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All the ideas for 'The Origin of the Work of Art', 'An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev)' and 'Thus Spake Zarathustra'

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56 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
But what is the reasoning of the body, that it requires the wisdom you seek? [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom. For who knows for what purpose your body requires precisely your best wisdom?
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.05)
     A reaction: Lovely question. For years I've paid lip-service to wisdom as the rough aim of all philosophy. Not quite knowing what wisdom is doesn't bother me, but knowing why I want wisdom certainly does, especially after this idea.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt]
     Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science.
     From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs'
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Reject wisdom that lacks laughter [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Let that wisdom be false to us that brought no laughter with it!
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 3.12.23)
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
To love truth, you must know how to lie [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Inability to lie is far from being love of truth. ....He who cannot lie does not know what truth is.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.13.9)
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Behind your thoughts and feelings stands a powerful commander, an unknown wise man - he is called a self. He lives in your body; he is your body.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], I.4), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 5 'Creature'
     A reaction: I find Nietzsche's view of the self very congenial, though I tend to see the self as certain central functions of the brain. The brain is enmeshed in the body (as in the location of pains).
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
Forget the word 'I'; 'I' is performed by the intelligence of your body [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: You say 'I' and you are proud of this word. But greater than this - although you will not believe in it - is your body and its great intelligence, which does not say 'I' but performs 'I'.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.05)
     A reaction: I'm not sure if I understand this, but I offer it as a candidate for the most profound idea ever articulated about personal identity.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is constantly frustrated by the past [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Powerless against that which has been done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past. The will cannot will backwards; that it cannot break time and time's desire - that is the will's most lonely affliction.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 2.20)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
We created meanings, to maintain ourselves [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Man first implanted values into things to maintain himself - he first created the meaning of things, a human meaning!
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.16)
     A reaction: It is certainly hard to see anything resembling values or meaning in the cosmos, if you remove the human beings. We should expect an evolutionary grounding in their explanation.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
The noble man wants new virtues; the good man preserves what is old [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The noble man wants to create new things and a new virtue. The good man wants the old things and that the old things shall be preserved.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.09)
     A reaction: There is a limit to how many plausible virtues the noble men can come up with. We may already have run out. Are we going to have to re-run the Iliad?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
We only really love children and work [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: One loves from the very heart only one's child and one's work.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 3.03)
     A reaction: Very Nietzchean (and masculine?) to cite one's work. Rachmaninov said he was 85% musician and 15% human being, so I guess he loved music from the very heart.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
I want my work, not happiness! [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Do I aspire after happiness? I aspire after my work!
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.20)
     A reaction: I empathise with aspiring to do something, rather than be something. But what do we wish for our children? Happiness first, then achievement?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Virtues can destroy one another, through jealousy [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Every virtue is jealous of the others, and jealousy is a terrible thing. Even virtues can be destroyed through jealousy.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.07)
     A reaction: How much more subtle and plausible than the picture of accumulating virtues, like medals! Zarathustra says it is best to have just one virtue.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
People now find both wealth and poverty too much of a burden [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Nobody grows rich or poor any more: both are too much of a burden.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.01)
     A reaction: True. Most people I know are just puzzled by people who actually seem to want to be extremely wealthy.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
If you want friends, you must be a fighter [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: If you want a friend, you must be willing to wage war for him: and to wage war, you must be capable of being an enemy.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.15)
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
The greatest experience possible is contempt for your own happiness, reason and virtue [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: What is the greatest thing you can experience? It is the hour of the great contempt. The hour in which even your happiness grows loathsome to you, and your reason and your virtue also.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.01)
     A reaction: This would be a transient state for Nietzsche, in which you realise the hollowness of those traditional ideas, and begin to seek something else.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: We must agree with Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau that nothing genuinely worthy of being called a state of nature will, at least in the long term, be a condition in which human beings can flourish.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Conc')
     A reaction: Given our highly encultured concept of modern flourishing, that is obviously right. There may be another reality where hom sap flourishes in a quite different and much simpler way. Education as personal, not institutional?
