12 ideas
15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs' |
18073 | Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher] |
Full Idea: Dummett argues that classical logic depends on the choice of the concept of truth as central to the theory of meaning, while for the intuitionist the concept of assertability occupies this position. | |
From: report of Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 06.5 | |
A reaction: Since I can assert any nonsense I choose, this presumably means 'warranted' assertability, which is tied to the concept of proof in mathematics. You can reason about falsehoods, or about uninterpreted variables. Can you 'assert' 'Fx'? |
19057 | Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Classical quantification represents an infinite conjunction or disjunction, and the truth-value is determined by the infinite sum or product of the instances ....but this presupposes that all the instances already possess determinate truth-values. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.246) | |
A reaction: In the case of the universal quantifier, Dummett is doing no more than citing the classic empiricism objection to induction - that you can't make the universal claim if you don't know all the instances. The claim is still meaningful, though. |
10502 | We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P] |
Full Idea: I can start with a triangle, and rise by degrees to all straight-lined figures and to extension itself. The lower degree will include the higher degree. Since the higher degree is less determinate, it can represent more things. | |
From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This attempts to explain the generalising ability of abstraction cited in Idea 10501. If you take a complex object and eliminate features one by one, it can only 'represent' more particulars; it could hardly represent fewer. |
18258 | We can only know the exterior world via our ideas [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P] |
Full Idea: We can have knowledge of what is outside us only through the mediation of ideas in us. | |
From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], p.63), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc' |
16784 | Forms make things distinct and explain the properties, by pure form, or arrangement of parts [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P] |
Full Idea: The form is what renders a thing such and distinguishes it from others, whether it is a being really distinct from the matter, according to the Schools, or whether it is only the arrangement of the parts. By this form one must explain its properties. | |
From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], III.18 p240), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 27.6 | |
A reaction: If we ask 'what explains the properties of this thing' it is hard to avoid coming up with something that might be called the 'form'. Note that they allow either substantial or corpuscularian forms. It is hard to disagree with the idea. |
10499 | We know by abstraction because we only understand composite things a part at a time [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P] |
Full Idea: The mind cannot perfectly understand things that are even slightly composite unless it considers them a part at a time. ...This is generally called knowing by abstraction. (..the human body, for example). | |
From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5) | |
A reaction: This adds the interesting thought that the mind is forced to abstract, rather than abstraction being a luxury extra feature. Knowledge through analysis is knowledge by abstraction. Also a nice linking of abstraction to epistemology. |
10501 | A triangle diagram is about all triangles, if some features are ignored [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P] |
Full Idea: If I draw an equilateral triangle on a piece of paper, ..I shall have an idea of only a single triangle. But if I ignore all the particular circumstances and focus on the three equal lines, I will be able to represent all equilateral triangles. | |
From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5) | |
A reaction: [compressed] They observed that we grasp composites through their parts, and now that we can grasp generalisations through particulars, both achieved by the psychological act of abstraction, thus showing its epistemological power. |
10500 | No one denies that a line has width, but we can just attend to its length [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P] |
Full Idea: Geometers by no means assume that there are lines without width or surfaces without depth. They only think it is possible to consider the length without paying attention to the width. We can measure the length of a path without its width. | |
From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5) | |
A reaction: A nice example which makes the point indubitable. The modern 'rigorous' account of abstraction that starts with Frege seems to require more than one object, in order to derive abstractions like direction or number. Path widths are not comparatives. |
19055 | Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett] |
Full Idea: An ability to state the condition for the truth of a sentence is, in effect, no more than an ability to express the content of the sentence in other words. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.224) | |
A reaction: Alternatively, if you give something other than a paraphrase of the sentence as its meaning (such as a proof of its truth), then you seem to have departed from your target sentence. Can we reduce and eliminate our sentences in this way? |
19056 | If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett] |
Full Idea: If a sentence is effectively undecidable, the condition which must obtain for it to be true is not one which we are capable of recognising whenever it obtains, or of getting ourselves in a position to do so. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.225) | |
A reaction: The instances of 'undecidable' sentences are most clearly seen in mathematics, such as the Continuum Hypothesis or Goldbach's Conjecture, or anything involving vast infinite cardinals. But do you need precise truth-conditions for meaning? |
19054 | Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett] |
Full Idea: If use constitutes meaning, it might seem that use is beyond criticism. ....But such an attitude can, ultimately, be supported onlly by the adoption of a holistic view of language. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.218) | |
A reaction: Dummett goes on to say that the rejection of the holistic view of mathematical meaning leads to his preference for intuitionistic logic. |