78 ideas
15801 | Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Leibniz, Reid, Brentano and others have held that, by considering certain obvious facts about ourselves, we can arrive at an understanding of the general principles of metaphysics. The present book is intended to confirm that view. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], Intro 1) | |
A reaction: I sympathise, but don't really agree. I see metaphysics as a process of filtering ourselves out of the picture, leaving an account of how things actually are. |
11832 | We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: We can achieve a lot by elucidations that put a concept to use without attempting to reduce it but, in using the concept, exhibit its connexions with other concepts that are established. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], Pr.3) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the best line of defence for analytic philosophy, given the much-cited observation that no one has successful reduced any concept by pure analysis. |
15802 | I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: My use of variables is not merely pedantic; it indicates that the various items on our list pertain to one and the same entity throughout. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], Intro 2) | |
A reaction: I am one of those poor souls who finds modern analytic philosophy challenging simply because I think in terms of old fashioned words, instead of thinking like mathematicians and logicians. This is a nice defence of their approach. |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
Full Idea: The common feature of every designating term is that designation may change from state to state - thus it can be formalized by a function from states to objects. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3) | |
A reaction: Specifying the objects sounds OK, but specifying states sounds rather tough. |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
Full Idea: To first order modal logic (with quantification over objects) we can add a second kind of quantification, over intensions. An intensional object, or individual concept, will be modelled by a function from states to objects. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.3) |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
Full Idea: Awareness logic enriched Hintikka's epistemic models with an awareness function, mapping each state to the set of formulas we are aware of at that state. This reflects some bound on the resources we can bring to bear. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.6.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Fagin and Halpern 1988 for this] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
Full Idea: In justification logics, the logics of knowledge are extended by making reasons explicit. A logic of proof terms was created, with a semantics. In this, mathematical truths are known for explicit reasons, and these provide a measure of complexity. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.6.1) |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
Full Idea: Mathematics is typically extensional throughout (we write 3+2=2+3 despite the two terms having different meanings). ..Classical first-order logic is extensional by design since it primarily evolved to model the reasoning of mathematics. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §1) |
11863 | (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The Lambda Abstraction Operator: We can write (λx)[Man x], which may be read as 'the property that any x has just if x is a man'. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 4.2) | |
A reaction: This technical device seems to be a commonplace in modern metaphysical discussions. I'm assuming it can be used to discuss properties without venturing into second-order logic. Presumably we could call the property here 'humanity'. |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
Full Idea: λ-abstraction can be used to abstract and disambiguate a predicate. De re is [λx◊P(x)](f) - f has the possible-P property - and de dicto is ◊[λxP(x)](f) - possibly f has the P-property. Also applies to □. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], §3.3) | |
A reaction: Compare the Barcan formula. Originated with Church in the 1930s, and Carnap 1947, but revived by Stalnaker and Thomason 1968. Because it refers to the predicate, it has a role in intensional versions of logic, especially modal logic. |
14746 | What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins] |
Full Idea: It would be incredible if what there is, rather than what we select for attention, depends on human activity and our conceptual scheme. One might expand to possible sortal concepts, rather than our language, but that amounts to four-dimensionalism. | |
From: comment on David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.3 | |
A reaction: [compression of a nice anti-Wiggins paragraph] He suggests that Wiggins is seeking an intermediate course (between narrow chauvinism about concepts, and excessive liberalism) in a discussion of natural kinds versus artifacts. |
15832 | Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: We will restrict events to those states of affairs which occur at certain places and times. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 4.6) | |
A reaction: If I say 'the bomb may explode sometime', that doesn't seem to refer to an event. Philosophers like Chisholm bowl along, defining left, right and centre, and never seem to step back from their system and ask obvious critical questions. |
15829 | The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: We will say that the mark of a state of affairs is the fact that it is capable of being accepted. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 4.2) | |
A reaction: I find this a quite bewildering proposal. It means that it is impossible for there to be a state of affairs which is beyond human conception, but why commit to that? |
15809 | A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies the thing to have a certain property. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.4) | |
A reaction: For this to work, we must include extrinsic and relational properties, and properties which are derived from mere predication. I think this is bad metaphysics, and leads to endless confusions. |
15828 | I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: I will propose that events are said to constitute one type of states of affairs, and propositions another | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 4.1) | |