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Love, or at least affection, not justice, is the first virtue of the family. Should mutual affection also be the first virtue of social and political institutions?
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 6 'Transcending')
     A reaction: Surely this ideal should be at the heart of any society, no matter how far away from the ideal it is pushed by events and failures of character? I take 'respect' to be the form of love we feel for strangers.
An enduring people needs its own individual values [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: No people could live without evaluating; but if it wishes to maintain itself it must not evaluate as its neighbour evaluates.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.16)
     A reaction: Political philosophers say plenty about a 'people', but little about what unifies them, or about what keeps one people distinct from another. Most people's are proud of their local values.
Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: We need to distinguish between individual and collective rationality. Collective rationality is what is best for each individual, on the assumption that everyone else will act the same way.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Hobbes')
     A reaction: Wolff is surmising what lies behind Hobbes's Laws of Nature (which concern collective rationality). The Prisoner's Dilemma is the dramatisation of this distinction. I would making the teaching of the distinction compulsory in schools.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: On the utilitarian account the state is justified if and only if it produces more happiness than any alternative. Whether we consent to the state is irrelevant.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Intro')
     A reaction: The paternalistic character of utilitarianism is a familiar problem. I quite like this approach, even though liberals will find it a bit naughty. We make children go to school, for their own good. Experts endorse society, even when citizens don't.
Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Social contract theory ...satisfies the twin demands of universalism - every person must be obligated - and voluntarism - political obligations can come into existence only through consent.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Voluntaristic')
     A reaction: I'm going off the idea that being a member of large society is voluntary. It can't possibly be so for most people, and it shouldn't be. I'm British, and society expects me to remain so (though they might release me, if convenient).
Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: One thought is that consent to government is communicated via the ballot-box. In voting for the government we give it our consent.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Voluntaristic')
     A reaction: Hm. This may be a strong positive reason why some people refuse to vote. We shouldn't load voting with such heavy commitments. It's just 'given the current situation, who will be temporarily in charge'.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: The general will demands the policy which is equally in everyone's interests. Thus we can think of the general will as the general interest.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Rousseau')
     A reaction: That seems to assume that the people know what is in their interests. Rousseau's General Will mainly concerns who governs, and their mode of government, but not details of actual policy.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The state coldly claims that it is the people, but that is a lie [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The state is the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it lies, too; and this lie creeps from its mouth: 'I, the state, am the people'. It is a lie!
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.12)
     A reaction: This strikes me as just as true even after everyone gets the vote. Rulers can't help gradually forgetting about the people.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Even if a dictator wants to advance the interests of the people, how are those interests to be known? In a democracy people show their interests, it seems, by voting: they vote for what they want.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Knowledge')
     A reaction: I suppose a wise and kind despot could observe very carefully, and understand the interests of the people better than they do themselves. Indeed, I very much doubt, in 2017, whether the people know what is good for them.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: The Federalists took the idea of 'separation of powers' from Locke and Montesquieu. This places the legislative, executive and judicial functions in independent hands, so that in theory any branch of government would be checked by the other two.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Representative')
     A reaction: [The American Federalist writers of 1787-8 were Madison, Hamilton and Jay] This is a brilliant idea. An interesting further element that has been added to it is the monitoring by a free press, presumably because the other three were negligent.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Political choices can be made by the utility principles (maximising total utility), or maximin (maximising for the worst off, a view for pessimists), or maximax (not serious, but one for optimists, being unequal, and aiming for a high maximum).
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing')
     A reaction: [my summary of a page of Wolff] Rawls embodies the maximin view. Wolff implies that we must choose between utilitarianism and Rawls. Would Marxists endorse maximin? He also adds 'constrained maximisation', with a safety net.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: As the anarchist picture of society becomes increasingly realistic and less utopian, it also becomes increasingly difficult to tell it apart from a liberal democratic state.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Anarchism')
     A reaction: Nice challenge to anarchism, which is clear in what it opposes, but isn't much of a political philosophy if it doesn't have positive aspirations. Anarchists may hope that people will beautifully co-operate, but what if they re-form the state to do it?
