
| 10130 | Set theory can prove the Peano Postulates [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: The Peano Postulates can be proven in ZFC. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.7) |
| 10089 | Talk of 'abstract entities' is more a label for the problem than a solution to it [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: One might well wonder whether talk of abstract entities is less a solution to the empiricist's problem of how a priori knowledge is possible than it is a label for the problem. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This pinpoints my view nicely. What the platonist postulates is remote, bewildering, implausible and useless! |
| 10131 | If mathematics is not about particulars, observing particulars must be irrelevant [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: As, in the logicist view, mathematics is about nothing particular, it is little wonder that nothing in particular needs to be observed in order to acquire mathematical knowledge. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002]) | |
| A reaction: At the very least we can say that no one would have even dreamt of the general system of arithmetic is they hadn't had experience of the particulars. Frege thought generality ensured applicability, but extreme generality might entail irrelevance. |
| 10092 | In the unramified theory of types, the types are objects, then sets of objects, sets of sets etc. [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: In the unramified theory of types, all objects are classified into a hierarchy of types. The lowest level has individual objects that are not sets. Next come sets whose elements are individuals, then sets of sets, etc. Variables are confined to types. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: The objects are Type 0, the basic sets Type 1, etc. |
| 10094 | The theory of types seems to rule out harmless sets as well as paradoxical ones. [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: The theory of types seems to rule out harmless sets as well as paradoxical ones. If a is an individual and b is a set of individuals, then in type theory we cannot talk about the set {a,b}. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Since we cheerfully talk about 'Cicero and other Romans', this sounds like a rather disasterous weakness. |
| 10095 | Type theory has only finitely many items at each level, which is a problem for mathematics [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: A problem with type theory is that there are only finitely many individuals, and finitely many sets of individuals, and so on. The hierarchy may be infinite, but each level is finite. Mathematics required an axiom asserting infinitely many individuals. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Most accounts of mathematics founder when it comes to infinities. Perhaps we should just reject them? |
| 17901 | Type theory prohibits (oddly) a set containing an individual and a set of individuals [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: If a is an individual and b is a set of individuals, then in the theory of types we cannot talk about the set {a,b}, since it is not an individual or a set of individuals, ...but it is hard to see what harm can come from it. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.3) |
| 10114 | Bounded quantification is originally finitary, as conjunctions and disjunctions [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: In the first instance all bounded quantifications are finitary, for they can be viewed as abbreviations for conjunctions and disjunctions. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as quite good support for finitism. The origin of a concept gives a good guide to what it really means (not a popular view, I admit). When Aristotle started quantifying, I suspect of he thought of lists, not totalities. |
| 10134 | Much infinite mathematics can still be justified finitely [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: It is possible to use finitary reasoning to justify a significant part of infinitary mathematics. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: This might save Hilbert's project, by gradually accepting into the fold all the parts which have been giving a finitist justification. |
| 10123 | The intuitionists are the idealists of mathematics [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: The intuitionists are the idealists of mathematics. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.6) |
| 10124 | Gödel's First Theorem suggests there are truths which are independent of proof [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: For intuitionists, truth is not independent of proof, but this independence is precisely what seems to be suggested by Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem. | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: Thus Gödel was worse news for the Intuitionists than he was for Hilbert's Programme. Gödel himself responded by becoming a platonist about his unprovable truths. |
| 21897 | Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May] |
| Full Idea: Continental philosophers, following Heidegger, see in the attempt to reduce the question of being to that of beings a symptom of an age that is too ready to accept the terms in which science conceives the world. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 1.04 | |
| A reaction: Interesting. I take the idea that this is a failing of the modern age to be ridiculous, since I take it to be the key metaphysical move made by Aristotle. Neverthless, Aristotle is closely in tune with modern science. For 'beings', read 'objects'. |
| 15573 | For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: We are Dasein - the entity who possesses - as constitutive for its understanding of existence - an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 34/13), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§4 | |
| A reaction: This seems to connect to the emerging 'externalist' view of mind that comes with the external view of content coming from Purnam's Twin Earth idea. |
| 9273 | Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray] |
| Full Idea: Heidegger turns to 'Being' for the same reason that Christians turn to God - to affirm the unique place of humans in the world. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.4 | |
| A reaction: This is the first remark I have encountered that makes sense of Heidegger's Being to me! It places Heidegger as a modernist philosopher, trying to grapple with the decline of religion. I'll stick with Bertrand Russell on that. |
| 22157 | Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro I.04) | |
| A reaction: How do you distinguish the Being of normal humans from the Being of someone in a deep coma, who has no existential issues? Has that Dasein ceased to be? Why does angst create a new mode of Being, but flying doesn't? |
| 8137 | Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: The formal existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole is: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6 41) | |
