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All the ideas for 'The Origin of the Work of Art', 'works' and 'Propositions'

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
15585 Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs'
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
3340 Von Neumann defines each number as the set of all smaller numbers [Neumann, by Blackburn]
     Full Idea: Von Neumann defines each number as the set of all smaller numbers.
     From: report of John von Neumann (works [1935]) by Simon Blackburn - Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy p.280
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
3355 Von Neumann wanted mathematical functions to replace sets [Neumann, by Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: Von Neumann suggested that functions be pressed into service to replace sets.
     From: report of John von Neumann (works [1935]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.23
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
9455 Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]
     Full Idea: Some say that proper names have no descriptive content, but others think that although a name does not have the right sort of descriptive content which fixes a unique referent, it has a content which fixes the sort or category to which it belongs.
     From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §7)
     A reaction: Presumably 'Mary', and 'Felix', and 'Rover', and 'Smallville' are cases in point. There is a well known journalist called 'Manchester', a famous man called 'Hilary', a village in Hertfordshire called 'Matching Tie'... Interesting, though.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
9454 The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
     Full Idea: The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's, ...of which to many Frege's is the most intuitive of the four. Frege says they refer to the unique item (if it exists) which satisfies the predicate.
     From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §5)
     A reaction: He doesn't expound the other three, but I record this a corrective to the view that Russell has the only game in town.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
22716 Von Neumann defined ordinals as the set of all smaller ordinals [Neumann, by Poundstone]
     Full Idea: At age twenty, Von Neumann devised the formal definition of ordinal numbers that is used today: an ordinal number is the set of all smaller ordinal numbers.
     From: report of John von Neumann (works [1935]) by William Poundstone - Prisoner's Dilemma 02 'Sturm'
     A reaction: I take this to be an example of an impredicative definition (not predicating something new), because it uses 'ordinal number' in the definition of ordinal number. I'm guessing the null set gets us started.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
9453 Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
     Full Idea: The propositions behind 'Cicero is emulated more than Tully' seems to differ somehow from 'Tully is emulated more than Cicero', despite the proper names being rigid designators.
     From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §1)
     A reaction: Interesting, because this isn't a directly propositional attitude situation like 'believes', though it depends on such things. Bealer says this is a key modern difficulty with propositions.
9452 Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
     Full Idea: The reductionist view of propositions sees them as either extensional functions from possible worlds to truth values, or as ordered sets of properties, relations, and perhaps particulars.
     From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §1)
     A reaction: The usual problem of all functional accounts is 'what is it about x that enables it to have that function?' And if they are sets, where does the ordering come in? A proposition isn't just a list of items in some particular order. Both wrong.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
9451 Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]
     Full Idea: Philosophers have been skeptical about abstract objects, and so have been skeptical about propositions,..but with the rise of modal logic and metaphysics, and cognitive science's realism about intentional states, traditional propositions are now dominant.
     From: George Bealer (Propositions [1998], §1)
     A reaction: I personally strongly favour belief in propositions as brain states, which don't need a bizarre ontological status, but are essential to explain language, reasoning and communication.