54 ideas
21360 | Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Those whom devotion to abstract discussions has rendered unobservant of the facts are too ready to dogmatise on the basis of a few observations. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 316a09) | |
A reaction: I totally approve of the idea that a good philosopher should be 'observant'. Prestige in modern analytic philosophy comes from logical ability. There should be some rival criterion for attentiveness to facts, with equal prestige. |
15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs' |
15413 | With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Fand P as 'will' and 'was', G as 'always going to be', H as 'always has been', all tenses reduce to 14 cases: the past series, each implying the next, FH,H,PH,HP,P,GP, and the future series PG,G,FG,GF,F,HF, plus GH=HG implying all, FP=PF which all imply. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.8) | |
A reaction: I have tried to translate the fourteen into English, but am not quite confident enough to publish them here. I leave it as an exercise for the reader. |
15415 | The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess] |
Full Idea: In temporal logic, if the converse Barcan formula holds then nothing goes out of existence, and the direct Barcan formula holds if nothing ever comes into existence. These results highlight the intuitive absurdity of the Barcan formulas. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.9) | |
A reaction: This is my reaction to the modal cases as well - the absurdity of thinking that no actually nonexistent thing might possibly have existed, or that the actual existents might not have existed. Williamson seems to be the biggest friend of the formulas. |
15430 | Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess] |
Full Idea: From one point of view intuitionistic logic is a part of classical logic, missing one axiom, from another classical logic is a part of intuitionistic logic, missing two connectives, intuitionistic v and → | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 6.4) |
15431 | It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The question of the completeness of the full intuitionistic logic for its intended interpretation is not yet fully resolved. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 6.9) |
15429 | Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The relevantist logician's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason'. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.8) |
15404 | Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Among the more technically oriented a 'logic' no longer means a theory about which forms of argument are valid, but rather means any formalism, regardless of its applications, that resembles original logic enough to be studied by similar methods. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], Pref) | |
A reaction: There doesn't seem to be any great intellectual obligation to be 'technical'. As far as pure logic is concerned, I am very drawn to the computer approach, since I take that to be the original dream of Aristotle and Leibniz - impersonal precision. |
15405 | Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess] |
Full Idea: There are topics of great philosophical interest that classical logic neglects because they are not important to mathematics. …These include distinctions of past, present and future, or of necessary, actual and possible. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.1) |
15427 | The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The Cut rule (from A|-B and B|-C, infer A|-C) directly expresses the classical doctrine that entailment is transitive. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.3) |
15421 | Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Classical logic neglects counterfactual conditionals for the same reason it neglects temporal and modal distinctions, namely, that they play no serious role in mathematics. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Science obviously needs counterfactuals, and metaphysics needs modality. Maybe so-called 'classical' logic will be renamed 'basic mathematical logic'. Philosophy will become a lot clearer when that happens. |
15403 | Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, a technical subject. …Its centre of gravity today lies in theoretical computer science. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], Pref) | |
A reaction: He firmly distinguishes it from 'philosophy of logic', but doesn't spell it out. I take it that philosophical logic concerns metaprinciples which compare logical systems, and suggest new lines of research. Philosophy of logic seems more like metaphysics. |
15407 | Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess] |
Full Idea: When formalising arguments it is convenient to have as many connectives as possible available.; but when proving results about formulas it is convenient to have as few as possible. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Illuminating. The fact that you can whittle classical logic down to two (or even fewer!) connectives warms the heart of technicians, but makes connection to real life much more difficult. Hence a bunch of extras get added. |
15424 | Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Gricean implicature theory might suggest that a disjunction is never assertable when a disjunct is (though actually the disjunction might be 'pertinent') - but the procedure is indispensable in mathematical practice. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.2) | |
A reaction: He gives an example of a proof in maths which needs it, and an unusual conversational occasion where it makes sense. |
15409 | All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess] |
Full Idea: All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.7) |
15414 | The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess] |
Full Idea: By contrast to rigidly designating proper names, …the denotation of definite descriptions is (in general) not rigid but flexible. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.9) | |
A reaction: This modern way of putting it greatly clarifies why Russell was interested in the type of reference involved in definite descriptions. Obviously some descriptions (such as 'the only person who could ever have…') might be rigid. |
