46 ideas
9912 | There are no such things as numbers [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: There are no such things as numbers. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], IIIC) | |
A reaction: Mill said precisely the same (Idea 9794). I think I agree. There has been a classic error of reification. An abstract pattern is not an object. If I coin a word for all the three-digit numbers in our system, I haven't created a new 'object'. |
9901 | Numbers can't be sets if there is no agreement on which sets they are [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: The fact that Zermelo and Von Neumann disagree on which particular sets the numbers are is fatal to the view that each number is some particular set. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], II) | |
A reaction: I agree. A brilliantly simple argument. There is the possibility that one of the two accounts is correct (I would vote for Zermelo), but it is not actually possible to prove it. |
9151 | Benacerraf says numbers are defined by their natural ordering [Benacerraf, by Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Benacerraf thinks of numbers as being defined by their natural ordering. | |
From: report of Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965]) by Kit Fine - Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence §5 | |
A reaction: My intuition is that cardinality is logically prior to ordinality, since that connects better with the experienced physical world of objects. Just as the fact that people have different heights must precede them being arranged in height order. |
13891 | To understand finite cardinals, it is necessary and sufficient to understand progressions [Benacerraf, by Wright,C] |
Full Idea: Benacerraf claims that the concept of a progression is in some way the fundamental arithmetical notion, essential to understanding the idea of a finite cardinal, with a grasp of progressions sufficing for grasping finite cardinals. | |
From: report of Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965]) by Crispin Wright - Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects 3.xv | |
A reaction: He cites Dedekind (and hence the Peano Axioms) as the source of this. The interest is that progression seems to be fundamental to ordianls, but this claims it is also fundamental to cardinals. Note that in the first instance they are finite. |
17904 | A set has k members if it one-one corresponds with the numbers less than or equal to k [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: Any set has k members if and only if it can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the set of numbers less than or equal to k. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], I) | |
A reaction: This is 'Ernie's' view of things in the paper. This defines the finite cardinal numbers in terms of the finite ordinal numbers. He has already said that the set of numbers is well-ordered. |
17906 | To explain numbers you must also explain cardinality, the counting of things [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: I would disagree with Quine. The explanation of cardinality - i.e. of the use of numbers for 'transitive counting', as I have called it - is part and parcel of the explication of number. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], I n2) | |
A reaction: Quine says numbers are just a progression, with transitive counting as a bonus. Interesting that Benacerraf identifies cardinality with transitive counting. I would have thought it was the possession of numerical quantity, not ascertaining it. |
9898 | We can count intransitively (reciting numbers) without understanding transitive counting of items [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: Learning number words in the right order is counting 'intransitively'; using them as measures of sets is counting 'transitively'. ..It seems possible for someone to learn the former without learning the latter. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], I) | |
A reaction: Scruton's nice question (Idea 3907) is whether you could be said to understand numbers if you could only count intransitively. I would have thought such a state contained no understanding at all of numbers. Benacerraf agrees. |
17903 | Someone can recite numbers but not know how to count things; but not vice versa [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: It seems that it is possible for someone to learn to count intransitively without learning to count transitively. But not vice versa. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], I) | |
A reaction: Benacerraf favours the priority of the ordinals. It is doubtful whether you have grasped cardinality properly if you don't know how to count things. Could I understand 'he has 27 sheep', without understanding the system of natural numbers? |
9897 | The application of a system of numbers is counting and measurement [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: The application of a system of numbers is counting and measurement. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], I) | |
A reaction: A simple point, but it needs spelling out. Counting seems prior, in experience if not in logic. Measuring is a luxury you find you can indulge in (by imagining your quantity) split into parts, once you have mastered counting. |
9900 | For Zermelo 3 belongs to 17, but for Von Neumann it does not [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: Ernie's number progression is [φ],[φ,[φ]],[φ,[φ],[φ,[φ,[φ]]],..., whereas Johnny's is [φ],[[φ]],[[[φ]]],... For Ernie 3 belongs to 17, not for Johnny. For Ernie 17 has 17 members; for Johnny it has one. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], II) | |
A reaction: Benacerraf's point is that there is no proof-theoretic way to choose between them, though I am willing to offer my intuition that Ernie (Zermelo) gives the right account. Seventeen pebbles 'contains' three pebbles; you must pass 3 to count to 17. |
9899 | The successor of x is either x and all its members, or just the unit set of x [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: For Ernie, the successor of a number x was the set consisting of x and all the members of x, while for Johnny the successor of x was simply [x], the unit set of x - the set whose only member is x. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], II) | |
