14212
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A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
A consistent theory is, by definition, one satisfied by some model; an isomorphic image of a model satisfies the same theories as the original model; to provide the making of an isomorphic image of any given model, a domain need only be large enough.
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Model')
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A reaction:
This is laying out the ground for Putnam's model theory argument in favour of anti-realism. If you are chasing the one true model of reality, then formal model theory doesn't seem to offer much encouragement.
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14213
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Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
Anti-realists say the only world is imaginary, or only has the parts or classes or relations we divide it into, or doubt that reference to the world is possible, or doubt that our interpretations can achieve truth.
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Anti-R')
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A reaction:
[compression of a paragraph on anti-realism] Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist. A nice example of the rhetorical device of ridiculing an opponent by suggesting that they don't even know what they themselves believe.
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14210
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A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
The mereological sum of the coffee in my cup, the ink in this sentence, a nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess of an object, yet its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints of nature.
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Might')
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A reaction:
In that case they do, but if there are no atoms at the root of physics then presumably their could also be thoroughly jointless assemblages, involving probability distributions etc. Even random scattered atoms seem rather short of joints.
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7112
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The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre]
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Full Idea:
We must remember that all authors who have described the Cogito have presented it as a reflective operation, i.e. as second-order. This Cogito is performed by a consciousness directed towards consciousness, which takes consciousness as its object.
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From:
Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (B))
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A reaction:
Sartre is raising the nice question of whether the Cogito still works for first-order consciousness, which attends totally to external objects. He claims that it doesn't. Contrast Russell, who says (Idea 5380) that it only works when it is first-order!
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7119
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Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre]
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Full Idea:
When Descartes says 'I doubt therefore I am', is he talking about the spontaneous doubt that reflective consciousness grasps in its instantaneous character, or is he talking of the enterprise of doubting? This ambiguity can lead to serious errors.
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From:
Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], II (B))
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A reaction:
Interesting. The obvious response is that it is about the immediate experience, but that leads to the problem of an instantaneous ego, which can't be justified over time. The 'enterprise' gives an enduring ego, but it is a more intellectual concept.
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7122
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We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre]
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Full Idea:
The Ego can be conceived only through itself and this is why we cannot grasp the consciousness of another (for this reason alone, and not because bodies separate us).
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From:
Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], II (D))
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A reaction:
Interesting. This makes telepathy a logical impossibility, and the body the only possible route for the communication between two minds. But, is Sartre is right, how do bodily events penetrate the inturned world of the Ego?
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7108
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The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre]
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Full Idea:
The unity of the thousand active consciousnesses through which I have added two and two to make four, is the transcendent object '2+2=4'. Without the permanence of this eternal truth, it would be impossible to conceive of a real unity of mind.
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From:
Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (A))
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A reaction:
This is the germ of externalism, here presented as a Platonic attitude to arithmetic, rather than being about water or gold. He claims that internalist attitudes to unity are fictions. I am inclined to think he is wrong, and that unity is biological.
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20618
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Persons must be conscious, reasoning, motivated, communicative, self-aware [Warren, by Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Suggested characteristics of personhood: consciousness (esp. of pain); reasoning and problem solving; self-motivated activity; varied communication on many topics; self-concepts and self-awareness.
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From:
report of Mary Anne Warren (On the Moral and Legal State of Abortion [1973], p.55) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 8 'Standing'
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A reaction:
[a 'famous' article] A number of non-human animals come very close to passing these tests. I suspect the complex communication is only in there to disqualify them from getting the full certificate. (But she wrote on animal rights).
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7106
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The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre]
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Full Idea:
I should like to show here that the Ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness; it is outside, in the world; it is a being in the world, like the Ego of another.
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From:
Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], Intro)
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A reaction:
This idea is the germ of what has got modern externalists about the mind (see quotations from Mark Rowlands) interested in Sartre. Personally I think he is wrong, and the Ego is a part of consciousness. It doesn't, though, have sharp boundaries.
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7117
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How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre]
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Full Idea:
If the 'I' is part of consciousness, there will be two I's: the reflective and the reflected. ...but it is unacceptable for any communication to be established between the reflective I and the reflected I, if they are real elements of consciousness.
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From:
Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (B))
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A reaction:
If we accept that there are two orders of consciousness (reflective, about itself, and reflected, about the world) it seems reasonable to say that there cannot be an 'I' in both of them. A nice, and intriguing, argument.
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22225
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My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre]
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Full Idea:
My I, in efffect, is no more certain for consciousness than the I of other men. It is only more intimate.
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From:
Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], p.104), quoted by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.1
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A reaction:
Not sure how to assess this. Other people seem just as real as I do, when I encounter them, as friend or as foe. And in dealing with them we act as if dealing with their Self (rather than their legs, say). So this idea seems a good one.
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7110
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If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre]
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Full Idea:
The superfluous transcendental 'I' is actually a hindrance. If it existed, it would violently separate consciousness from itself, it would divide it, slicing through consciousness like an opaque blade.
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From:
Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], I (A))
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A reaction:
I see no a priori reason why consciousness should not be split in two, if that's how it is. Personally I am happy with a fairly traditional Cartesian view, that the self is the will and understanding, and the rest of consciousness is its working material.
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14209
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Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
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Full Idea:
Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families].
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From:
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc')
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A reaction:
(The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference.
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