8 ideas
10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: If φ contains no bound second-order variables, the corresponding comprehension axiom is said to be 'predicative'; otherwise it is 'impredicative'. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1) | |
A reaction: ['Predicative' roughly means that a new predicate is created, and 'impredicative' means that it just uses existing predicates] |
10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: I offer these three claims as a partial analysis of 'pure logic': ontological innocence (no new entities are introduced), universal applicability (to any realm of discourse), and cognitive primacy (no extra-logical ideas are presupposed). | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1) |
10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: If my arguments are correct, the theory of plural quantification has no right to the title 'logic'. ...The impredicative plural comprehension axioms depend too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §4) |
10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: According to its supporters, second-order logic allow us to pay the ontological price of a mere first-order theory and get the corresponding monadic second-order theory for free. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §0) |
6408 | Russell needed three extra axioms to reduce maths to logic: infinity, choice and reducibility [Grayling] |
Full Idea: In order to deduce the theorems of mathematics from purely logical axioms, Russell had to add three new axioms to those of standards logic, which were: the axiom of infinity, the axiom of choice, and the axiom of reducibility. | |
From: A.C. Grayling (Russell [1996], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The third one was adopted to avoid his 'barber' paradox, but many thinkers do not accept it. The interesting question is why anyone would 'accept' or 'reject' an axiom. |
10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Our modern general concept of an object is given content only in connection with modern quantificational logic. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §2) | |
A reaction: [He mentions Frege, Carnap, Quine and Dummett] This is the first thing to tell beginners in modern analytical metaphysics. The word 'object' is very confusing. I think I prefer 'entity'. |
6414 | Two propositions might seem self-evident, but contradict one another [Grayling] |
Full Idea: Two propositions might contradict each other despite appearing self-evident when considered separately. | |
From: A.C. Grayling (Russell [1996], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Russell's proposal (Idea 5416) is important here, that self-evidence comes in degrees. If self-evidence was all-or-nothing, Grayling's point would be a major problem, but it isn't. Bonjour explores the idea more fully (e.g. Idea 3704) |
7825 | The politics of Leibniz was the reunification of Christianity [Stewart,M] |
Full Idea: The politics of Leibniz may be summed up in one word: theocracy. The specific agenda motivating much of his work was to reunite the Protestant and Catholic churches | |
From: Matthew Stewart (The Courtier and the Heretic [2007], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This would be a typical project for a rationalist philosopher, who thinks that good reasoning will gradually converge on the one truth. |