A reaction: I would much prefer to distinguish between the static and the dynamic, so we have a static or timeless state of affairs, and a dynamic event or process. Propositions I take to be neither. He really means 'facts', which subsume the whole lot. |
15827 | Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Some properties may be said to be 'rooted outside the times at which they are had'. Examples are the property of being a widow and the property of being a future President. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 3.4) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of mess you when you treat the category in which an object belongs as if it was one of its properties. We categorise because of properties. |
15830 | Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: There are properties which nothing can possibly have; an example is the property of being both round and square. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 4.2) | |
A reaction: This is a rather bizarre Meinongian claim. For a start it sounds like two properties not one. Is there a property of being both 'over here' and 'over there'? We might say the round-square property must exist, for God to fail to implement it (?) |
15804 | If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: The state of affairs which is some dogs being brown may be said to entail (make it necessarily so) the property of 'being brown', as well as the properties of 'being canine' and 'being both brown and canine'. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.4) | |
A reaction: And the property of 'being such that it is both brown and canine and brown or canine'. Etc. This is dangerous nonsense. Making all truths entail the existence of some property means we can no longer get to grips with real properties. |
15810 | Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: It may well be that the only way we have, ultimately, of individuating anything is to relate it uniquely to ourselves. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.5) | |
A reaction: I'm guessing that Chisholm is thinking of 'ourselves' as meaning just himself, but I'm thinking this is plausible if he means the human community. I doubt whether there is much a philosopher can say on individuation that is revealing or precise. |
11900 | We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins] |
Full Idea: We might agree with Wiggins's theory of individuation, but reject his thesis that a thing's principle of individuation (of distinctness and persistence) must be preserved in all counterfactual situations. | |
From: comment on David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 8.7 | |
A reaction: I'm not even convinced that initial individuation consists of falling under a sortal, and I prefer to discuss the powers of the thing, rather than counterfactual facts about behaviour. |
11870 | Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: What a principle of activity does completely for a natural thing, and the function does imperfectly for an ordinary artefact, the artist's conception of his own making of the work must do for the painting. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 4.12) | |
A reaction: This nicely sums up Wiggins on individuation, and he seems to effectively elide individuation with essence. I certainly feel uneasy that a work of art needs a quite separate account from other artefacts. Surely it is just that we are fussier about them? |
11866 | The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: It is hard to think of anything true and significant that could not be said using the idea of thisness not better said while respectiving the distinctions designation/predication and particular/universal. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 4.7) | |
A reaction: Politis calls 'thisness' the 'ultimate subject of predication', so it is covered in logic by the name for an object. But we need to understand objects, and not just refer to them, and I'm not sure that 'universals' advance our understanding. |
15805 | Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Being the tallest man and being President of the United States are 'individual concepts', but not haecceities. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Chisholm introduces this term, to help him explain his haecceity more clearly. (His proposal on that adds a lot of fog to this area of metaphysics). |
15807 | A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: An individual essence or haecceity is a narrower type of individual concept. This is a property which is had necessarily, and which it is impossible for any other thing to have. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.4) | |
A reaction: [Apologies to Chisholm for leaving out the variables from his definition of haecceity. See Idea 15802] See also Idea 15805. The tallest man is unique, but someone else could become the tallest man. No one else could acquire 'being Socrates'. |
11896 | A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Wiggins bases sortal essentialism on the notion that a thing's principle of individuation is essential to it. | |
From: report of David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 7.1 | |
A reaction: This idea has failed to make much impression on me. I seem to be the only person who doesn't understand the concept of 'individuation'. Please let me know exactly what it means. Type individuation is not individual individuation, I presume. |
11841 | The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star. For Venus is not a star. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is a nice objection to the idea that identity is entirely a matter of falling under the same sortal category. |
15835 | Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Wiggins bases sortal essentialism on the notion that a thing's principle of individuation is essential to it. | |
From: report of David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 7.1 | |
A reaction: My problem with this is that individuation is a human activity, not an intrinsic feature of the entities in the external world. Entities presumably have a 'unity', but I'm not sure about a 'principle' that does that job, though Aristotle is sympathetic. |
10679 | 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack] |
Full Idea: 'Sortalism' endorses the view that some things have parts, but denies that every collection of things composes something. Whenever there is a particular, there must be a sort or kind to which it belongs. | |
