57 ideas
22223 | Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
Full Idea: Being-in-the-world is a phenomenon of 'care' with a tripartite structure: a) projection towards its possibilities, b) thrownness among those possibilities, so Dasein is not free, and c) fallenness among worldly possibilities, to neglect of its own. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227 | |
A reaction: Sounds a bit Californian to me. Just living among the world's possibilities is evidently a bad thing, because you could be concentrating on yourself and your own development instead? |
22158 | Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: 'Phenomenology' can be formulated as 'To the things themselves!' It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings, and to conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated. It is opposed to traditiona' pseudo-problems. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro II.07) | |
A reaction: It sounds as if we are invited to look at the world the way a dog might look at it. I am not at all clear what it to be gained from this approach. |
15574 | 'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: Heidegger concludes that 'logos' essentially means 'making something manifest'. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 56/33) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§7 | |
A reaction: It would at least seem to involve revealing the truth of something, though truth doesn't seem to be central to Heidegger's thought. 'Logos' is often translated as 'an account', as well as a 'reason', so Heidegger may be right. |
15569 | Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: Heidegger is a relentless enemy of ahistorical, absolutist concepts of truth. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 1 | |
A reaction: I presume that if truth is not absolute then it must be relative, but Polt is a little coy about saying so. For me, anyone who says truth is relative doesn't understand the concept, and is talking about something else. |
18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Moral realism isn't realism about things, and it seems strange to suggest that moral realism is existence entailing in the way that realism about unobservable is. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: Cameron is questioning whether a realist has to believe in truthmakers. It seems to me that his doubts are because he insists that truthmaking is committed to the existence of 'things'. I assume any moral realism must supervene on nature. |
18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron] |
Full Idea: What possible reason could one have for thinking of some propositions that they need to be grounded in what there is that doesn't apply to all propositions? | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: Well, if truthmaking said that all truths are grounded, then some could be grounded in what there is, and others in how it is, or maybe even how it isn't (if you get a decent account of negative truths). |
18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Orthodox truthmaker theory (Armstrong's) entails Maximalism (that every true proposition has at least one truthmaker), and Necessitarianism (that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of its proposition). | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: I think I accept both of these. If you say only some truths have truthmakers, the other truths are then baffling. And how could a truthmaker fail in its job? But that doesn't necessitate the existence of the proposition. |
18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The truthmaker thought is that explanation only bottoms out at existence facts; for God to give a complete plan of the world He needs only make an inventory of what is to exist. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: He is defending Necessitarianism about truthmaking. I'm struggling with this. An inventory of the contents of my house doesn't begin to fix all the truths that arise from them. Why is Cameron so resistent to 'how' things are being part of the truthmaking? |
18879 | What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The explanation of the truth of the proposition [p] doesn't stop at it being the case that p, so it's false to claim that whenever a proposition is true it's true in virtue of the world being as the proposition says it is. The features often lie deeper. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Grounding') | |
A reaction: [He is opposing Jennifer Hornsby 2005] Cameron offers 'the average family has 2.4 children' as a counterexample' (since no one actually has 2.4 children). That seems compelling. Second example: 'the rose is beautiful'. |
18880 | Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Rivals to the truthmaker claim that facts about what there is are the truthmakers, there are theories that add facts about how the things are, or add dispositional facts, or modal facts, or haecceitistic facts, or maybe moral facts. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Grounding') | |
A reaction: [compressed] He seems to think his version has a monopoly on truthmaking, but I don't see why these other theories shouldn't count as truthmaking. The truthmaker for 'live grenades are dangerous' is not just the existence of grenades. |
18874 | Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron] |
Full Idea: It's definitely not sufficient to be a realist that one be a truthmaker theorist, since one can simply be anti-realist about the truthmakers. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: It is not quite clear how unreal truth makers could actually MAKE propositions true, rather than just being correlated with them. |
18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron] |
Full Idea: If negative truths don't have truthmakers then make no mistake: they are ungrounded. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: What would be the grounding for truths which expressed the necessary preconditions for all existence? Could 'nothing whatever exists' ever be a truth? |
18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron] |
Full Idea: I tend to think that the fundamental reason we can have the correspondence theory of truth is that truthmaker theory is correct. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: [This responds to Fumerton 2006, who gives the opposite view] Cameron gives himself the classic problem of spelling out the correspondence relation (perhaps as 'congruence'). I like truthmaking, but I'm unsure about correspondence. |
18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron] |
Full Idea: One view says truthmaker theory stands or falls with the correspondence theory of truth, because the truthmaker for p is just the portion of reality that p corresponds to: truthmaker and correspondence can be conversely defined. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: The normal view, which I prefer, is that correspondence is a particular theory of truthmaking, invoking a precise 'correspondence' relation. Hence abolishing correspondence would not abolish truthmaking, if you had a rival account. |
