17312
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It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
Being the successor of the successor of 0 is more explanatory than being predecessor of 3 of the nature of 2, since it mirrors more closely the method by which 2 is constructed from a basic entity, 0, and a relation (successor) taken as primitive.
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4)
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A reaction:
This assumes numbers are 'constructed', which they are in the axiomatised system of Peano Arithmetic, but presumably the numbers were given in ordinary experience before 'construction' occurred to anyone. Nevertheless, I really like this.
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17314
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The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
The relata of the grounding relation are typically taken to be facts or propositions, while the relata of ontological dependence ...are objects and their characteristics, activities, constituents and so on.
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.5 n25)
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A reaction:
Interesting. Good riddance to propositions here, but this seems a bit unfair to facts, since I take facts to be in the world. Audi's concept of 'worldly facts' is what we need here.
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17309
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For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
Fine assumes that essences can be identified with collections of propositions that are true in virtue of the identity of a particular object, or objects. ...There is not, on this approach, much of a distinction between essences and real definitions.
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.4)
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A reaction:
This won't do, because the essence of a physical object is not a set of propositions, it is some aspects of the object itself, which are described in a definition. Koslicki notes that psuché is an essence, and the soul is hardly a set of propositions!
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17317
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A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki]
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Full Idea:
It is plausible to think that an explanation, when successful, captures or represents (by argument, or a why? question) an underlying real-world relation of dependence which obtains among the phenomena cited.
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From:
Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.6)
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A reaction:
She cites causal dependence as an example. I'm incline to think that 'grounding' is a better word for the target of good explanations than is 'dependence' (which can, surely, be mutual, where ground has the directionality needed for explanation).
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20443
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The aesthetic attitude is nothing more than paying close attention [Dickie, by Giovannelli]
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Full Idea:
Once analysed, Dickie claimed, the so-called aesthetic attitude is not special at all, but is rather just a matter of close attention and focus on the subject.
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From:
report of George Dickie (The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude [1964]) by Alessandro Giovannelli - Some contemporary developments (aesthetics) 1
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A reaction:
Sounds wrong. If a paint specialist gives close attention to a painting, they do not necessarily have an aesthetic view of it. You need to know the aim of the activity, just as when you watch a game.
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