Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Origin of the Work of Art', 'Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction'' and 'Aristotle on Essence and Explanation'

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10 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent

15585	Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt]
	Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science.
	From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs'

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition

10528	Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Our concern in giving a definition is not to say how things are by to say how we wish to speak
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
	A reaction: This sounds like an acceptable piece of wisdom which arises out of analytical and linguistic philosophy. It puts a damper on the Socratic dream of using definition of reveal the nature of reality.

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle

10529	If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Neo-Fregeans have thought that Hume's Principle, and the like, might be definitive of number and therefore not subject to the usual epistemological worries over its truth.
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.310)
	A reaction: This seems to be the underlying dream of logicism - that arithmetic is actually brought into existence by definitions, rather than by truths derived from elsewhere. But we must be able to count physical objects, as well as just counting numbers.

10530	Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The fundamental difficulty facing the neo-Fregean is to either adopt the predicative reading of Hume's Principle, defining numbers, but inadequate, or the impredicative reading, which is adequate, but not really a definition.
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.312)
	A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but the general drift is the difficulty of building a system which has been brought into existence just by definition.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities

11993	Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung]
	Full Idea: If Jones ceases to be a father, or ceases to be over eight years old, he will cease to exist, yet these properties surely do not belong essentially to him.
	From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II)
	A reaction: This seems to correct, though I would doubt whether either of these count as true properties, in the causal sense I prefer. If being 'over 8' is a property, how many 'over n' or 'under m' properties does he have? One for each quantum moment?

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary

11997	A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung]
	Full Idea: It is possible that a property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another.
	From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], III)
	A reaction: Thus a love of blues music may be part of your essence, but only a minor part of me. Sounds right. Spin or charge are part of the essence of an electron, but only contingently part of a child's top.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory

11992	Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung]
	Full Idea: Three essentialist claims are labelled 'Aristotelian': the thing would cease to exist without the property; an essential property is explanatory; and it is such that it must belong to everything to which it belongs.
	From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], Intro)
	A reaction: She says the second one is indispensable, and that it rules out the third one. My working assumption, like hers, is that the second one is the key part of the game, because Aristotle wanted to explain things.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence

11995	Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung]
	Full Idea: There will be demonstrated properties at the edge of the system, so to speak. They will be explained in terms of the essential properties of the basic entities and principles of the science, but will themselves not be explanatory of further properties.
	From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II)
	A reaction: This is an important line of thought which needs clarification. We can't glibly say that essences are what explain the other properties. Some properties do more than others to explain subsequent dependent properties.

11996	Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung]
	Full Idea: It seems highly likely that some non-essential properties may explain more about the individual or about things of his kind than the peripheral properties.
	From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II)
	A reaction: Another important issue, if one is defending the explanatory role of essences. It is not only essences which explain. A key question is whether we endorse individual essences as well as generic ones. I think we should. They explain the details.

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence

10527	An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: If an abstraction principle is going to be acceptable, then it should not 'inflate', i.e. it should not result in there being more abstracts than there are objects. By this mark Hume's Principle will be acceptable, but Frege's Law V will not.
	From: Kit Fine (Precis of 'Limits of Abstraction' [2005], p.307)
	A reaction: I take this to be motivated by my own intuition that abstract concepts had better be rooted in the world, or they are not worth the paper they are written on. The underlying idea this sort of abstraction is that it is 'shared' between objects.