Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Courtier and the Heretic', 'Frege' and 'Philosophia Epicurea'

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3 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Aristotelian logic dealt with inferences about concepts, and there were also proposition inferences [Weiner]
     Full Idea: Till the nineteenth century, it was a common view that Aristotelian logic could evaluate inferences whose validity was based on relations between concepts, while propositional logic could evaluate inferences based on relations between propositions.
     From: Joan Weiner (Frege [1999], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Venn diagrams relate closely to Aristotelian syllogisms, as each concept is represented by a circle, and shows relations between sets. Arrows seem needed to represent how to go from one proposition to another. Is one static, the other dynamic?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Form is the principle that connects a thing's constitution (rather than being operative) [Hill,N]
     Full Idea: Form is the state and condition of a thing, a result of the connection among its material principles; it is a constituting principle, not an operative one.
     From: Nicholas Hill (Philosophia Epicurea [1610], n 35)
     A reaction: Pasnau presents this as a denial of form, but it looks to me like someone fishing for what form could be in a more scientific context. Aristotle would have approved of 'principles'. Hill seems to defend the categorical against the dispositional.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 10. Theocracy
The politics of Leibniz was the reunification of Christianity [Stewart,M]
     Full Idea: The politics of Leibniz may be summed up in one word: theocracy. The specific agenda motivating much of his work was to reunite the Protestant and Catholic churches
     From: Matthew Stewart (The Courtier and the Heretic [2007], Ch. 5)
     A reaction: This would be a typical project for a rationalist philosopher, who thinks that good reasoning will gradually converge on the one truth.