It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Many anarchists have accepted the need for the authority of experts within society
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Anarchism')
     A reaction: The status of experts may be the hottest topic in contemporary politics, given the contempt for experts shown by Trump, and by the Brexit campaign of 2016. It is a nice point that even anarchists can't duck the problem.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: A utilitarian political philosophy would probably be a free market with a welfare state.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing')
     A reaction: This is roughly how Britain became, after the welfare state was added to Millian liberalism. What's missing from this formula is some degree of control of the free market, to permit welfare.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: We are very unlikely to be able to find an instrumental defence of democracy which also builds the values of freedom and equality into a feasible system.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Conc')
     A reaction: I increasingly think that freedom is the most overrated political virtue (though it is certainly a virtue). Total freedom is ridiculous, but the aim of sacrificing many other social goods in order to maximise freedom also looks wrong.
Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Democracy is a way of expressing equal respect for all, which is perhaps why we withdraw the vote from criminals: by their behaviour they forfeit the right to equal respect.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Conc')
     A reaction: I disagree, and he has converted me to franchise for criminals. One-off criminals do not forfeit my respect for them as people, though their action may merit a controlling response on our part. Bad character, not a bad action, forfeits respect.
Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Greeks assumed democracy was consistent with slavery, Rousseau that it was consistent with sexual inequality, and Wollstonecraft that it was consistent with disenfranchisement of the poor.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Freedom')
     A reaction: If you are allowed to restrict the franchise in some way, then a narrow oligarchy can qualify as a democracy, with half a dozen voters.
A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: A democratic state has power only over the people who make up the electorate. Ruling over a subservient class, or territory, is claimed to be antithetical to the true ideals of democracy.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Intro')
     A reaction: Is making trade deals very favourable to yourself (i.e. good capitalism) antithetical to democracy?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: To avoid mixed-motivation voting, we must choose between one model of people voting in accordance with their preferences, and another of voting for their estimate of the common good.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Voting')
     A reaction: Personally I always voted for the common good, and only slowly realised that most people were voting for their own interests. A rational society would at least bring this dichotomy into the open. Voting for self-interest isn't wicked.
Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Condorcet proved that provided people have a better than even chance of getting the right answer, and that they vote for their idea of the common good, then majority decisions are an excellent way to get the right result.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Voting')
     A reaction: [compressed] The point is that collective voting magnifies the result. If they tend to be right, the collective view is super-right. But if they tend towards the wrong, the collective view goes very wrong indeed. History is full of the latter.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Most of us can accept losing from time to time, but sometimes an entrenched majority will win vote after vote, leaving the minority group permanently outvoted and ignored.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Protecting')
     A reaction: This is the key problem of the treatment of minorities in a democracy. Personally I have only once been on the winning side in voting for my MP, and he changed party a couple of years later.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: The price system is a way of signalling and transmitting information. The fact that the price of a good rises shows that the good is in short supply. And if prices rise in a sector because of increasing demand, then new producers rush in for the profits.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Free')
     A reaction: [Woff is discussing Hayek] Why do we have a shortage of decent housing in the UK? Centralised economies lack this direct way of discovering where their efforts should be directed.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Saints want to live as they desire, or not to live at all [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: 'To live as I desire to live or not to live at all': that is what I want, that is what the most saintly man wants.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.09)
     A reaction: [spoken by Zarathustra]
Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Many laws of contemporary society are very hard to defend in terms of Mill's Liberty Principle, such as laws against duelling, incest between siblings, and euthanasia.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Poison')
     A reaction: [He cites Chief Justice Lord Devlin for this] Being killed in a duel can cause widespread misery. Fear of inbreeding is behind the second one, and fear of murdering the old behind the third one. No man is an island.
Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Critics say that the Difference Principle allows inequality of liberty ...and (more often) that liberty means we cannot impose any restriction on individual property holdings.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Nozick')
     A reaction: The second objection is associated with Robert Nozick. The point is that you can implement the Difference Principle without restricting liberty. The standard right-wing objection of social welfare.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: The utilitarian argument for equality assumes that people have 'diminishing marginal returns' for goods. If there are two people and two nice chocolate biscuits, then utilitarianism is likely to recommend one each.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Arguments')
     A reaction: The point is that the second biscuit provides slightly diminished pleasure. This is why you can buy boxes of assorted biscuits, which you are then not required to share.
Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Difference Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing')
     A reaction: Rivals would say that inequalities should go to those who have earned them.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: As Marx observed, and as women have learnt to their cost, equal political rights are worth fighting for, but they are of little value if one is still treated unequally in day-to-day life.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Participatory')
     A reaction: In fact social equality comes first, because that will imply political equality and financial justice. I think it is all covered under the virtue of 'respect', which should have pre-eminence in both public and private life.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: The normal liberal basic rights are right to life, free speech, free assembly and freedom of movement, plus the rights to vote and stand for office. Some theorists add the right to a decent living standard (shelter, food and health care).
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty')
     A reaction: I think he has forgotten to add education. In Britain Beatrice Webb seems to have single-handedly added the living standard group to the list.
If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: The theory of basic natural rights is problematic, because although the theory is rigorous and principled, the disadvantage is that we are left with nothing more fundamental to say in defence of these rights.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty')
     A reaction: This is a nice point about anything which is treated as axiomatic - even Euclid's geometry. Presumably rights can only be justified by the needs of our shared human nature.
If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: If natural rights have a fundamental status, and so are not arrived at on the basis of some other argument, how do we know what rights we have?
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty')
     A reaction: He cites Bentham as using this point. Utilitarianism at least provides a grounding for the identification of possible basic rights. Start from what we want, or what we more objectively need? Human needs, or needs in our present culture?
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: A utilitarian justification of property rights says allowing people to appropriate property, trade in it, and leave it to their descendants will encourage them to make the most productive use of their resources.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Locke')
     A reaction: This obviously has a point, but equally justifies confiscation of land from people who are not making best use of it. In Sicily many landowners refused to allow the peasants to make any use at all of the land.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Justice is the last virtue of society, or at least the last resort. Rights, or considerations of justice, are like an insurance policy: something offering security to fall back on.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 6 'Transcending')
     A reaction: I like this. He points out that a good family doesn't talk of rights and justice. We want a friendly harmonious society, with safety nets.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Some laws have little grounding in morality. You may believe you have a moral obligation to stop at a red light at a deserted crossroads, but only because that is what the law tells you to do.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Goal')
     A reaction: I would have thought such a law was wholly grounded in the morality of teamwork. It is the problem of rule utilitarianism, and also a problem about virtuous character. The puzzle is not the law, but the strict obedience to it.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Whenever we have seen suffering, we have wanted the revenge of punishment [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The spirit of revenge: my friends, that, up to now, has been mankind's chief concern; and where there was suffering, there was always supposed to be punishment.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 2.20)
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Man and woman are deeply strange to one another! [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Who has fully conceived how strange man and woman are to one another!
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 3.10.2)
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
I can only believe in a God who can dance [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: I should believe only in a God who understood how to dance.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.08)
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
There can't be gods, because that leaves us nothing to create! [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: If there were gods, how could I endure not to be a god! Therefore there are no gods. ...For what would there be to create if gods - existed!
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 2.02)
     A reaction: [Zarathustra says this, not Nietzsche!]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
We don't want heaven; now that we are men, we want the kingdom of earth [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: We certainly do not want to enter into the kingdom of heaven: we have become men, so we want the kingdom of earth.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.18.2)
Heaven was invented by the sick and the dying [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: It was the sick and dying who despised the body and the earth and invented the things of heaven and the redeeming drops of blood.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.04)