19377
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A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Each monad, together with a particular body, makes up a living substance. Thus, there is not only life everywhere, joined to limbs or organs, but there are also infinite degrees of life in the monads, some dominating more or less over others.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], 4)
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A reaction:
Two key ideas: that each monad is linked to a body (which is presumably passive), and the infinite degrees of life in monads. Thus rocks consist of monads, but at an exceedingly low degree of life. They are stubborn and responsive.
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14753
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The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
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Full Idea:
Burke claims that the 'dominant' sortal is the one whose satisfaction entails possession of the widest range of properties. For example, the statue (unlike the lump of clay) also possesses aesthetic properties, and hence is dominant.
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From:
report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.4
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A reaction:
[there are three papers by Burke on this; see all the quotations from Burke] Presumably one sortal could entail a single very important property, and the other sortal entail a huge range of trivial properties. What does being a 'thing' entail?
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16072
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'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
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Full Idea:
Burke distinguishes three different readings of 'the rock'. It can be a singular description denoting an object, or a plural description denoting all the little pieces of rock, or a mass description the relevant rocky stuff.
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From:
report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 5
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A reaction:
Idea 16068 is an objection to the second reading. Only the first reading seems plausible, so we must just get over all the difficulties philosophers have unearthed about knowing exactly what an 'object' is. I offer you essentialism. Rocks have unity.
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16234
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Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
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Full Idea:
Michael Burke argues that a sweater is identical with the thread that consitutes it, that both were created at the moment when they began to coincide, and that the original thread was destroyed in the process.
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From:
report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.3
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A reaction:
[Burke's ideas are spread over three articles] It is the thread which is destroyed, because the sweater is the 'dominant sortal' (which strikes me as a particularlyd desperate concept).
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14750
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Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
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Full Idea:
Michael Burke has given an account that avoids distinguishing coinciding entities. ...The statue/lump satisfies both 'lump' and 'statue', but only the latter determines that object's persistence conditions, and so is that object's 'dominant sortal'.
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From:
report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.4
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A reaction:
Presumably a lump on its own can have its own persistance conditions (as a 'lump'), but those would presumably be lost if you shaped it into a statue. Burke concedes that. Can of worms. Using a book as a doorstop...
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19353
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'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
We distinguish between 'perception', the internal state of the monad representing external things, and 'apperception', which is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this internal state, not given to all souls, nor at all times to a given soul.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §4)
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A reaction:
The word 'apperception' is standard in Kant. I find it surprising that modern analytic philosophers don't seem to use it when they write about perception. It strikes me as useful, but maybe specialists have a reason for avoiding it.
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5061
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Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
There is a connexion between the perceptions of animals, which bears some resemblance to reason: but it is based only on the memory of facts or effects, and not at all on the knowledge of causes.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason [1714], §5)
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A reaction:
This amounts to the view that animals can do Humean induction (where you see regularities), but not Leibnizian induction (where you see necessities). I say all minds perceive patterns, but only humans can think about the patterns they have perceived.
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