24 ideas
5311 | If observation goes up a level, we expect the laws of the lower level to remain in force [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: When the observer shifts his attention from one level of organisation to the next, as from physics to chemistry, he expects to find obedience to all the laws of the levels below. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to state a necessary condition of reduction, but not a sufficient one. Wilson points out that new phenomena emerge at higher levels. This principle is similar to Hume's argument against miracles. You don't easily overthrow basic laws. |
5312 | A child first sees objects as distinct, and later as members of groups [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: From a single-minded effort to move objects a child's activity grows into a detached reflection on the movements themselves. The objects are first perceived as distinct entities, and then as members of groups to be classified. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This does not, of course, prove anything about the philosophical problems of universals, but it does seem to pinpoint the stage in human development when 'universals' are perceived. The basis seems to be groups or sets, but how do we spot those? |
5309 | Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: How does he know this proposition which he asserts so confidently? Obvious counterexamples seem to be utterly trivial beliefs, and self-destructive beliefs. What is the evolutionary value of low self-esteem? Still, you see his point. |
5310 | Philosophers study the consequences of ethics instead of its origins [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Philosophers examine the precepts of ethical systems with reference to their consequences and not their origins. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: He is interested in biological origins, but it strikes me that every moral theory has some account of the origins of morality, be it pure reason, or the love of pleasure, or human nature, or eternal ideas, or the will of God, or selfish desires. |
5313 | The rules of human decision-making converge and overlap in a 'human nature' [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: The rules followed in human decision-making are tight enough to produce a broad overlap in the decisions taken by all individuals, and hence a convergence powerful enough to be labelled 'human nature'. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This is a nice empirical criterion for asserting the existence of human nature, and it seems right to examine decisions, rather than more thoughtless or conformist behaviour. Existentialists dream of new possibilities, but the old ways always seem best… |
5316 | We undermine altruism by rewarding it, but we reward it to encourage it [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: By sanctifying altruism in order to reward it we make it less true, but by that means we promote its recurrence in others. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: So is my preference for not rewarding (or even noticing) altruism an anti-social tendency. The very conspicuous charity of sponsorship seems somehow inferior to the truly anonymous gift. Or super-altruism is very public, to encourage it in others? |
5318 | Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: By 'hard-core' he means suicidally self-sacrificing, rather than extensive. This seems a good thesis. It strikes me that the development of civil society is often impeded by family loyalty, such as in the case of the Mafia. |
5317 | The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: This is a key element of social contract theory. It shows why natural selection of truly altruistic traits might be beneficial to individuals, provided they are surrounded by possible recipricators. We trust those who are genuine and sincere. |
5308 | The only human purpose is that created by our genetic history [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: No species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This invites the question of what that purpose is perceived to be. Some people feel an imperative to play the piano all day, so presumably genetic history has created that feeling. Presumably we can also choose a purpose, even extinction. |
17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
Full Idea: Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all. | |
From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins... |
5314 | Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and fast, biological evolution is Darwinian and slow [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and very fast, whereas biological evolution is Darwinian and usually very slow. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: An intriguing point, given how discredited Lamarckian evolution is. It links with the Dawkins idea of 'memes' - cultural ideas which spread very fast. Is biological evolution suddenly about to become Lamarckian, as culture influences biology? |
5315 | Over 99 percent of human evolution has been in the hunter-gatherer phase [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Selection pressures of hunter-gatherer existence have persisted for over 99 percent of human genetic evolution. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This seems a key point to bear in mind when assessing human nature. Hunter-gathering isn't just one tendency in our genetics; it more or less constitutes everything we are. |
17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
Full Idea: The signs are that the higher categories are not natural kinds and so the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. ...This is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether, it is not abandoning a tree of life. | |
From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 6) | |
A reaction: Devitt's underlying point is that the higher and more general kinds do not have an essence (a specific nature), which is the qualification to be a natural kind. They explain nothing. Essence is the hallmark of natural kinds. Hmmm. |
17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |
Full Idea: Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species. | |
From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 7) | |
