17 ideas
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
Full Idea: The common feature of every designating term is that designation may change from state to state - thus it can be formalized by a function from states to objects. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3) | |
A reaction: Specifying the objects sounds OK, but specifying states sounds rather tough. |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
Full Idea: To first order modal logic (with quantification over objects) we can add a second kind of quantification, over intensions. An intensional object, or individual concept, will be modelled by a function from states to objects. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.3) |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
Full Idea: Awareness logic enriched Hintikka's epistemic models with an awareness function, mapping each state to the set of formulas we are aware of at that state. This reflects some bound on the resources we can bring to bear. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.6.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Fagin and Halpern 1988 for this] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
Full Idea: In justification logics, the logics of knowledge are extended by making reasons explicit. A logic of proof terms was created, with a semantics. In this, mathematical truths are known for explicit reasons, and these provide a measure of complexity. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.6.1) |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
Full Idea: Mathematics is typically extensional throughout (we write 3+2=2+3 despite the two terms having different meanings). ..Classical first-order logic is extensional by design since it primarily evolved to model the reasoning of mathematics. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §1) |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
Full Idea: λ-abstraction can be used to abstract and disambiguate a predicate. De re is [λx◊P(x)](f) - f has the possible-P property - and de dicto is ◊[λxP(x)](f) - possibly f has the P-property. Also applies to □. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §3.3) | |
A reaction: Compare the Barcan formula. Originated with Church in the 1930s, and Carnap 1947, but revived by Stalnaker and Thomason 1968. Because it refers to the predicate, it has a role in intensional versions of logic, especially modal logic. |
4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
Full Idea: The Lottery Paradox says that for 100 tickets and one winner, each ticket has a .99 likelihood of defeat, so they are all likely to lose, so there is unlikely to be a winner. | |
From: report of Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §5) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: The problem seems to be viewing each ticket in isolation. If I buy two tickets, I increase my chances of winning. |
8507 | Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers (like Devitt) think of reality as made up of things. Others, like me, think of it as made up of facts or states of affairs. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3) | |
A reaction: Devitt is a follower of Quine on this. Personally I rather like 'processes'. Unanalysed things with predication (Quine) don't look promising. I currently favour things with active powers, which give rise to properties. See Shoemaker and Ellis. |
8506 | Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I favour the Realist view that while we can distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties, but the two 'factors' are too intimately together to speak of a relation between them. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3) | |
A reaction: Is Armstrong being a bit of an ostrich here? We could talk of part-whole relationships, or internal relations, or set membership, or coinciding objects, or bundles. We certainly ought to have a go. Armstrong approaches Quine here! |
8505 | Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A philosophical account of a general sort is required of what it is for different tokens to be of the same type. To refuse to give such an account is to be a metaphysical ostrich. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §1) | |
A reaction: This defines Ostrich Nominalism (a label Armstrong aims at Quine). I certainly sympathise with Armstrong. If there is no more to a class (a type) than just having members (tokens), nothing is explain. What is natural, essential, intensional etc.? |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
Full Idea: Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds quite naturally. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.4) | |
A reaction: A definite description can pick out the same object in another possible world, or a very similar one, or an object which has almost nothing in common with the others. |
4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], Intro) | |
A reaction: I don't see why there shouldn't be a phenomenalist, anti-realist version of externalism, which just has 'starting points' instead of a serious commitment to foundations. |
4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: The fundamental question that must be answered by any acceptable version of foundationalism is: how are basic beliefs possible? | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §I) | |
A reaction: This question seems to be asking for a justification for basic beliefs, which smacks of 'Who made God?' Look, basic beliefs are just basic, right? |
4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: The central argument for foundationalism is simply that all other possible outcomes of the regress of justifications lead inexorably to scepticism. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §I) | |
A reaction: If you prefer coherence to foundations, you need the security of reason to assess the coherence (which seems to be an internal foundation!). |
4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: The most extreme version of externalism would be one that held that the external condition required for justification is simply the truth of the belief in question. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §II) | |
A reaction: The question is, why should we demand any more than this? The problem case is, traditionally, the lucky guess, but naturalist may say that these just don't occur with any regularity. We only get beliefs right because they are true. |
4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: External or objective reliability is not enough to offset subjective irrationality (such as unexplained clairvoyance). | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §IV) | |
A reaction: A good argument. Where do animals fit into this? If your clairvoyance kept working, in the end you might concede that you 'knew', even though you were baffled about how you managed it. |
4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
Full Idea: It may be that where there are no positive grounds for a charge of irrationality, the acceptance of a belief with only external justification is still subjectively irrational in a sense that rules out its being epistemologically justified. | |
From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §IV) | |
A reaction: A key objection. Surely rational behaviour requires a judgement to be made before a belief is accepted? If you are consistently clairvoyant, you must ask why. |