14 ideas
| 6222 | If a decision is in accord with right reason, everyone can agree with it [Cumberland] |
| Full Idea: No decision can be in accord with right reason unless all can agree on it. | |
| From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.V.XLVI) | |
| A reaction: Personally I think anyone who disagrees with this should get out of philosophy (and into sociology, fantasy fiction, ironic game-playing, crime…). Of course 'can' agree is not the same as 'will' agree. You must have faith that good reasons are persuasive. |
| 15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
| Full Idea: The common feature of every designating term is that designation may change from state to state - thus it can be formalized by a function from states to objects. | |
| From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3) | |
| A reaction: Specifying the objects sounds OK, but specifying states sounds rather tough. |
| 15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
| Full Idea: To first order modal logic (with quantification over objects) we can add a second kind of quantification, over intensions. An intensional object, or individual concept, will be modelled by a function from states to objects. | |
| From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.3) |
| 15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
| Full Idea: Awareness logic enriched Hintikka's epistemic models with an awareness function, mapping each state to the set of formulas we are aware of at that state. This reflects some bound on the resources we can bring to bear. | |
| From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.6.1) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Fagin and Halpern 1988 for this] |
| 15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
| Full Idea: In justification logics, the logics of knowledge are extended by making reasons explicit. A logic of proof terms was created, with a semantics. In this, mathematical truths are known for explicit reasons, and these provide a measure of complexity. | |
| From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.6.1) |
| 11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
| Full Idea: Mathematics is typically extensional throughout (we write 3+2=2+3 despite the two terms having different meanings). ..Classical first-order logic is extensional by design since it primarily evolved to model the reasoning of mathematics. | |
| From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §1) |
| 11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
| Full Idea: λ-abstraction can be used to abstract and disambiguate a predicate. De re is [λx◊P(x)](f) - f has the possible-P property - and de dicto is ◊[λxP(x)](f) - possibly f has the P-property. Also applies to □. | |
| From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §3.3) | |
| A reaction: Compare the Barcan formula. Originated with Church in the 1930s, and Carnap 1947, but revived by Stalnaker and Thomason 1968. Because it refers to the predicate, it has a role in intensional versions of logic, especially modal logic. |
| 17914 | He made a molten sea, which was ten cubits across, and thirty cubits round the edge [Anon (Kings)] |
| Full Idea: And he made a molten sea, ten cubits from the one brim to the other; it was round all about, and his height was five cubits: and a line of cubits did compass it round about. | |
| From: Anon (Kings) (11: Book of Kings 1 [c.550 BCE], 7:23) | |
| A reaction: In the sixth century BCE, this appears to give 3 as the value of Pi, though perhaps it shouldn't be taken too literally! |
| 15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
| Full Idea: Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds quite naturally. | |
| From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: A definite description can pick out the same object in another possible world, or a very similar one, or an object which has almost nothing in common with the others. |
| 6217 | Natural law is supplied to the human mind by reality and human nature [Cumberland] |
| Full Idea: Some truths of natural law, concerning guides to moral good and evil, and duties not laid down by civil law and government, are necessarily supplied ot the human mind by the nature of things and of men. | |
| From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.I) | |
| A reaction: I agree that some moral truths have the power of self-evidence. If you say they are built into the mind, we now ask what did the building, and evolution is the only answer, and hence we distance ourselves from the truths, seeing them as strategies. |
| 6221 | If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible [Cumberland] |
| Full Idea: If there be posited different ultimate ends, whose causes are opposed to each other, then there will be truly good actions likewise opposed to each other, which is impossible. | |
| From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.V.XVI) | |
| A reaction: A very interesting argument for there being one good rather than many, and an argument which I don't recall in any surviving Greek text. A response might be to distinguish between what is 'right' and what is 'good'. See David Ross. |
| 6218 | The happiness of individuals is linked to the happiness of everyone (which is individuals taken together) [Cumberland] |
| Full Idea: The happiness of each person cannot be separated from the happiness of all, because the whole is no different from the parts taken together. | |
| From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.VI) | |
| A reaction: Sounds suspiciously like the fallacy of composition (Idea 6219). An objection to utilitarianism is its assumption that a group of people have a 'total happiness' that is different from their individual states. Still, Cumberland is on to utilitarianism. |
| 6220 | The happiness of all contains the happiness of each, and promotes it [Cumberland] |
| Full Idea: The common happiness of all contains the greatest happiness for each, and most effectively promotes it. …There is no path leading anyone to his own happiness, other than the path which leads all to the common happiness. | |
| From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.VI) | |
| A reaction: I take this as a revolutionary idea, which leads to utilitarianism. It is doing what seemed to the Greeks unthinkable, which is combining hedonism with altruism. There is no proof for it, but it is a wonderful clarion call for building a civil society. |
| 6216 | Natural law is immutable truth giving moral truths and duties independent of society [Cumberland] |
| Full Idea: Natural law is certain propositions of immutable truth, which guide voluntary actions about the choice of good and avoidance of evil, and which impose an obligation to act, even without regard to civil laws, and ignoring compacts of governments. | |
| From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.I) | |
| A reaction: Not a popular view, but I am sympathetic. If you are in a foreign country and find a person lying in pain, there is a terrible moral deficiency in anyone who just ignores such a thing. No legislation can take away a person's right of self-defence. |