4 ideas
| 3750 | "It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey] |
| Full Idea: It is evident that "It is true that Caesar was murdered" means no more than that Caesar was murdered. | |
| From: Frank P. Ramsey (Facts and Propositions [1927]) | |
| A reaction: At the very least, saying it is true adds emphasis. One sentence is about Caesar, the other about a proposal concerning Caesar, so they can't quite be the same. Note Frege's priority in making this suggestion. |
| 7726 | Aristotelian logic dealt with inferences about concepts, and there were also proposition inferences [Weiner] |
| Full Idea: Till the nineteenth century, it was a common view that Aristotelian logic could evaluate inferences whose validity was based on relations between concepts, while propositional logic could evaluate inferences based on relations between propositions. | |
| From: Joan Weiner (Frege [1999], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Venn diagrams relate closely to Aristotelian syllogisms, as each concept is represented by a circle, and shows relations between sets. Arrows seem needed to represent how to go from one proposition to another. Is one static, the other dynamic? |
| 18818 | Sentence meaning is given by the actions to which it would lead [Ramsey] |
| Full Idea: The meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead. | |
| From: Frank P. Ramsey (Facts and Propositions [1927], p.51), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought | |
| A reaction: I find this idea quite bizarre. Most sentences have no connection to any action or behavior at all. Do we have to ingeniously contrive some possible action? That is the worst sort of behaviourism. See context - Ramsey wasn't stupid! |
| 7825 | The politics of Leibniz was the reunification of Christianity [Stewart,M] |
| Full Idea: The politics of Leibniz may be summed up in one word: theocracy. The specific agenda motivating much of his work was to reunite the Protestant and Catholic churches | |
| From: Matthew Stewart (The Courtier and the Heretic [2007], Ch. 5) | |
| A reaction: This would be a typical project for a rationalist philosopher, who thinks that good reasoning will gradually converge on the one truth. |