4 ideas
10835 | True sentences says the appropriate descriptive thing on the appropriate demonstrative occasion [Austin,JL] |
Full Idea: A sentence is said to be true when the historic state of affairs to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it 'refers') is of a type with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions. | |
From: J.L. Austin (Truth [1950], §3) | |
A reaction: This is correspondence by convention rather than correspondence by mapping. Personally I prefer some sort of mapping account, despite all the difficulty and vagueness of specifying what maps onto what. |
10836 | Correspondence theorists shouldn't think that a country has just one accurate map [Austin,JL] |
Full Idea: Correspondence theorists too often talk as one would who held that every map is either accurate or inaccurate; that every country can have but one accurate map. | |
From: J.L. Austin (Truth [1950], n 24) | |
A reaction: A well-made point, for those who intuitively hang on to correspondence as not only good common sense, but also some sort of salvation for a realist view of the world which might give us certainty in epistemology. |
21867 | Conatus is brain circuits seeking survival and well-being [Damasio] |
Full Idea: Conatus is explicable as the aggregate of dispositions laid down in brain circuitry that seeks both survival and well-being. | |
From: Antonio Damasio (Looking for Spinoza [2003], p.36) | |
A reaction: So conatus is the motivation of my inner personal assistant, who reminds me what I am doing later today. I like the mention of dispositions, hence powers. |
7825 | The politics of Leibniz was the reunification of Christianity [Stewart,M] |
Full Idea: The politics of Leibniz may be summed up in one word: theocracy. The specific agenda motivating much of his work was to reunite the Protestant and Catholic churches | |
From: Matthew Stewart (The Courtier and the Heretic [2007], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This would be a typical project for a rationalist philosopher, who thinks that good reasoning will gradually converge on the one truth. |