15406 | 'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess] |
Full Idea: There are atomic formulas, and formulas built from the connectives, and that is all. We show that all formulas have some property, first for the atomics, then the others. This proof is 'induction on complexity'; we also use 'recursion on complexity'. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: That is: 'induction on complexity' builds a proof from atomics, via connectives; 'recursion on complexity' breaks down to the atomics, also via the connectives. You prove something by showing it is rooted in simple truths. |
15425 | The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess] |
Full Idea: It might be wondered how one could have any kind of proof procedure at all if transitivity of entailment is disallowed, but the sequent calculus can get around the difficulty. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.3) | |
A reaction: He gives examples where transitivity of entailment (so that you can build endless chains of deductions) might fail. This is the point of the 'cut free' version of sequent calculus, since the cut rule allows transitivity. |
15426 | We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Instead of demonstrations which are either axioms, or follow from axioms by rules, we can have one ever-growing sequence of formulas of the form 'Axioms |- ______', where the blank is filled by Axioms, then Lemmas, then Theorems, then Corollaries. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.3) |
15408 | 'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The valid formulas of classical sentential logic are called 'tautologically valid', or simply 'tautologies'; with other logics 'tautologies' are formulas that are substitution instances of valid formulas of classical sentential logic. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.5) |
15418 | Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Validity (truth by virtue of logical form alone) and demonstrability (provability by virtue of logical form alone) have correlative notions of logical possibility, 'satisfiability' and 'consistency', which come apart in some logics. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.3) |
15412 | Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Models generally deliberately leave out meaning, retaining only what is important for the determination of truth values. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: This is the key point to hang on to, if you are to avoid confusing mathematical models with models of things in the real world. |
15411 | We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess] |
Full Idea: In practice there is no need to consider any but mathematical models, models whose universes consist of mathematical objects, since every model is isomorphic to one of these. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.8) | |
A reaction: The crucial link is the technique of Gödel Numbering, which can translate any verbal formula into numerical form. He adds that, because of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem only subsets of the natural numbers need be considered. |
15416 | We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The aim in setting up a model theory is that the technical notion of truth in all models should agree with the intuitive notion of truth in all instances. A model is supposed to represent everything about an instance that matters for its truth. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.2) |
15428 | The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess] |
Full Idea: It is a common view that the liar sentence ('This very sentence is not true') is an instance of a truth-value gap (neither true nor false), but some dialethists cite it as an example of a truth-value glut (both true and false). | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.7) | |
A reaction: The defence of the glut view must be that it is true, then it is false, then it is true... Could it manage both at once? |
13212 | Infinity is only potential, never actual [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nothing is actually infinite. A thing is infinite only potentially. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 318a21) | |
A reaction: Aristotle is the famous spokesman for this view, though it reappeared somewhat in early twentieth century discussions (e.g. Hilbert). I sympathise with this unfashionable view. Multiple infinites are good fun, but no one knows what they really are. |
13221 | Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some things are-potentially while others are-actually. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 327b24) | |
A reaction: I've read a lot of Aristotle, but am still not quite clear what this distinction means. I like the distinction between a thing's actual being and its 'modal profile', but the latter may extend well beyond what Aristotle means by potential being. |
16100 | True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In that which underlies a change there is a factor corresponding to the definition [logon] and there is a material factor. When a change is in these constitutive factors there is coming to be or passing away, but in a thing's qualities it is alteration. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 317a24) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a key summary of Aristotle's account of change, in the context of his hylomorphism (form-plus-matter). The logos is the account of the thing, which seems to be the definition, which seems to give the form (principle or structure). |
16101 | A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: When a change occurs in the qualities [pathesi] and is accidental [sumbebekos], there is alteration (rather than true change). | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 317a27) | |
A reaction: [tr. partly Gill] Aristotle doesn't seem to have a notion of 'properties' in quite our sense. 'Pathe' seems to mean experienced qualities, rather than genuine causal powers. Gill says 'pathe' are always accidental. |