From: report of David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Keith Hossack - Plurals and Complexes 7 | |
A reaction: What is the status of 'the first of its kind'? This seems to say that a token only has identity if it has type-identity. This sounds wildly wrong to me. I've made a 'thing' for you, but I haven't decided what it is yet. |
14363 | Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: Wiggins says an identity a=b stands no chance of being true unless there is some concept f under which a falls and under which b falls, which 'determines identity, persistence and existence conditions for members of its extension'. | |
From: report of David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Peter F. Strawson - Review of 'Sameness and Substance' p.604 | |
A reaction: This is the first clear statement I have met of Wiggins's central idea, upon which his sortal essentialism is built. Strawson's exposition adds that each thing necessarily falls under the 'highest' appropriate sortal ('dog', rather than 'terrier'). |
14364 | A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: In Wiggins's theory, necessity carries over from the kind to constitution. If Toby is necessarily a dog and 'dog' is a natural kind term, then Toby necessarily has the constitution of a dog, the features of which make up the real essence of being a dog. | |
From: report of David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Peter F. Strawson - Review of 'Sameness and Substance' p.605 | |
A reaction: The essence will then presumably consist of all and only the characteristics which are shared by all dogs whatsoever. So how do you decide the borderline between wolf and dog? Why isn't a wolf a dog? |
11851 | Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: There are countless predicates in English that have the appearance of sortal predicates but are purely generic (animal, machine, artefact), or are pure determinables for sortal determination (space-occupier, entity, substance). | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 2.6) | |
A reaction: This is preparing the ground for a specification of a sortal which defines something essential as being the hallmark of identity. It is never quite clear to me whether Wiggins's case rests on a nominal or a real essence. |
11865 | The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: A thing could have a property only if its having the property could be conceived, and that requires some sortal concept which adequately answers the Aristotelian question what the thing is. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [Algebra omitted!] The core idea of Wiggins's theory. It seems at first glance to be a revival of Aristotelian essentialism, but his view of that seems to merely involve falling into a category. He treats sortal concepts as Aristotle's 'primary being'. |
14744 | Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider] |
Full Idea: Wiggins says that coincidence is possible only between objects of different kinds. Trees and cats coincide with aggregates of matter, but never trees with trees or cats with cats. | |
From: report of David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.3 | |
A reaction: At first glance this sounds quite plausible, but I think this commitment to the priority of kinds produces huge confusion, given that we only derive our notions of kinds from inductions derived from individuals. Language perpetuates old inductions. |
11852 | Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The Pope's crown is made of crowns. There is no definite answer, when the Pope is wearing his crown, to the question 'how many crowns does he have on his head?' | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 2.7) | |
A reaction: A very nice example, in which the identity of the item seems clear enough, until you try to apply a sortal to it. I can't get excited about it, though, because calling it one 'crown' creates uncertainty, but calling it the 'Pope's crown' doesn't. |
11875 | Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: It can be perfectly determinate which mountain x is without x's extent's being determinate. A mountain is not, after all, something essentially demarcated by its extent or boundary. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 6.5) | |
A reaction: This endorses something I have always wanted to assert ('a vague boundary is still a boundary'), but with the interesting addition that one might think about vagueness in terms of what is essential to a thing. Hm.... |
14749 | Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider] |
Full Idea: Wiggins points out that identity is an atemporal relation whereas composition, like parthood, holds only relative to times. | |
From: report of David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.3 | |
A reaction: If David Cameron is identical to the Prime Minister, that doesn't seem to be atemporal. If x=7 in this problem, I can change x to something else in the next problem. x had better not be equal to 7 and to 9. |
15814 | A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Our idea of a peach is not an idea of something that 'has' those particular qualities, but the concrete thing that 'is' sweet and round and fuzzy. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.6) | |
A reaction: This is the beginnings of his 'adverbial' account of properties, with which you have to sympathise. It tries to eliminate the possibility of some propertyless thing, to which properties can then be added, like sprinkling sugar on it. |
12852 | If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons] |
Full Idea: Chisholm has an axiom: if x is a proper part of y, then necessarily if y exists then x is part of it. If x is ever part of y, they y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists. | |
From: report of Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], p.149) by Peter Simons - Parts 5.3 | |
A reaction: This is Chisholm's notorious mereological essentialism, that all parts are necessary, and change of part means change of thing. However, it looks to me more like a proposal about what properties are necessary, not what are essential. |
11844 | If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: If I repair or destroy an item, I do not repair or destroy each part of it (and since each part of a part is a part this would be difficult). | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 2.6) | |
A reaction: This seems like a nice refutation of any attempt to claim that a thing is no more than the sum of its parts, but one could analyse the notion of 'destroy', and find it just meant introducing gaps between parts. |