| A reaction: If you find that thought really illuminating, you are probably on the wrong website. However, the thought that we exist 'ahead of ourselves' might be a fruitful line for existentialists to explore. |
| 21951 | In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: This being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of being of 'the others', in such a way, indeed, that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.164), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 5 | |
| A reaction: He seems to be describing the psychology of someone who joins a small crowd which gradually increases in size. I take this relation to others to be the basic existential dilemma, of retaining individual authenticity within a community. |
| 20745 | 'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: When we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein' we are expressing not its 'what' (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but its being. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.297), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 2 'Phenomenology' | |
| A reaction: Presumably analytic discussions of persons try to be too objective. Heidegger is trying to capture the thought at the heart of Kierkegaard's existentialism. Objectivity and subjectivity are never in conflict. Is there really a different mode of existence? |
| 8134 | The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| Full Idea: Heidegger borrows a common German word 'dasein', meaning 'being' or 'existence', to refer both to 'the manner of Being which... man... possesses', and to the creature which possesses it. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.32) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: This just strikes me as an elementary ontological mistake. Because something has startling properties it doesn't follow that we have a different type of Being. Magnets don't have a different type of being from ordinary iron. |
| 8135 | 'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| Full Idea: We each of us not only have Dasein (our kind of Being), but we can lay claim to it. Also the Dasein of a thing 'is an issue for it' - we care about the kinds of creatures we can make ourselves into. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.67) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: Heidegger says other more puzzling things about Dasein. The second half of the idea is what makes Heidegger an existentialist, and an inspiration for Sartre. |
| 21948 | Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which, in its very being, comports itself understandingly towards that being. ...Mineness belongs to an existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.78), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1 | |
| A reaction: He might eventually persuade me that Dasein is so different from mere material being that it deserves a category of its own. But a reductive account of mind is also a reductive account of being. |
| 7680 | Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Ontology is possible only as phenomenology. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.31), quoted by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: Jacquette argues against this claim. The idea seems to be the ultimate extension of Kant, and it is not a big move to say that the only real phenomenology we can discuss is our semantics. Wrong, wrong, wrong. |
| 22161 | Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in themselves' are defined ontologico-categorially. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15) | |
| A reaction: I assume this is a direct reference to the problem idealists had with the thing-in-itself. It seems that the reality of a thing consists of the strengthened relationship it has with Dasein, which sounds fairly idealist to me. |
| 12693 | A body is that which exists in space [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: A body is defined as that which exists in space. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Confessio naturae contra atheistas [1669], A6.1.490), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1 | |
| A reaction: A very early view. Leibniz notes that this tells you nothing about shape and motion. |
| 15576 | Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| Full Idea: Heidegger tries to develop a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' ('wesen' as a verb). | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§25-7 |
| 15578 | Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| Full Idea: Propositions are not a good clue to the essence of understanding, because we must already understand things before we formulate propositions about them. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.31) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3 | |
| A reaction: I like this, because I think the most important aspects of our thought and understanding are entirely non-verbal - even in cases where they seem to be highly specific and verbal. We don't understand ourselves at all! |
| 22159 | If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: One of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an 'I' or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.1.10) | |
| A reaction: Descartes had thrown doubt on the informativeness of the phenomena, so presumably your phenomenologist is not interested in whether they reveal any truth. So why are unreliable phenomena of any interest? |
| 22160 | Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: The less we stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become. ...The kind of Being which equipment possesses... we call 'readiness-to-hand' [Zuhandenheit]. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15) | |
| A reaction: This example would be well at home in the writings of the pragmatists. It is also an important example for existentialists. In analytic philosophy we might say the experience combines perception with direct exerience of causation. |
| 15580 | There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: We always take a noise as the sound of something; we always take a hue as the color of something. We simply do not experience raw, uninterpreted sense-data - these are the inventions of philosophers. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 207/163-4), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3 | |
| A reaction: This is something like the modern view of sense-data as promoted by John McDowell, rather than the experiential atoms of Russell and Moore. Experience is holistic, but that doesn't mean we can't analyse it into components. |
| 20749 | Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: The perceptual 'something' is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a 'field'. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.4), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 3 'Perceptual' | |
| A reaction: Sounds like our knowledge of electrons. Nice point. Standard analytic discussions of perceiving a glass always treat it in isolation, when it is on an expensive table near a brandy bottle. Or near a hammer. |