9944 | We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam] |
Full Idea: We seem to understand some statements about all sets (e.g. 'for every set x and every set y, there is a set z which is the union of x and y'). | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Mathematics without Foundations [1967], p.308) | |
A reaction: His example is the Axiom of Choice. Presumably this is why the collection of all sets must be referred to as a 'class', since we can talk about it, but cannot define it. |
9937 | I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam] |
Full Idea: I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations'. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Mathematics without Foundations [1967]) | |
A reaction: Agreed that mathematics can function well without foundations (given that the enterprise got started with no thought for such things), the ontology of the subject still strikes me as a major question, though maybe not for mathematicians. |
9939 | It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam] |
Full Idea: I believe that under certain circumstances revisions in the axioms of arithmetic, or even of the propositional calculus (e.g. the adoption of a modular logic as a way out of the difficulties in quantum mechanics), is fully conceivable. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Mathematics without Foundations [1967], p.303) | |
A reaction: One can change the axioms of a system without necessarily changing the system (by swapping an axiom and a theorem). Especially if platonism is true, since the eternal objects reside calmly above our attempts to axiomatise them! |
9940 | Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Mathematics might be 'empirical' in the sense that one is allowed to try to put alternatives into the field. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Mathematics without Foundations [1967], p.303) | |
A reaction: He admits that change is highly unlikely. It take hardcore Millian arithmetic to be only changeable if pebbles start behaving very differently with regard to their quantities, which appears to be almost inconceivable. |
9941 | Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Science demands much more of a mathematical theory than that it should merely be consistent, as the example of the various alternative systems of geometry dramatizes. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Mathematics without Foundations [1967]) | |
A reaction: Well said. I don't agree with Putnam's Indispensability claims, but if an apparent system of numbers or lines has no application to the world then I don't consider it to be mathematics. It is a new game, like chess. |
21897 | Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May] |
Full Idea: Continental philosophers, following Heidegger, see in the attempt to reduce the question of being to that of beings a symptom of an age that is too ready to accept the terms in which science conceives the world. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 1.04 | |
A reaction: Interesting. I take the idea that this is a failing of the modern age to be ridiculous, since I take it to be the key metaphysical move made by Aristotle. Neverthless, Aristotle is closely in tune with modern science. For 'beings', read 'objects'. |
15573 | For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: We are Dasein - the entity who possesses - as constitutive for its understanding of existence - an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 34/13), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§4 | |
A reaction: This seems to connect to the emerging 'externalist' view of mind that comes with the external view of content coming from Purnam's Twin Earth idea. |
9273 | Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray] |
Full Idea: Heidegger turns to 'Being' for the same reason that Christians turn to God - to affirm the unique place of humans in the world. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.4 | |
A reaction: This is the first remark I have encountered that makes sense of Heidegger's Being to me! It places Heidegger as a modernist philosopher, trying to grapple with the decline of religion. I'll stick with Bertrand Russell on that. |
22157 | Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro I.04) | |
A reaction: How do you distinguish the Being of normal humans from the Being of someone in a deep coma, who has no existential issues? Has that Dasein ceased to be? Why does angst create a new mode of Being, but flying doesn't? |
8137 | Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The formal existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole is: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6 41) | |
A reaction: If you find that thought really illuminating, you are probably on the wrong website. However, the thought that we exist 'ahead of ourselves' might be a fruitful line for existentialists to explore. |
21951 | In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: This being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of being of 'the others', in such a way, indeed, that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.164), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 5 | |
A reaction: He seems to be describing the psychology of someone who joins a small crowd which gradually increases in size. I take this relation to others to be the basic existential dilemma, of retaining individual authenticity within a community. |
20745 | 'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: When we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein' we are expressing not its 'what' (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but its being. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.297), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 2 'Phenomenology' | |
A reaction: Presumably analytic discussions of persons try to be too objective. Heidegger is trying to capture the thought at the heart of Kierkegaard's existentialism. Objectivity and subjectivity are never in conflict. Is there really a different mode of existence? |
8134 | The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Heidegger borrows a common German word 'dasein', meaning 'being' or 'existence', to refer both to 'the manner of Being which... man... possesses', and to the creature which possesses it. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.32) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This just strikes me as an elementary ontological mistake. Because something has startling properties it doesn't follow that we have a different type of Being. Magnets don't have a different type of being from ordinary iron. |