11861 | We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Let us be realistic, and forget about individual or particularized essences. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 4.2) | |
A reaction: This is the rather weird position you reach if you follow Wiggins's 'modest' essentialism, deriving from a thing merely falling under a sortal, or into a category. What is a natural kind, if its members don't each have a shared essence? |
15808 | A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: According to the traditional account of individual essence, each thing has only one individual essence and it includes all the characteristics that the thing has necessarily. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Chisholm is steeped in medieval theology, but I don't think this is quite what Aristotle meant. Everyone nowadays has to exclude the 'trivial' necessary properties, for a start. But why? I'm contemplating things which survive the loss of their essence. |
11871 | Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Essences of natural things are not fancified vacuities parading themselves ...as the ultimate explanation of everything that happens in the world. They are natures whose possession is a precondition of their owners being divided from the rest of reality. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 5.2) | |
A reaction: Thus Wiggins rejects the explanation account of essence, with an assertion of his own (highly implausible) view that essence is about individuation rather than about behaviour. Individuation strikes me as an entirely human activity, and not 'real'. |
11879 | Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Wiggins's proposal of a predicate-modifier account is the best formal representation of essential statements. ...This simple version is perfectly adequate to represent the claim that a is essentially-F: □(a exists → a is F). | |
From: report of David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], Ch.4) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 1.2 | |
A reaction: I suppose that is right. Having an essence is a feature of an entity, but it has to boil done to characteristics that define the entity, and which it must presumably always have. Could an entity ever lack its essence? |
11835 | The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Things being ranked under Names into sorts only as they agree with certain abstract ideas, to which we have annexed the Names, the essence of each sort comes to nothing but that abstract idea which the sortal name stands for. This is the nominal Essence. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], III.iii.15) | |
A reaction: He contrasts 'nominal essence' with 'real essence'. A key passage for David Wiggins. One shouldn't put too much emphasis on nominal essence, since it means that someone referred to as 'that idiot over there' (you, perhaps) is necessarily an idiot. |
11876 | It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: If horse-stages made sense at all, it would be easier to go from horses to horse-stages than to go from horse-stages to horses. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 6.9) | |
A reaction: A nice remark, analogous to 'it is easier to break a vase than to mend it'. Going from horse-stages to horses is the classic difficulty for 'bundle theories' (of objects, or persons): what is it that unites the bundle? |
12851 | Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons] |
Full Idea: Chisholm poses the problem of intermittence with the case of a toy fort which is built from toy bricks, taken apart, and then reassembled with the same bricks in the same position. | |
From: report of Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], p.90) by Peter Simons - Parts 5.3 | |
A reaction: You could strengthen the case, or the problem, by using those very bricks to build a ship during the interval. Or building a fort with a different design. Most people would be happy to say that same object (token) has been rebuilt. |
11858 | The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Let us remember that the title in question is not the title to the sobriquet 'Theseus' Ship'; it is the title to identity with Theseus' ship, a particular ship originating from the eighth century B.C. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 3.4) | |
A reaction: There is an assumption here that identity is defined by origin. What is the origin of the identity of those huge football clubs that began under the name of some village team in 1875? What is the origin of 'England' as a single entity? |
11843 | Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: People often speak of identity over time and distinguish it from identity at a time. But identity is just identity. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 2.3) | |
A reaction: I myself am guilty of such usage, but it doesn't imply a commitment to a multivocal concept. The epistemological issues (of explaining what it is now, and simply reidentifying it later) seem profoundly different. Hume only admits identity over time. |
11864 | Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The simple proof (from Ruth Barcan Marcus) is: Hesperus is necessarily Hesperus, so if Phosphorus is Hesperus, then Phosphorus is necessarily Hesperus. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 4.3) | |
A reaction: This is the famous idea which she noticed well before Kripke. The point is that the simple logic of the case bestows a necessity on the identity. We shouldn't be confused by the a posteriori and contingent nature of the discovery. |
11831 | The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The formal properties of identity are the reflexivity of identity, and Leibniz's Law (if x is the same as y, then whatever is true of one is true of the other). | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], Pr.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably transitivity will also apply, and, indeed, symmetry. He seems to mean something like the 'axiomatic formal properties'. |
14362 | Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: Wiggins argues that Geach's Relative Identity is incompatible with the formal properties of identity, which include, besides transitivity, symmetry and reflexivity, the complete community of properties defined by the Indiscernibility of Identicals. | |
From: report of David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Peter F. Strawson - Review of 'Sameness and Substance' p.603 | |
