6 ideas
17896 | We need to know the meaning of 'and', prior to its role in reasoning [Prior,AN, by Belnap] |
Full Idea: For Prior, so the moral goes, we must first have a notion of what 'and' means, independently of the role it plays as premise and as conclusion. | |
From: report of Arthur N. Prior (The Runabout Inference Ticket [1960]) by Nuel D. Belnap - Tonk, Plonk and Plink p.132 | |
A reaction: The meaning would be given by the truth tables (the truth-conditions), whereas the role would be given by the natural deduction introduction and elimination rules. This seems to be the basic debate about logical connectives. |
17898 | Prior's 'tonk' is inconsistent, since it allows the non-conservative inference A |- B [Belnap on Prior,AN] |
Full Idea: Prior's definition of 'tonk' is inconsistent. It gives us an extension of our original characterisation of deducibility which is not conservative, since in the extension (but not the original) we have, for arbitrary A and B, A |- B. | |
From: comment on Arthur N. Prior (The Runabout Inference Ticket [1960]) by Nuel D. Belnap - Tonk, Plonk and Plink p.135 | |
A reaction: Belnap's idea is that connectives don't just rest on their rules, but also on the going concern of normal deduction. |
11021 | Prior rejected accounts of logical connectives by inference pattern, with 'tonk' his absurd example [Prior,AN, by Read] |
Full Idea: Prior dislike the holism inherent in the claim that the meaning of a logical connective was determined by the inference patterns into which it validly fitted. ...His notorious example of 'tonk' (A → A-tonk-B → B) was a reductio of the view. | |
From: report of Arthur N. Prior (The Runabout Inference Ticket [1960]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.8 | |
A reaction: [The view being attacked was attributed to Gentzen] |
13836 | Maybe introducing or defining logical connectives by rules of inference leads to absurdity [Prior,AN, by Hacking] |
Full Idea: Prior intended 'tonk' (a connective which leads to absurdity) as a criticism of the very idea of introducing or defining logical connectives by rules of inference. | |
From: report of Arthur N. Prior (The Runabout Inference Ticket [1960], §09) by Ian Hacking - What is Logic? |
16640 | Form is the principle that connects a thing's constitution (rather than being operative) [Hill,N] |
Full Idea: Form is the state and condition of a thing, a result of the connection among its material principles; it is a constituting principle, not an operative one. | |
From: Nicholas Hill (Philosophia Epicurea [1610], n 35) | |
A reaction: Pasnau presents this as a denial of form, but it looks to me like someone fishing for what form could be in a more scientific context. Aristotle would have approved of 'principles'. Hill seems to defend the categorical against the dispositional. |
7825 | The politics of Leibniz was the reunification of Christianity [Stewart,M] |
Full Idea: The politics of Leibniz may be summed up in one word: theocracy. The specific agenda motivating much of his work was to reunite the Protestant and Catholic churches | |
From: Matthew Stewart (The Courtier and the Heretic [2007], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This would be a typical project for a rationalist philosopher, who thinks that good reasoning will gradually converge on the one truth. |