| 22163 | The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof [of external things] has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. ...The kind of Being of the entity which does the proving has not been made definite enough. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.43a) | |
| A reaction: The 'scandal' was a remark of Kant's. Presumably Heidegger's exploration of Dasein aims to establish the Being of the prover sufficiently to solve this problem (via phenomenology). |
| 21949 | Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| Full Idea: Heidegger argues that having thoughts and feelings is only possible for entity that is actually engaged in the world. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be an a priori exclusion of the possibility of a brain in a vat. I guess the ancestor of this idea is Schopenhauer. |
| 22222 | Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| Full Idea: The world is a world shared with others, so that far from being a solipsistic ego ...Dasein finds itself already amongst others. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.226 | |
| A reaction: Phenomenologists don't seem bothered about the problem of knowing other minds. If you take something for granted, it ceases to be a problem to be solved! |
| 8136 | If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| Full Idea: How do I know that other people have minds? The question is a bad one. Precisely because I encounter them at work, play and the like, it is guaranteed that they, too, are Dasein, intelligent agents. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.153-) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: I've seen film of someone playing peek-a-boo with a bonobo ape, so presumably they have Dasein. It might be easier for the AI community to aim at building a robot with Dasein, than one which was simply conscious. |
| 22164 | When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.2.13) | |
| A reaction: This is the first plausible fruit of phenomenology I have been able to discover. Analysing the passive mind is not very promising, but seeing what happens when we become more proactive is revealing. |
| 22162 | There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: The self of everyday Dasein is the they-self [das Man-selbst], which we distinguish from the authentic self - that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27) | |
| A reaction: To a novice this sounds like a requirement for increased self-consciousness during daily activity. 'Be a good animal, true to your animal self' said one of Lawrence's characters. |
| 20114 | Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Everyone is other, and no one is himself. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.165), quoted by Rüdiger Safranski - Nietzsche: a philosophical biography 09 | |
| A reaction: Safranski describes this as the idea of 'structural self-evasion'. He detects the same idea in Nietzsche's 'Daybreak'. |
| 15577 | Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| Full Idea: For Heidegger moods are disclosive; they show us things in a more fundamental way than theoretical propositions ever can. For example, fear reveals something as a threat. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.30) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§30 | |
| A reaction: Most modern students of emotion seem to agree. Even though they may not have specific content, it is always possible to consider the underlying cause of the mood. |
| 10110 | Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some of them sets) [George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some classes will be sets, the others proper classes). | |
| From: A.George / D.J.Velleman (Philosophies of Mathematics [2002], Ch.4) |
| 20748 | We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: We do not throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something is encountered as such, the thing in question has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.190-1), quoted by George Dickie - The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude 3 'Undoing' | |
| A reaction: Analytic philosophy and science have tried to dismantle experience, and Heidegger wants to put it back together. I would say there is a big difference between encountering a thing (which is a bit facty), and understanding it (which is more valuey). |
| 22166 | Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Because Dasein is lost in the 'they', it must first find itself. It must be 'shown' to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], II.2.54) | |
| A reaction: I wish there was some criterion for knowing when you are being yourself and when you are not. |
| 22165 | Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualised in individualisation. | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.40) | |
| A reaction: Is sounds like insecurity, as a sort of trauma that shocks one into self-realisation. The idea means very little to me personally. |
| 21952 | Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| Full Idea: For Heidegger, as a consequence of my anxiety in the face of death, I am set free to live my life as my own rather than doing things merely because others expect me to do them. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 7 | |
| A reaction: Contrary to Epicurus, Heidegger thinks anxiety about death is a good thing. The point is, I suppose, that we all die alone, and people who are very socially contrained need to face up to death in order to grasp their autonomy. |
| 22224 | Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| Full Idea: Anxiety [angst] is the disturbing sense of uncanniness by which Dasein is overtaken (thrownness) when it discovers there is nothing other than its own freedom to sustain its projects (projection), and from which Dasein constantly takes flight (falling). | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be Kierkegaard's idea, unamended. In my experience anxiety only comes when I am forced into making decisions by worldly situations. An 'existential crisis' is a sort of blankness appearing where a future life was supposed to be. |
| 15572 | Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger] |
| Full Idea: Dasein's Being-what-it-is (essentia) must .be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia). | |
| From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 67/42), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the origin of Sartre's famous slogan 'existence before essence'. It seems to be a rebellion against Husserl's quest for essences. |
| 20453 | Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley] |
| Full Idea: Heidegger says you must choose your hero; either you choose 'das Man', the inauthentic life, or you choose yourself - the point being that you have to choose yourself as your hero in order to be authentic. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Simon Critchley - Impossible Objects: interviews 5 | |
| A reaction: If Nietzsche's 'Ecce Homo' is the model for choosing yourself as hero, I am not too sure about this idea. Needing a hero seems awfully German and romantic. Ein Heldenleben. Be your own anit-hero (like a standup comedian)? |