A reaction: The tricky part is that Wiggins then goes on to say that identity depends on sortals, which sounds very close to the Geach view. I find disentangling them tricky. See Idea 14363 for a helpful comment from Strawson. |
11838 | Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The thesis of Relativity of Identity (which I steadfastly oppose) ..suggests that it makes all the difference to keeping track of continuants through space and time which concept one subsumes something under. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [Geach I take to be the villain of this idea] The point is that identity is entirely relative to the sortal concept, where Wiggins wants to make identity a combination of the object itself and our concept of it (I think). |
11847 | To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: As a necessary condition of the truth of an identity claim, some common sort f will have to be found to which they each belong. That is the point at which the primary question of identity can come into focus. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 2.2) | |
A reaction: This is the plainest English expression I can find of Wiggins's main thesis. He maintains this thesis, while adamantly denying the idea that identity consists entirely of falling under a concept. |
15806 | The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: I wish to urge that the property of being identical with me is an individual concept. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.4) | |
A reaction: I can just about live with the claim (for formal purposes) that I am identical with myself, but I strongly resist my then having a 'property' consisting of 'being identical with myself' (or 'not being identical with somone else' etc.). |
11845 | Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Leibniz's Law underwrites the substitutivity of identity and this is a principle not long dispensable in any form of reasoning. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 2.7) | |
A reaction: Thus the modern fashion of deriving our metaphysics from our logic. Presumably we can derive it from our epistemology too, or even from our intuitions, if we thought they were good enough as evidence. |
11839 | Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Is Leibniz's Law as true for 'is the same as' as it is for '='? | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 1.2) | |
A reaction: [By Leibniz's Law he means if they are the same, they support the same truths] |
15826 | There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: I suggest that there is a 'loose' sense of identity that is consistent with saying 'A has a property that B does not have', or 'some things are true of A but not of B'. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 3.2) | |
A reaction: He is trying to explicate Bishop Butler's famous distinction between 'strict and philosophical' and 'loose and popular' senses. We might want to claim that the genuine identity relation is the 'loose' one (pace the logicians and mathematicians). |
11869 | Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Worlds are the shadows of our suppositions and they take on their identity from these. Suppositions take on their identity from (inter alia) the objects they relate to. If they sever themselves from these objects, then they collapse. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 4.11) | |
A reaction: Sounds good. My picture is of possibilities which are suggested by objecfs in the actual world, with extreme possibilities being at fifth-remove from actuality. Any worlds that go beyond natural possibility are just there for fun. |
11850 | Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: It is perfectly notorious that not every story corresponds to a possible world. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 2.4) | |
A reaction: Thus a fantasy castle might be decorated with 'beautiful circular squares', or be threatened by a lump of enriched uranium twenty feet in diameter. Wiggins is replying to the claim that a possible world represents a 'story'. |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
Full Idea: Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds quite naturally. | |
From: Melvin Fitting (Intensional Logic [2007], 3.4) | |
A reaction: A definite description can pick out the same object in another possible world, or a very similar one, or an object which has almost nothing in common with the others. |
15819 | Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Does a red sense-datum or appearance have a back side as well as a front? Where is it located? Does it have any weight? What is it made of? | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.8) | |
A reaction: A reductive physicalist like myself is not so troubled by questions like this, which smack of Descartes's non-spatial argument for dualism. |
15816 | 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: The sentences 'I feel depressed' and 'I feel exuberant' are related in the way in which 'He runs slowly' and 'He runs swiftly' are related, and not in the way in which 'He has a red book' and 'He has a brown book' are related. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.8) | |
A reaction: Ducasse 1942 and Chisholm 1957 seem to be the sources of the adverbial theory. I gather Chisholm gave it up late in his career. The adverbial theory seems sort of right, but it doesn't illuminate what is happening. |
15818 | So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: We may summarise my way of looking at appearing by saying that so-called appearances or sense-data are 'affections' or 'modifications' of the person who is said to experience them. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.8) | |
A reaction: Hm. That seems to transfer the ontological problem of the redness of the tomato from the tomato to the perceiver, but leave the basic difficulty untouched. I think we need to pull apart the intrinsic and subjective ingredients here. |
15817 | If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: If we say a man 'senses redly', may we also say that he 'senses rhomboidally' or 'senses rectangularly'? There is no reason why not. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.8) | |
A reaction: This is Chisholm replying to one of the best known objections to the adverbial theory. Can we sense 'wobblyrhomboidallywithpinkdots-ly'? Can we perceive 'landscapely'? The problem is bigger than he thinks. |
15831 | Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: I suggest that states of affairs constitute the objects of the theory of explanation. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 4.4) | |