12133 | If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Since we must distinguish the substratum and the property whose nature is to be predicated of the substratum,..there is alteration when the substratum persists...but when nothing perceptible persists as a substratum, this is coming-to-be and passing-away. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 319b08-16) | |
A reaction: As usual, Aristotle clarifies the basis of the problem, by distinguishing two different types of change. Notice the empirical character of his approach, resting on whether or not the substratum is 'perceptible'. |
13213 | All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Every coming-to-be is a passing away of something else and every passing-away some other thing's coming-to-be. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 319a07) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the closest that Aristotle gets to sympathy with the Heraclitus view that all is flux. When a sparrow dies and disappears, I am not at all clear what comes to be, except some ex-sparrow material. |
12134 | Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Matter, in the proper sense of the term, is to be identified with the substratum which is receptive of coming-to-be and passing-away; but the substratum of the remaining kinds of change is also matter, because these substrata receive contraries. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 320a03) | |
A reaction: This must be compared with his complex discussion of the role of matter in his Metaphysics, where he has introduced 'form' as the essence of things. I don't think the two texts are inconsistent, but it's tricky... See Idea 12133 on types of change. |
16572 | Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The question might be raised whether substance (i.e. the 'this') comes-to-be at all. Is it not rather the 'such', the 'so-great', or the 'somewhere', which comes-to-be? | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 317b21) | |
A reaction: This is interesting because it pulls the 'tode ti', the 'this-such', apart, showing that he does have a concept of a pure 'this', which seems to constitute the basis of being ('ousia'). We can say 'this thing', or 'one of these things'. |
16573 | Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In addition, coming-to-be may proceed out of nothing pre-existing - a thesis which, more than any other, preoccupied and alarmed the earliest philosophers. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 317b29) | |
A reaction: This is the origin of the worry about 'ex nihilo' coming-to-be. Christians tended to say that only God could create in this way. |
13214 | The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The substratum [hupokeimenon?] is the material cause of the continuous occurrence of coming-to-be, because it is such as to change from contrary to contrary. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 319a19) | |
A reaction: Presumably Aristotle will also be seeking the 'formal' cause as well as the 'material' cause (not to mention the 'efficient' and 'final' causes). |
13215 | If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is 'alteration' when the substratum is perceptible and persists, but changes in its own properties. ...But when nothing perceptible persists in its identity as a substratum, and the thing changes as a whole, it is coming-to-be of a substance. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 319b11-17) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Note that a substratum can be perceptible - it isn't just some hidden mystical I-know-not-what (as Locke calls it). This whole text is a wonderful source on the subject of physical change. Note too the reliance on what is perceptible. |
15420 | De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess] |
Full Idea: There is a problem over 'de re' modality (as contrasted with 'de dicto'), as in ∃x□x. What is meant by '"it is analytic that Px" is satisfied by a', given that analyticity is a notion that in the first instance applies to complete sentences? | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.9) | |
A reaction: This is Burgess's summary of one of Quine's original objections. The issue may be a distinction between whether the sentence is analytic, and what makes it analytic. The necessity of bachelors being unmarried makes that sentence analytic. |
15419 | General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess] |
Full Idea: To the extent that there is any conventional wisdom about the question, it is that S5 is correct for alethic logical modality, and S4 correct for apodictic logical modality. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.8) | |
A reaction: In classical logic these coincide, so presumably one should use the minimum system to do the job, which is S4 (?). |
15417 | Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Logical necessity is a genus with two species. For classical logic the truth-related notion of validity and the proof-related notion of demonstrability, coincide - but they are distinct concept. In some logics they come apart, in intension and extension. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.3) | |
A reaction: They coincide in classical logic because it is sound and complete. This strikes me as the correct approach to logical necessity, tying it to the actual nature of logic, rather than some handwavy notion of just 'true in all possible worlds'. |
15422 | Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Three main theories of the truth of indicative conditionals are Materialism (the conditions are the same as for the material conditional), Idealism (identifying assertability with truth-value), and Nihilism (no truth, just assertability). | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 4.3) |
15423 | It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess] |
Full Idea: It is contentious whether conditionals have negations, and whether 'it is not the case that if A,B' has any clear meaning. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 4.9) | |
A reaction: This seems to be connected to Lewis's proof that a probability conditional cannot be reduced to a single proposition. If a conditional only applies to A-worlds, it is not surprising that its meaning gets lost when it leaves that world. |
