5 ideas
| 15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs' |
| 18253 | I wish to go straight from cardinals to reals (as ratios), leaving out the rationals [Frege] |
| Full Idea: You need a double transition, from cardinal numbes (Anzahlen) to the rational numbers, and from the latter to the real numbers generally. I wish to go straight from the cardinal numbers to the real numbers as ratios of quantities. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Letters to Russell [1902], 1903.05.21), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics 21 'Frege's' | |
| A reaction: Note that Frege's real numbers are not quantities, but ratios of quantities. In this way the same real number can refer to lengths, masses, intensities etc. |
| 18166 | The loss of my Rule V seems to make foundations for arithmetic impossible [Frege] |
| Full Idea: With the loss of my Rule V, not only the foundations of arithmetic, but also the sole possible foundations of arithmetic, seem to vanish. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Letters to Russell [1902], 1902.06.22) | |
| A reaction: Obviously he was stressed, but did he really mean that there could be no foundation for arithmetic, suggesting that the subject might vanish into thin air? |
| 18269 | Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege] |
| Full Idea: How are we to conceive of logical objects? My only answer is, we conceive of them as extensions of concepts or, more generally, as ranges of values of functions ...what other way is there? | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Letters to Russell [1902], 1902.07.28), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 epigr | |
| A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of what Frege means by an 'object'. But an extension is a collection of things, so an object is a group treated as a unity, which is generally how we understand a 'set'. Hence Quine's ontology. |
| 22406 | The maximisation of happiness must be done fairly [Rawls, by Smart] |
| Full Idea: Rawls has suggested that we should maximise the general happiness only if we do so in a fair way. | |
| From: report of John Rawls (Justice as fairness: Political not Metaphysical [1958]) by J.J.C. Smart - Outline of a System of Utilitarianism 6 | |
| A reaction: Rawls is usually seen as an opponent of utilitarianism, but if we allow a few supplementary rules we can improve the theory. After all, it has a meta-rule that 'everybody counts as one'. What other supplementary values can there be? Honesty? |