A reaction: It is good to ask what the constituents of a theory of explanation might be. He has an all-embracing notion of state of affairs, whereas I would say that events and processes are separate. See Idea 15828. |
11848 | Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The special effectiveness of the 'what is it?' question is that, in the case of continuants, it refers us back to our constantly exercised idea of the persistence and life-span of an entity. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Compare 'this is a human' with 'this is a member of a family noted for its longevity'. We can't simply answer 'what is it?' by tossing it into the nearest category. I say we need an individual essence for explanation, not just a sortal. |
15811 | I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: What picks me out uniquely, without relating me to some other being? It can only be the property of 'being me' or 'being identical with myself', which can only be an individual essence or haecceity, a property I cannot fail to have. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Only a philosopher (and a modern analytic one at that) would imagine that this was some crucial insight into how we know our own identities. |
15815 | Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I would think it better to say that the ego is 'transparent'. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.8) | |
A reaction: Insofar as we evidently have a self, I would say it is neither. It is directly experienced, through willing, motivation, and mental focus. |
15813 | People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Each person uses the first person pronoun to refer to himself, and in such a way that its reference (Bedeutung) is to himself and its intention (Sinn) is his own individual essence. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 1.5) | |
A reaction: I think this is exactly right, and may be the basis of the way we essentialise in our understanding of the rest of reality. I have a strong notion of what is essential in me and what is not. |
15803 | Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Some very strange theories of the self suggest it is an abstract object, such as a class, or a property, or a function. Some theories imply that I am a collection, or a bundle, or a structure, or an event, or a process (or even a verb!). | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], Intro 4) | |
A reaction: I certainly reject the abstract lot, but the second lot doesn't sound so silly to me, especially 'structure' and 'process'. I don't buy the idea that the Self is an indivisible monad. It is a central aspect of brain process - the prioritiser of thought. |
15821 | Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Determinism is the proposition that, for every event that occurs, there occurs a sufficient causal condition of that event. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 2.2) | |
A reaction: You need an ontology of events to put it precisely this way. Doesn't it also work the other way: that there is an event for every sufficient causal condition? The beginning and the end of reality pose problems. |
11859 | The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 3.6) | |
A reaction: I like this piece of simple common sense. I personally don't think you can reach first base in a sensible discussion if you don't face up to both sides of this idea (especially the second half, which many philosophers, especially of language, neglect). |
11836 | We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: We can use the Fregean 'concept' on the level of reference and naming, and prefer the word 'conception' for the Kantian idea of the sense, or the information needed to understand the concept. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], Pr.5) | |
A reaction: This is a nice suggestion, and at first blush I think it should be adopted. Sometimes philosophers regret adopting a terminology several hundred years after it has been agreed. |
15824 | There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: If a man does not respond to a greeting, if he was unaware that he was addressed then his failure to respond may be a mere omission. But if he intended to snub the man, then he could be said to have 'committed the omission'. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 2.6) | |
A reaction: Chisholm has an extensive knowledge of Catholic theology. These neat divisions are subject to vagueness and a continuum of cases in real life. |
15822 | The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: It is generally agreed, I think, that the concept of physical necessity, or a law of nature, is fundamental to the theory of causation and, more generally, to the concept of nature. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This seems intuitively right, but we might be able to formulate a concept of nature that had a bit less necessity in it, especially if we read a few books on quantum theory first. |
11860 | Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: For all the purposes of identity and individuation of things that belong to natural kinds..., it is enough to have regard for the lawlike propensities of members of the kind. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001], 4.1) | |
A reaction: This may have got things in reverse, since it is hard to see how you could pick out any laws if you didn't assume the existence of natural kinds which were causing the regularities in the behaviour. |
15823 | Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: Sometimes a distinction is made between 'event causation' and 'agent causation' and it has been suggested that there is an unbridgeable gap between the two. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 2.5) | |
A reaction: Nope, don't buy that. I connect it with Davidson's 'anomalous monism', that tries to combine one substance with separate laws of action. The metaphysical price for such a theory is too high to pay. |
15820 | A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm] |
Full Idea: When we say something is 'physically necessary' we can replace it with 'law of nature'. | |
From: Roderick Chisholm (Person and Object [1976], 2.2) | |
A reaction: [plucked out of context even more than usual!] This is illuminating about what contemporary philosophers (such as Armstrong) seem to mean by a law of nature. It is not some grand equation, but a small local necessary connection. |