Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Courtier and the Heretic', 'Laughter' and 'Letters to Thomasius'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton]
     Full Idea: There are three common accounts of amusement: superiority theories (Hobbes's 'sudden glory'), 'relief from restraint' (Freud on jokes), and 'incongruity' theories (Schopenhauer).
     From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §5)
     A reaction: All three contain some truth. But one need not feel superior to laugh, and one may already be in a state of unrestraint. Schopenhauer seems closest to a good general account.
Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton]
     Full Idea: It is a matter of indifference whether the object of amusement be thought to be real.
     From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §7)
     A reaction: Sort of. If I say 'wouldn't it be funny if someone did x?', it is probably much less funny than if I say 'apparently he really did x'. The fantasy case has to be much funnier to evoke the laughter.
The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton]
     Full Idea: There are amusing buildings, but not amusing rocks and cliffs. If I were to propose a candidate for the formal object of amusement, then the human would be my choice, ...or at least emphasise its centrality.
     From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §9)
     A reaction: Sounds good. Animal behaviour only seems to amuse if it evokes something human. Plants would have to look a bit human to be funny.
Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Man is the only animal that laughs, so a starting point for all enquiries into laughter must be the hypothesis that it is an attribute of reason (though that gets us no further than our definition of reason).
     From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §1)
     A reaction: I would be inclined to say that both our capacity for reason and our capacity for laughter (and, indeed, our capacity for language) are a consequence of our evolved capacity for meta-thought.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
The essence of a circle is the equality of its radii [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The essence of a circle consists in the equality of all lines drawn from its centre to its circumference.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomasius [1669], 1669)
     A reaction: Compare Locke in Idea 13431 and Spinoza in Idea 13073 on the essence of geometrical figures. A key question is whether the essence is in the simplest definition, or in a complex and wide-ranging account, e.g. including conic sections for circles.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton]
     Full Idea: It is only rational beings who can be attentive without a motive; only rational beings who can be interested in that in which they have no interest.
     From: Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §12)
     A reaction: Rational beings make long term plans, so they cannot prejudge which things may turn out to be of interest to them. Scruton (a Kantian) makes it sound a little loftier than it actually is.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 10. Theocracy
The politics of Leibniz was the reunification of Christianity [Stewart,M]
     Full Idea: The politics of Leibniz may be summed up in one word: theocracy. The specific agenda motivating much of his work was to reunite the Protestant and Catholic churches
     From: Matthew Stewart (The Courtier and the Heretic [2007], Ch. 5)
     A reaction: This would be a typical project for a rationalist philosopher, who thinks that good reasoning will gradually converge on the one truth.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Bodies are recreated in motion, and don't exist in intervening instants [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I have demonstrated that whatever moves is continuously created and that bodies are nothing at any time between the instants in motion.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomasius [1669], 1669.04), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
     A reaction: Leibniz is a little over-confident about what he has 'demonstrated', but I think (from this remark) that he would not have been displeased with quantum theory, and the notion of a 'quantum leap' and a 'Planck time'. A 'conatus' is a 'smallest motion'.