17 ideas
7910 | Pursue truth with the urgency of someone whose clothes are on fire [Ashvaghosha] |
Full Idea: As though your turban or your clothes were on fire, so with a sense of urgency should you apply your intellect to the comprehension of the truths. | |
From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI) | |
A reaction: The best philosophers need no such urging. I retain a romantic view that we should be 'natural' in these things. See Plato's views in Idea 2153 and 1638. However, maybe I should be confronted with this quotation every morning when I awake. |
8378 | Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are too apt to take their views on science from each other, not from science. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.178) | |
A reaction: This wasn't true of Russell, but it is certainly true of me. I rely on philosophical researchers to find the interesting bits of science for me (like blindsight). Memo to myself: read more science. |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
Full Idea: The common feature of every designating term is that designation may change from state to state - thus it can be formalized by a function from states to objects. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3) | |
A reaction: Specifying the objects sounds OK, but specifying states sounds rather tough. |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
Full Idea: To first order modal logic (with quantification over objects) we can add a second kind of quantification, over intensions. An intensional object, or individual concept, will be modelled by a function from states to objects. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.3) |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
Full Idea: Awareness logic enriched Hintikka's epistemic models with an awareness function, mapping each state to the set of formulas we are aware of at that state. This reflects some bound on the resources we can bring to bear. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.6.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Fagin and Halpern 1988 for this] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
Full Idea: In justification logics, the logics of knowledge are extended by making reasons explicit. A logic of proof terms was created, with a semantics. In this, mathematical truths are known for explicit reasons, and these provide a measure of complexity. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.6.1) |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
Full Idea: Mathematics is typically extensional throughout (we write 3+2=2+3 despite the two terms having different meanings). ..Classical first-order logic is extensional by design since it primarily evolved to model the reasoning of mathematics. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §1) |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
Full Idea: λ-abstraction can be used to abstract and disambiguate a predicate. De re is [λx◊P(x)](f) - f has the possible-P property - and de dicto is ◊[λxP(x)](f) - possibly f has the P-property. Also applies to □. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §3.3) | |
A reaction: Compare the Barcan formula. Originated with Church in the 1930s, and Carnap 1947, but revived by Stalnaker and Thomason 1968. Because it refers to the predicate, it has a role in intensional versions of logic, especially modal logic. |
8375 | 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell] |
Full Idea: 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, meaning that it is true for all possible values of its argument or arguments. Thus 'If x is a man, x is mortal' is necessary, because it is true for any possible value of x. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.175) | |
A reaction: This is presumably the intermediate definition of necessity, prior to modern talk of possible worlds. Since it is a predicate about functions, it is presumably a metalinguistic concept, like the semantic concept of truth. |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
Full Idea: Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds quite naturally. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.4) | |
A reaction: A definite description can pick out the same object in another possible world, or a very similar one, or an object which has almost nothing in common with the others. |
4396 | The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell] |
Full Idea: The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.173) | |
A reaction: A bold proposal which should be taken seriously. However, if we drop it from scientific explanation, we may well find ourselves permanently stuck with it in 'folk' explanation. What is the alternative? |
8376 | If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell] |
Full Idea: A cause is an event lasting for a finite time, but if cause and effect are contiguous then the earlier part of a changing cause can be altered without altering the effect, and a static cause will exist placidly for some time and then explode into effect. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.177) | |
A reaction: [very compressed] He concludes that they can't be contiguous (and eventually rejects cause entirely). This kind of problem is the sort of thing that only bothers philosophers - the question of how anything can happen at all. Why change? |
8380 | Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell] |
Full Idea: A may be the cause of B even if there actually are cases of B not following A. Striking a match will be the cause of its igniting, in spite of the fact that some matches are damp and fail to ignite. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.185) | |
A reaction: An important point, although defenders of the constant conjunction view can cope with it. There is a further regularity between dampness of matches and their failure to strike. |
8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
Full Idea: An 'event' (in a statement of the 'law of causation') is intended to be something that is likely to recur, since otherwise the law becomes trivial. It follows that an 'event' is not some particular, but a universal of which there may be many instances. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.179) | |
A reaction: I am very struck by this. It may be a key insight into understanding what a law of nature actually is. It doesn't follow that we must be realists about universals, but the process of abstraction from particulars is at the heart of generalisation. |
8381 | The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is not in the sameness of causes and effects that the constancy of scientific law consists, but in sameness of relations. And even 'sameness of relations' is too simple a phrase; 'sameness of differential equations' is the only correct phrase. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.186) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a commitment to the regularity view, since there is nothing more to natural law than that the variables keeping obeying the equations. It also seems to be a very instrumentalist view. |
7909 | The Eightfold Path concerns morality, wisdom, and tranquillity [Ashvaghosha] |
Full Idea: The Eightfold Path has three steps concerning morality - right speech, right bodily action, and right livelihood; three of wisdom - right views, right intentions, and right effort; and two of tranquillity - right mindfulness and right concentration. | |
From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI) | |
A reaction: Most of this translates quite comfortably into the aspirations of western philosophy. For example, 'right effort' sounds like Kant's claim that only a good will is truly good (Idea 3710). The Buddhist division is interesting for action theory. |
7908 | At the end of a saint, he is not located in space, but just ceases to be disturbed [Ashvaghosha] |
Full Idea: When an accomplished saint comes to the end, he does not go anywhere down in the earth or up in the sky, nor into any of the directions of space, but because his defilements have become extinct he simply ceases to be disturbed. | |
From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI) | |
A reaction: To 'cease to be disturbed' is the most attractive account of heaven I have encountered. It all sounds a bit dull though. I wonder, as usual, how they know all this stuff. |