8135 | 'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: We each of us not only have Dasein (our kind of Being), but we can lay claim to it. Also the Dasein of a thing 'is an issue for it' - we care about the kinds of creatures we can make ourselves into. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.67) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Heidegger says other more puzzling things about Dasein. The second half of the idea is what makes Heidegger an existentialist, and an inspiration for Sartre. |
21948 | Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which, in its very being, comports itself understandingly towards that being. ...Mineness belongs to an existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.78), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1 | |
A reaction: He might eventually persuade me that Dasein is so different from mere material being that it deserves a category of its own. But a reductive account of mind is also a reductive account of being. |
7680 | Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Ontology is possible only as phenomenology. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.31), quoted by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Jacquette argues against this claim. The idea seems to be the ultimate extension of Kant, and it is not a big move to say that the only real phenomenology we can discuss is our semantics. Wrong, wrong, wrong. |
18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The analytic commitment of realism is that truths are grounded in the world. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Grounding') | |
A reaction: Certain fifth-level truths might be a long way from the actual world, and deeply interfused with human concepts and theories. Negative truths must be fitted into this picture. |
18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Realism about a discourse is 1) to think that the sentences are, when construed literally, literally true or false, and 2) to think that some of the sentences of the discourse are non-vacuously true. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: [Cameron adds 'non-vacuously' to an idea of Sayre-McCord 199 p.5] This is realism based on what is 'true', without specifying 'commitments', so I like it. Cameron says it makes mathematical postulationists into realists. He likes 'mind-independent'. |
18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron] |
Full Idea: All that is necessary for realism, I claim, is that truth is grounded in mind-independent features of fundamental reality. Truthmaker theory comes into play because it is a theory about what those features are (…so it isn't a commitment to realism). | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: [He cites Michael Devitt for this approach] What is the word 'fundamental' doing here? Because the mind-dependent parts of reality are considered non-fundamental? The no-true-Scotsman-hates-whisky move? His truthmaking is committed to 'things'. |
22161 | Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in themselves' are defined ontologico-categorially. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15) | |
A reaction: I assume this is a direct reference to the problem idealists had with the thing-in-itself. It seems that the reality of a thing consists of the strengthened relationship it has with Dasein, which sounds fairly idealist to me. |
9943 | You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Surely the mere fact that we may never know whether the continuum hypothesis is true or false is by itself just no reason to think that it doesn't have a truth value! | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Mathematics without Foundations [1967]) | |
A reaction: This is Putnam in 1967. Things changed later. Personally I am with the younger man all they way, but I reserve the right to totally change my mind. |
15576 | Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: Heidegger tries to develop a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' ('wesen' as a verb). | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§25-7 |
18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron] |
Full Idea: I think we should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: An interesting passing remark. Presumably there would be unknowable truths about such worlds, which wouldn't bother a full-blooded realist. Indiscernible to whom? Me? Humanity? A divine mind? |
15578 | Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: Propositions are not a good clue to the essence of understanding, because we must already understand things before we formulate propositions about them. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.31) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3 | |
A reaction: I like this, because I think the most important aspects of our thought and understanding are entirely non-verbal - even in cases where they seem to be highly specific and verbal. We don't understand ourselves at all! |
22159 | If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: One of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an 'I' or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.1.10) | |
A reaction: Descartes had thrown doubt on the informativeness of the phenomena, so presumably your phenomenologist is not interested in whether they reveal any truth. So why are unreliable phenomena of any interest? |
22160 | Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The less we stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become. ...The kind of Being which equipment possesses... we call 'readiness-to-hand' [Zuhandenheit]. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15) | |
A reaction: This example would be well at home in the writings of the pragmatists. It is also an important example for existentialists. In analytic philosophy we might say the experience combines perception with direct exerience of causation. |
15580 | There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: We always take a noise as the sound of something; we always take a hue as the color of something. We simply do not experience raw, uninterpreted sense-data - these are the inventions of philosophers. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 207/163-4), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3 | |
A reaction: This is something like the modern view of sense-data as promoted by John McDowell, rather than the experiential atoms of Russell and Moore. Experience is holistic, but that doesn't mean we can't analyse it into components. |
20749 | Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The perceptual 'something' is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a 'field'. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.4), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 3 'Perceptual' | |
A reaction: Sounds like our knowledge of electrons. Nice point. Standard analytic discussions of perceiving a glass always treat it in isolation, when it is on an expensive table near a brandy bottle. Or near a hammer. |