A reaction: See also Idea 9900. Benacerraf's famous point is that it doesn't seem to make any difference to arithmetic which version of set theory you choose as its basis. I take this to conclusively refute the idea that numbers ARE sets. |
8697 | Disputes about mathematical objects seem irrelevant, and mathematicians cannot resolve them [Benacerraf, by Friend] |
Full Idea: If two children were brought up knowing two different set theories, they could entirely agree on how to do arithmetic, up to the point where they discuss ontology. There is no mathematical way to tell which is the true representation of numbers. | |
From: report of Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: Benacerraf ends by proposing a structuralist approach. If mathematics is consistent with conflicting set theories, then those theories are not shedding light on mathematics. |
8304 | No particular pair of sets can tell us what 'two' is, just by one-to-one correlation [Benacerraf, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Hume's Principle can't tell us what a cardinal number is (this is one lesson of Benacerraf's well-known problem). An infinity of pairs of sets could actually be the number two (not just the simplest sets). | |
From: report of Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965]) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 10.3 | |
A reaction: The drift here is for numbers to end up as being basic, axiomatic, indefinable, universal entities. Since I favour patterns as the basis of numbers, I think the basis might be in a pre-verbal experience, which even a bird might have, viewing its eggs. |
9906 | If ordinal numbers are 'reducible to' some set-theory, then which is which? [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: If a particular set-theory is in a strong sense 'reducible to' the theory of ordinal numbers... then we can still ask, but which is really which? | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], IIIB) | |
A reaction: A nice question about all reductions. If we reduce mind to brain, does that mean that brain is really just mind. To have a direction (up/down?), reduction must lead to explanation in a single direction only. Do numbers explain sets? |
9907 | If any recursive sequence will explain ordinals, then it seems to be the structure which matters [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: If any recursive sequence whatever would do to explain ordinal numbers suggests that what is important is not the individuality of each element, but the structure which they jointly exhibit. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], IIIC) | |
A reaction: This sentence launched the whole modern theory of Structuralism in mathematics. It is hard to see what properties a number-as-object could have which would entail its place in an ordinal sequence. |
9908 | The job is done by the whole system of numbers, so numbers are not objects [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: 'Objects' do not do the job of numbers singly; the whole system performs the job or nothing does. I therefore argue that numbers could not be objects at all. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], IIIC) | |
A reaction: This thought is explored by structuralism - though it is a moot point where mere 'nodes' in a system (perhaps filled with old bits of furniture) will do the job either. No one ever explains the 'power' of numbers (felt when you do a sudoku). Causal? |
9909 | The number 3 defines the role of being third in a progression [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: Any object can play the role of 3; that is, any object can be the third element in some progression. What is peculiar to 3 is that it defines that role, not by being a paradigm, but by representing the relation of any third member of a progression. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], IIIC) | |
A reaction: An interesting early attempt to spell out the structuralist idea. I'm thinking that the role is spelled out by the intersection of patterns which involve threes. |
9911 | Number words no more have referents than do the parts of a ruler [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: Questions of the identification of the referents of number words should be dismissed as misguided in just the way that a question about the referents of the parts of a ruler would be seen as misguided. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], IIIC) | |
A reaction: What a very nice simple point. It would be very strange to insist that every single part of the continuum of a ruler should be regarded as an 'object'. |
8925 | Mathematical objects only have properties relating them to other 'elements' of the same structure [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: Mathematical objects have no properties other than those relating them to other 'elements' of the same structure. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], p.285), quoted by Fraser MacBride - Structuralism Reconsidered §3 n13 | |
A reaction: Suppose we only had one number - 13 - and we all cried with joy when we recognised it in a group of objects. Would that be a number, or just a pattern, or something hovering between the two? |
9938 | How can numbers be objects if order is their only property? [Benacerraf, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: Benacerraf raises the question how numbers can be 'objects' if they have no properties except order in a particular ω-sequence. | |
From: report of Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], p.301) by Hilary Putnam - Mathematics without Foundations | |
A reaction: Frege certainly didn't think that order was their only property (see his 'borehole' metaphor in Grundlagen). It might be better to say that they are objects which only have relational properties. |
9910 | Number-as-objects works wholesale, but fails utterly object by object [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: The identification of numbers with objects works wholesale but fails utterly object by object. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], IIIC) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a glaring problem for platonists. You can stare at 1728 till you are blue in the face, but it only begins to have any properties at all once you examine its place in the system. This is unusual behaviour for an object. |