A reaction: Devitt votes for it, and cites Dupré, among many other. Given the existence of rival accounts, all making good points, it is hard to resist this view. |
21243 | An existing thing is even greater if its non-existence is inconceivable [Anselm] |
Full Idea: Something can be thought of as existing, which cannot be thought of as not existing, and this is greater than that which cannot be thought of as not existing. | |
From: Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Ch 3) | |
A reaction: This is a necessary addition, to single out the concept of God as special. But you really must give reasons for saying God's non-existence is inconceivable. Atheists seem to manage. |
21241 | Even the fool can hold 'a being than which none greater exists' in his understanding [Anselm] |
Full Idea: Even the fool must be convinced that a being than which none greater can be thought exists at least in his understanding, since when he hears this he understands it, and whatever is understood is in the understanding. | |
From: Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Ch 2) | |
A reaction: Psalm 14.1: 'The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God'. But how does the fool interpret the words, if he has limited imagination? He might get no further than an attractive film star. He would need prompting to think of a spiritual being. |
21242 | If that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists, that is greater than the mere idea [Anselm] |
Full Idea: Clearly that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist in the understanding alone. For it it is actually in the understanding alone, it can be thought of as existing also in reality, and this is greater. | |
From: Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Ch 2) | |
A reaction: The suppressed premise is 'something actually existing is greater than the mere conception of it'. As it stands this is wrong. I can imagine a supreme evil. But see Idea 21243. |
21244 | Conceiving a greater being than God leads to absurdity [Anselm] |
Full Idea: If some mind could think of something better than thou, the creature would rise above the Creator and judge its Creator; but this is altogether absurd. | |
From: Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Ch 3) | |
A reaction: An error, revealing a certain desperation. If a greafer being could be conceived than the being so far imagined as God (a necessarily existing being), that being would BE God, by his own argument (and not some arrogant 'creature'). |
1421 | A perfection must be independent and unlimited, and the necessary existence of Anselm's second proof gives this [Malcolm on Anselm] |
Full Idea: Anselm's second proof works, because he sees that necessary existence (or the impossibility of non-existence) really is a perfection. This is because a perfection requires no dependence or limit or impediment. | |
From: comment on Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Ch 3) by Norman Malcolm - Anselm's Argument Sect II | |
A reaction: I have the usual problem, that it doesn't seem to follow that the perfect existence of something bestows a perfection. It may be necessary that 'for every large animal there exists a disease'. Satan may exist necessarily. |
21245 | The word 'God' can be denied, but understanding shows God must exist [Anselm] |
Full Idea: We think of a thing when we say the world, and in another way when we think of the very thing itself. In the second sense God cannot be thought of as nonexistent. No one who understands can think God does not exist. | |
From: Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Ch 4) | |
A reaction: It seems open to the atheist to claim the exact opposite - that you can commit to God's existence if it is just a word, but understanding shows that God is impossible (perhaps because of contradictions). How to arbitrate? |
21246 | Guanilo says a supremely fertile island must exist, just because we can conceive it [Anselm] |
Full Idea: Guanilo supposes that we imagine an island surpassing all lands in its fertility. We might then say that we cannot doubt that it truly exists is reality, because anyone can conceive it from a verbal description. | |
From: Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Reply 3) | |
A reaction: Guanilo was a very naughty monk, who must have had sleepless nights over this. One could further ask whether an island might have necessary existence. Anselm needs 'a being' to be a special category of thing. |
21247 | Nonexistence is impossible for the greatest thinkable thing, which has no beginning or end [Anselm] |
Full Idea: If anyone does think of something a greater than which cannot be thought, then he thinks of something which cannot be thought of as nonexistent, ...for then it could be thought of as having a beginning and an end. And this is impossible. | |
From: Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Reply 3) | |
A reaction: A nice idea, but it has a flip side. If the atheist denies God's existence, then it follows that (because no beginning is possible for such a being) the existence of God is impossible. Anselm adds that contingent existents have parts (unlike God). |
1420 | Anselm's first proof fails because existence isn't a real predicate, so it can't be a perfection [Malcolm on Anselm] |
Full Idea: Anselm's first proof fails, because he treats existence as being a perfection, which it isn't, because that would make it a real predicate. | |
From: comment on Anselm (Proslogion [1090], Ch 2) by Norman Malcolm - Anselm's Argument Sect I | |
A reaction: Not everyone accepts Kant's claim that existence cannot be a predicate. They all seem to know what a perfection is. Can the Mona Lisa (an object) not be a perfection? Must it be broken down into perfect predicates? |
5320 | It is estimated that mankind has produced 100,000 religions [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Since the first recorded religion (in Iraq 60,000 years ago) it is estimated that mankind has produced in the order of one hundred thousand religions. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: If asked to guess the number, I would probably have said '200'! This staggering figure seems to argue both ways - it suggest a certain arbitrariness in the details of religions, but an extremely intense drive to have some sort of religious belief. |