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6862
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Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson]
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Full Idea:
Fuzzy logic is based on a continuum of degrees of truth, but it is committed to the idea that it is half-true that one identical twin is tall and the other twin is not, even though they are the same height.
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From:
Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.154)
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A reaction:
Maybe to be shocked by a contradiction is missing the point of fuzzy logic? Half full is the same as half empty. The logic does not say the twins are different, because it is half-true that they are both tall, and half-true that they both aren't.
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6861
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What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
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Full Idea:
The problem of vagueness is the problem of what logic is correct for vague concepts, and correspondingly what notions of truth and falsity are applicable to vague statements (does one need a continuum of degrees of truth, for example?).
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From:
Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.153)
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A reaction:
This certainly makes vagueness sound like one of the most interesting problems in all of philosophy, though also one of the most difficult. Williamson's solution is that we may be vague, but the world isn't.
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6860
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How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson]
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Full Idea:
If one takes a spectrum of colours from yellow to red, it might be that given a series of colour samples along that spectrum, each sample is indiscriminable by the naked eye from the next one, though samples at either end are blatantly different.
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From:
Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.151)
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A reaction:
This seems like a nice variant of the Sorites paradox (Idea 6008). One could demonstrate it with just three samples, where A and C seemed different from each other, but other comparisons didn't.
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8430
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Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
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Full Idea:
The function of causal statements is 1) to explain events, 2) for predictive usefulness, 3) to help control events, 4) with agents, to attribute moral responsibility, 5) in physical theory. We should judge causal theories by how they account for these.
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From:
Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.207)
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A reaction:
He suggests that Lewis's counterfactual theory won't do well on this test. I think the first one is what matters. Philosophy aims to understand, and that is achieved through explanation. Regularity and counterfactual theories explain very little.
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8429
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Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
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Full Idea:
Counterfactuals can express 'analytical' dependency, or the fact that one event is part of another, or an action done by doing another, or (most interestingly) an event can determine another without causally determining it.
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From:
Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205)
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A reaction:
[Kim gives example of each case] Counterfactuals can even express a relation that involves no dependency. Or they might just involve redescription, as in 'If Scott were still alive, then the author of "Waverley" would be too'.
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4781
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Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]
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Full Idea:
Kim gives a range of examples of counterfactual dependence without causation, as: 'if yesterday wasn't Monday, today wouldn't be Tuesday', and 'if my sister had not given birth, I would not be an uncle'.
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From:
report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §3.3
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A reaction:
This is aimed at David Lewis. The objection seems like commonsense. "If you blink, the cat gets it". Causal claims involve counterfactuals, but they are not definitive of what causation is.
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