9903 | Number words are not predicates, as they function very differently from adjectives [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: The unpredicative nature of number words can be seen by noting how different they are from, say, ordinary adjectives, which do function as predicates. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], II) | |
A reaction: He points out that 'x is seventeen' is a rare construction in English, unlike 'x is happy/green/interesting', and that numbers outrank all other adjectives (having to appear first in any string of them). |
9904 | The set-theory paradoxes mean that 17 can't be the class of all classes with 17 members [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: In no consistent theory is there a class of all classes with seventeen members. The existence of the paradoxes is a good reason to deny to 'seventeen' this univocal role of designating the class of all classes with seventeen members. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], II) | |
A reaction: This was Frege's disaster, and seems to block any attempt to achieve logicism by translating numbers into sets. It now seems unclear whether set theory is logic, or mathematics, or sui generis. |
9905 | Identity statements make sense only if there are possible individuating conditions [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: Identity statements make sense only in contexts where there exist possible individuating conditions. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (What Numbers Could Not Be [1965], III) | |
A reaction: He is objecting to bizarre identifications involving numbers. An identity statement may be bizarre even if we can clearly individuate the two candidates. Winston Churchill is a Mars Bar. Identifying George Orwell with Eric Blair doesn't need a 'respect'. |
23308 | Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Boethius says that reasoning [ratiocinatio] is related to intellectual understanding [intellectus] as time to eternity, involving as it does movement from one stage to another. | |
From: report of Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], 4, prose 6) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Shifting' | |
A reaction: This gives true understanding a quasi-religious aura, as befits a subject which is truly consoling. |
5771 | Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Just as the knowledge of present things imposes no necessity on what is happening, so foreknowledge imposes no necessity on what is going to happen. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.IV) | |
A reaction: This, I think, is the key idea if you are looking for a theological answer to the theological problem of free will. Don't think of God as seeing the future 'now'. God is outside time, and so only observes all of history just as we observe the present. |
5767 | Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius] |
Full Idea: There is freedom of the will, for it would be impossible for any rational nature to exist without it. Whatever by nature has the use of reason has the power of judgement to decide each matter. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.II) | |
A reaction: A view taken up by Aquinas (Idea 1849) and Kant (Idea 3740). The 'power of judgement' pinpoints the core of rationality, and it is not clear how a robot could fulfil such a power, if it lacked consciousness. Does a machine 'judge' barcodes? |
5768 | God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius] |
Full Idea: God's universal foreknowledge and freedom of the will seem clean contrary and opposite. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.III) | |
A reaction: The original source of the great theological and philosophical anguish over free will. The problem is anything which fixes future facts, be it oracular knowledge or scientific prediction. Personally I think free will was an invention by religions. |
5769 | Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Does foreknowledge of the future cause the necessity of events, or necessity cause the foreknowledge? | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.III) | |
A reaction: An intriguing question, though not one that bothers me. I don't understand how foreknowledge causes necessity, unless God's vision of the future is a kind of 'freezing ray'. Even the gods must bow to necessity (Idea 3016). |
5762 | The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius] |
Full Idea: If the wicked obtained what they want - that is goodness - they could not be wicked. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.II) | |
A reaction: This is a nice paradox which arises from Boethius being, like Socrates, an intellectualist. The question is whether the wicked want the good de re or de dicto. If they wanted to good de re (as its true self) they would obviously not be wicked. |
5770 | Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius] |
Full Idea: If there is no free will, then in vain is reward offered to the good and punishment to the bad, because they have not been deserved by any free and willed movement of the mind. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.III) | |
A reaction: I just don't see why decisions have to come out of nowhere in order to have any merit. People are different from natural forces, because the former can be persuaded by reasons. A moral agent is a mechanism which decides according to reasons. |
5764 | When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius] |
Full Idea: When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.III) | |
A reaction: This is a view I find quite sympathetic, but which is a million miles from the modern view. Today's paper showed a picture of a famous criminal holding a machine gun and a baby. We seem to delight in the idea that human nature is partly wicked. |
5756 | Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.I) | |
A reaction: This sounds like the ancient 'eudaimonism' of Socrates and Aristotle, which might not be entirely compatible with orthodox Christianity. It is not true, though, that happy people lack ambition. To be happy, an unfilfilled aim may be needed. |
5763 | The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius] |
Full Idea: The supreme good is the goal of good men and bad men alike, and the good seek it by means of a natural activity - the exercise of virtue - while the bad strive to acquire it by means of their desires, which is not a natural way of obtaining the good. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.II) | |