16717 | Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What sorts of contrarities, and how many of them, are to be accounted 'originative sources' of body? | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 329b04) | |
A reaction: Pasnau says these pages of Aristotle are the source of the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. Essentially, hot, cold, wet and dry are his four primary qualities. |
13216 | Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The matter is that of which points and lines are limits, and it is something that can never exist without quality and without form. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 320b16) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a contradiction here somewhere. Matter has to be substantial enough to have a form, and yet seems to be the collective 'limit' of the points and lines. I wonder what 'limit' is translating? Sounds a bit too modern. |
17994 | The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We must reckon as an 'orginal source' and as 'primary' the matter which underlies, though it is inseparable from the contrary qualities: for 'the hot' is not matter for 'the cold' nor 'cold' for 'hot', but the substratum is matter for them both. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 329a30) | |
A reaction: A much discussed passage. |
13224 | There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: No one supposes a single 'element' to persist, as the basis of all, in such a way that it is Water as well as Air (or any other element) at the same time. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 332a09) | |
A reaction: Of course, we now think that oxygen is a key part of both water and of air, but Aristotle's basic argument still seems right. How could multiplicity be explained by a simply unity? The One is cool, but explains nothing. |
16594 | The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: These bodies (Fire, Water and the like) change into one another (and are not immutable as Empedocles and other thinkers assert, since 'alteration' would then have been impossible). | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 329b1) | |
A reaction: This is why Aristotle proposes that matter [hule] underlies the four elements. Gill argues that by matter Aristotle means the elements. |
13223 | Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The four couples of elementary qualities attach themselves to the apparently 'simple' bodies (Fire, Air, Earth, Water). Fire is hot and dry, whereas Air is hot and moist (being a sort of aqueous vapour); Water is cold and moist, and Earth is cold and dry. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 330b02) | |
A reaction: This is the traditional framework accepted throughout the middle ages, and which had a huge influence on medicine. It all looks rather implausible now. Aristotle was a genius, but not critical enough about evidence. |
13220 | Bodies are endlessly divisible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Bodies are divisible through and through. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 326b27) | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle's flat rejection of atomism, arrived at after several sustained discussions, in this text and elsewhere. I don't think we are in a position to say that Aristotle is wrong. |
13210 | Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If having divided a piece of wood I put it together, it is equal to what it was and is one. This is so whatever the point at which I cut the wood. The wood is therefore divided potentially through and through. So what is in the wood besides the division? | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 316b11) | |
A reaction: Part of a very nice discussion of the implications of the thought experiment of cutting something 'through and through'. It seems to me that the arguments are still relevant, in the age of quarks, electrons and strings. |
13211 | If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Dividing a body at all points might actually occur, so the body will be both actually indivisible and potentially divided. Then nothing will remain and the body passes into what is incorporeal. So it might be reassembled out of points, or out of nothing. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 316b24) | |
A reaction: [a bit compressed] This sounds like an argument in favour of atomism, but Aristotle was opposed to that view. He is aware of the contradictions that seem to emerge with infinite division. Graham Priest is interesting on the topic. |
13228 | There is no time without movement [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There can be no time without movement. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 337a24) | |
A reaction: See Shoemaker's nice thought experiment as a challenge to this. Intuition seems to cry out that if movement stopped for a moment, that would not stop time, even though there was no way to measure its passing. |
16595 | If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If some one of the things 'which are' is constantly disappearing, why has not the whole of 'what is' been used up long ago and vanished away - assuming of course that the material of all the several comings-to-be was infinite? | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 318a17) | |
A reaction: This thought is the basis of Aquinas's Third Way for proving the existence of God (as the force which prevents the vicissitudes of nature from sliding into oblivion). |
13227 | Being is better than not-being [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Being is better than not-being. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 336b29) | |
A reaction: [see also Metaphysics 1017a07 ff, says the note] This peculiar assumption is at the heart of the ontological argument. Is the existence of the plague bacterium, or of Satan, or of mass-murderers, superior? |
13226 | An Order controls all things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There is an Order controlling all things. | |
From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 336b13) | |
A reaction: Presumably the translator provides the capital letter. How do we get from 'there is an order in all things' to 'there is an order which controls all things'? |