Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Courtier and the Heretic', 'Possible Worlds' and 'Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier'

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4 ideas

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15793 We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan]
     Full Idea: Stalnaker suggests talking 'ways things might have been' as sui generis elements of our ontology - actual abstract entities in their own right, not to be reduced to more familiar items.
     From: report of Robert C. Stalnaker (Possible Worlds [1976]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 09
     A reaction: This seems to rest on an ontology of 'states of affairs', favoured by Armstrong, and implied in the Tractatus. How big is a state of affairs? How manys states of affairs can be co-present?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 10. Theocracy
7825 The politics of Leibniz was the reunification of Christianity [Stewart,M]
     Full Idea: The politics of Leibniz may be summed up in one word: theocracy. The specific agenda motivating much of his work was to reunite the Protestant and Catholic churches
     From: Matthew Stewart (The Courtier and the Heretic [2007], Ch. 5)
     A reaction: This would be a typical project for a rationalist philosopher, who thinks that good reasoning will gradually converge on the one truth.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
12719 Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The notion of force is as clear as that of action and passion, because it is that from which action follows when nothing prevents it.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
     A reaction: For Leibniz, force seems to be a metaphysical notion, rather than a feature of the physical world. I take it to be the bottom level of explanation, and it equates with Aristotelian form and essence.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
12720 Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Time never exists, since all of its parts never exist together.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
     A reaction: The problem here is that he seems to be admitting that time has 'parts'. Can something have parts and not exist? Events will also fail to exist by this criterion, though we could hardly deny that events (or some such) 'happen'.