A reaction: Interesting here is the slightly surprising claim that the pursuit of virtue is 'natural', implying that the mere pursuit of desire is not. Doesn't nature have to be restrained to achieve the good? Boethius is in the tradition of Aristotle and stoicism. |
5759 | Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius] |
Full Idea: The various things that men pursue are not perfect and good, because they differ from one another; ..when they differ they are not good, but when they begin to be one they become good, so it is through the acquisition of unity that these things are good. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.XI) | |
A reaction: This is a criticism of Aristotle's pluralism about the good(s) for man. Boethius' thought is appealing, and ties in with the Socratic notion that the virtues might be unified in some way. I think it is right that true virtues merge together, ideally. |
7825 | The politics of Leibniz was the reunification of Christianity [Stewart,M] |
Full Idea: The politics of Leibniz may be summed up in one word: theocracy. The specific agenda motivating much of his work was to reunite the Protestant and Catholic churches | |
From: Matthew Stewart (The Courtier and the Heretic [2007], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This would be a typical project for a rationalist philosopher, who thinks that good reasoning will gradually converge on the one truth. |
5754 | You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius] |
Full Idea: The only way one man can exercise power over another is over his body and what is inferior to it, his possessions. You cannot impose anything on a free mind. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], II.VI) | |
A reaction: Written, of course, in prison. Boethius had not met hypnotism, or mind-controlling drugs, or invasive brain surgery. He hadn't read '1984'. He hadn't seen 'The Ipcress File'. (In fact, he should have got out more…) |
16692 | Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Divine eternity is the all-at-once [tota simul] and complete possession of unending life. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.1 | |
A reaction: This is a famous definition, and 'tota simul' became the phrase used for 'entia successiva', such as a day, or the Olympic Games. |
5752 | Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius] |
Full Idea: A philosopher (possibly Epicurus) asked where evil comes from if there is a god, and where good comes from if there isn't. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], I.IV) | |
A reaction: A nice question. The best known answer to the first question is 'Satan'. Some would say that in the second case good is impossible, but I would have thought that the only possible answer is 'mankind'. |
5758 | God is the good [Boethius] |
Full Idea: God is the good. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.XI) | |
A reaction: This summary follows on from the rather dubious discussion in Idea 5757. If God IS the good, it is not clear how God could be usefully described as 'good'. We would know that he was good a priori, without any enquiry into his nature being needed. |
5757 | God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius] |
Full Idea: That which by its own nature is something distinct from supreme good, cannot be supreme good. ..It is impossible for anything to be by nature better than that from which it is derived, so that which is the origin of all things is supreme good. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.X) | |
A reaction: This is the contortion early Christians got into once they decided God had to be 'supreme' in the moral world (and every other world). Boethius allows a possible external source of all morality, but then has to say that this source is morally inferior. |
5760 | The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius] |
Full Idea: For this power, whatever it is, through which creation remains in existence and in motion, I use the word which all people use, namely God. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.XII) | |
A reaction: An interesting caution in the phrase 'whatever it is'. Boethius would have been very open-minded in discussion with modern science about the stability of nature. Personally I reject Boethius' theory, but don't have a better one. Cf Idea 1431. |
5753 | The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius] |
Full Idea: I could never believe that events of such regularity as we find in this life are due to the haphazards of chance. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], I.VI) | |
A reaction: It depends what you mean by 'chance'. Boethius infers a conscious mind, and presumes this to be God, but that is two large and unsupported steps. Modern atheists must acknowledge Boethius' problem. Why is there order? |
5765 | The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Goodness is happiness, ..but we agree that those who attain happiness are divine. The reward of the good, then, is to become gods. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.III) | |
A reaction: Kant offered a similar argument (see Idea 1455). Most of us are unlikely to agree with the second premise of Boethius' argument. The idea that we might somehow become gods gripped the imagination for the next thousand years. |
5761 | God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius] |
Full Idea: 'There is nothing that an omnipotent power could not do?' 'No.' 'Then can God do evil?' 'No.' 'So evil is nothing, since that is what He cannot do who can do anthing.' | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.XII) | |
A reaction: A lovely example of the contortions necessary once you insist that God must be 'omnipotent', in some absolute sense of the term. Saying that evil is 'nothing' strikes me as nothing more than a feeble attempt to insult it. |
5766 | If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius] |
Full Idea: If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere. | |
From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.VI) | |
A reaction: This brings out the verificationist in me. See Idea 1467, by Antony Flew. Presumably Boethius would retain his faith as Europe moved horribly from 1939 to 1945, and even if the whole of humanity sank into squalid viciousness. |