23 ideas
| 15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science. | |
| From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs' |
| 3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: The basis on which the concepts of truth and objectivity depend for application is a community of understanding, agreement among speakers on how each is to be understood. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233) | |
| A reaction: Obviously all understanding is, in practice, an interpretation by a community, but that isn't what 'truth' means. We mean 'true independently of any community'. |
| 3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: It makes no sense to speak of comparing or agreeing on ultimate standards of rationality, since it is our own standards in each case to which we must turn in interpreting others. This is not a failure of objectivity, but where 'questions come to an end'. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232) | |
| A reaction: This seems wrong, given the commitment to truth and charity in interpretation. He could have said the same about perception, but I doubt if he would. |
| 13445 | Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD] |
| Full Idea: Descartes founded analytic geometry on the assumption that there is a one-one order-preserving correspondence between the points on a line and the real numbers. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 1 |
| 16774 | Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Descartes thinks it is a pointless relic of scholastic metaphysics to dispute over the boundaries between substances and mere aggregates. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.6 | |
| A reaction: This is Pasnau's carefully considered conclusion, with which others may not agree. It presumably captures the attitude of modern science generally to such issues. |
| 7400 | Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck] |
| Full Idea: Descartes argued (in 'The World') that just as words refer to objects, but they do not resemble them, in the same way, visual images or other sensory inputs relate to objects without depicting them. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a rather significant and plausible claim, which might contain the germ of the idea of a language of thought. It is also the basis for the recent view that language is the best route to understanding the mind. |
| 3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
| A reaction: I think this is right. It fits with Searle's notion of consciousness as a property, like the liquidity of water. I don't panic if I think "I have no mind, but I have extraordinary properties". |
| 4310 | We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: We have inner awareness of our freedom. | |
| From: René Descartes (works [1643]) | |
| A reaction: This begs a few questions. I may be directly aware that I have not been hypnotised, but no one would accept it as proof. |
| 6553 | Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Descartes himself was well aware of the interaction problem, and corresponded uncomfortably with Princess Elizabeth on the matter; …he pointed out that gravity is causal despite not being a physical object. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by William Lycan - Consciousness n1.3 | |
| A reaction: Lycan observes that at least gravity is in space-time, unlike the Cartesian mind. Pierre Gassendi had pointed out the problem to Descartes in the Fifth Objection to the 'Meditations' (see Idea 3400). |
| 3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: If there are no strict psychophysical laws, this rules out reductionism, either by definition of mental predicates in physical terms, or by way of bridging laws. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
| A reaction: But it is by no means clear that there are no psycho-physical laws. How could this be known a priori? |
| 3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: All mental events are causally related to physical events. ..This seems obvious. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
| A reaction: All mental events are physically caused. Some bodily physical events result from mental events. Probably all mental events have some effect of other mental events (all of which are in some sense physical). |
| 3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: There are no strict psychophysical laws (that is, laws connecting mental events under their mental descriptions with physical events under their physical descriptions). | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
| A reaction: This is clearly open to question. It may be just that no human mind could ever grasp such laws, given their probable complexity. |
| 3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me clearly true, however we propose to characterise mental events. |
| 3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: My basic premises lead to the conclusion of ontological monism coupled with conceptual dualism (like Spinoza, except that he denied mental causation). | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
| A reaction: 'Conceptual dualism' implies no real difference, but 'property dualism' is better, suggesting different properties when viewed from different angles. |
| 3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: To imagine a totally irrational animal is to imagine an animal without thought. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232) | |
| A reaction: This wouldn't be so clear without the theory of evolution, which suggests that only the finders of truth last long enough to breed. |
| 3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: What we mean by what we say is partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.235) | |
| A reaction: There is 'strict and literal meaning', which is fixed by the words, even if I don't know what I am saying. But 'speaker's meaning' is surely a pure matter of a state of mind? |
| 3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: The idea of a proposition is unhelpful, until it is explained how exactly the words in the contained sentence manage to name or describe a proposition (which even Frege failed to achieve). | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232) | |
| A reaction: It seems obvious to me that there are brain events best labelled as propositions, even if their fit with language is puzzling. |
| 3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: We would have no fully-fledge thoughts if we were not in communication with others. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233) | |
| A reaction: This seems a plausible empirical observation, though I would doubt any a priori proof of it. If animals could speak, they would become intellectuals? |
| 3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: The 'principle of charity' is a misleading term, since there is no alternative if we want to make sense of the attitudes and actions of the agents around us. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233) | |
| A reaction: I suppose so, but only with a background of evolutionary theory. I would necessarily assume charity if a robot spoke to me. |
| 3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Without a 'teacher', nothing would give content to the idea that there is a difference between getting things right and getting them wrong. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.234) | |
| A reaction: Seems right. A group of speculators with no one in the role of 'teacher' would seem to be paralysed with uncertain (except where judgements are very obvious). |
| 19676 | Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux] |
| Full Idea: It is Descartes who ratifies the idea that nature is devoid of thought. | |
| From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Quentin Meillassoux - After Finitude; the necessity of contingency 5 | |
| A reaction: His dualism is crucial, along with his ontological argument, because they make all mentality supernatural. Remember, for Descartes animals are mindless machines. |
| 6518 | Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Notoriously, the Cartesian idea that matter is purely geometrical will not do, for it leaves no distinction between matter and empty volumes: a filler for these volumes is required. | |
| From: comment on René Descartes (works [1643]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.3 | |
| A reaction: Descartes thinks of matter as 'extension'. Descartes's error seems so obvious that it is a puzzle why he made it. He may have confused epistemology and ontology - all we can know of matter is its extension in space. |
| 3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: If two events are related as cause and effect, there is a strict law under which they may be subsumed. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231) | |
| A reaction: Davidson admits that this is open to challenge (though Hume and Kant supported it). It does seem to be central to our understanding of nature. |