22163 | The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof [of external things] has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. ...The kind of Being of the entity which does the proving has not been made definite enough. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.43a) | |
A reaction: The 'scandal' was a remark of Kant's. Presumably Heidegger's exploration of Dasein aims to establish the Being of the prover sufficiently to solve this problem (via phenomenology). |
21949 | Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
Full Idea: Heidegger argues that having thoughts and feelings is only possible for entity that is actually engaged in the world. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1 | |
A reaction: This seems to be an a priori exclusion of the possibility of a brain in a vat. I guess the ancestor of this idea is Schopenhauer. |
22222 | Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
Full Idea: The world is a world shared with others, so that far from being a solipsistic ego ...Dasein finds itself already amongst others. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.226 | |
A reaction: Phenomenologists don't seem bothered about the problem of knowing other minds. If you take something for granted, it ceases to be a problem to be solved! |
8136 | If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: How do I know that other people have minds? The question is a bad one. Precisely because I encounter them at work, play and the like, it is guaranteed that they, too, are Dasein, intelligent agents. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.153-) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3 | |
A reaction: I've seen film of someone playing peek-a-boo with a bonobo ape, so presumably they have Dasein. It might be easier for the AI community to aim at building a robot with Dasein, than one which was simply conscious. |
22164 | When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.2.13) | |
A reaction: This is the first plausible fruit of phenomenology I have been able to discover. Analysing the passive mind is not very promising, but seeing what happens when we become more proactive is revealing. |
22162 | There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The self of everyday Dasein is the they-self [das Man-selbst], which we distinguish from the authentic self - that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27) | |
A reaction: To a novice this sounds like a requirement for increased self-consciousness during daily activity. 'Be a good animal, true to your animal self' said one of Lawrence's characters. |
20114 | Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Everyone is other, and no one is himself. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.165), quoted by Rüdiger Safranski - Nietzsche: a philosophical biography 09 | |
A reaction: Safranski describes this as the idea of 'structural self-evasion'. He detects the same idea in Nietzsche's 'Daybreak'. |
15577 | Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: For Heidegger moods are disclosive; they show us things in a more fundamental way than theoretical propositions ever can. For example, fear reveals something as a threat. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.30) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§30 | |
A reaction: Most modern students of emotion seem to agree. Even though they may not have specific content, it is always possible to consider the underlying cause of the mood. |
20748 | We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: We do not throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something is encountered as such, the thing in question has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.190-1), quoted by George Dickie - The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude 3 'Undoing' | |
A reaction: Analytic philosophy and science have tried to dismantle experience, and Heidegger wants to put it back together. I would say there is a big difference between encountering a thing (which is a bit facty), and understanding it (which is more valuey). |
22166 | Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Because Dasein is lost in the 'they', it must first find itself. It must be 'shown' to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], II.2.54) | |
A reaction: I wish there was some criterion for knowing when you are being yourself and when you are not. |
22165 | Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualised in individualisation. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.40) | |
A reaction: Is sounds like insecurity, as a sort of trauma that shocks one into self-realisation. The idea means very little to me personally. |
21952 | Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
Full Idea: For Heidegger, as a consequence of my anxiety in the face of death, I am set free to live my life as my own rather than doing things merely because others expect me to do them. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 7 | |
A reaction: Contrary to Epicurus, Heidegger thinks anxiety about death is a good thing. The point is, I suppose, that we all die alone, and people who are very socially contrained need to face up to death in order to grasp their autonomy. |
22224 | Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
Full Idea: Anxiety [angst] is the disturbing sense of uncanniness by which Dasein is overtaken (thrownness) when it discovers there is nothing other than its own freedom to sustain its projects (projection), and from which Dasein constantly takes flight (falling). | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227 | |
A reaction: This seems to be Kierkegaard's idea, unamended. In my experience anxiety only comes when I am forced into making decisions by worldly situations. An 'existential crisis' is a sort of blankness appearing where a future life was supposed to be. |
15572 | Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Dasein's Being-what-it-is (essentia) must….be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia). | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 67/42), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the origin of Sartre's famous slogan 'existence before essence'. It seems to be a rebellion against Husserl's quest for essences. |
20453 | Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: Heidegger says you must choose your hero; either you choose 'das Man', the inauthentic life, or you choose yourself - the point being that you have to choose yourself as your hero in order to be authentic. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Simon Critchley - Impossible Objects: interviews 5 | |
A reaction: If Nietzsche's 'Ecce Homo' is the model for choosing yourself as hero, I am not too sure about this idea. Needing a hero seems awfully German and romantic. Ein Heldenleben. Be your own anit-hero (like a standup comedian)? |