4 ideas
2572 | Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack] |
Full Idea: It is surely less plausible to suppose that logical truth consists in correspondence to the facts than that 'factual' truth does. | |
From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.6) |
2570 | The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack] |
Full Idea: The definition of truth will have to be, Tarski argues, relative to a language, for one and the same sentence may be true in one language, and false or meaningless in another. | |
From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.5) |
527 | Everything exists which anyone perceives [Metrodorus of Chios] |
Full Idea: Everything exists which anyone perceives. | |
From: Metrodorus (Chi) (Natural Science (lost) [c.340 BCE], B2), quoted by (who?) - where? | |
A reaction: cf Berkeley and Epicurus. This misses out the problem of perceptual error, such as a square tower looking round from a distance, or one person in a group thinking they have seen something. It is still a good criterion, though! |
7667 | There are two sides to men - the pleasantly social, and the violent and creative [Diderot, by Berlin] |
Full Idea: Diderot is among the first to preach that there are two men: the artificial man, who belongs in society and seeks to please, and the violent, bold, criminal instinct of a man who wishes to break out (and, if controlled, is responsible for works of genius. | |
From: report of Denis Diderot (works [1769], Ch.3) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism | |
A reaction: This has an obvious ancestor in Plato's picture (esp. in 'Phaedrus') of the two conflicting sides to the psuché, which seem to be reason and emotion. In Diderot, though, the suppressed man has virtues, which Plato would deny. |