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All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds and Biological Realism', 'An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation' and 'Sentences'

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11 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations

18528	The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol]
	Full Idea: It appears that a single thing, which must be imagined as some sort of interval [intervallum] existing between two things, cannot exist in extramental reality, but only in the intellect.
	From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], I fols318 v a-b), quoted by John Heil - The Universe as We Find It 7
	A reaction: This is the standard medieval denial of the existence of real relations. It contrasts with post-Russell ontology, which seems to admit relations as entities. Heil and Auriol and right.

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory

21500	We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: When the whole range of empirical beliefs is taken into account, all of them more or less dependent on memorial knowledge, we find that those which are most credible can be assured by their mutual support, or 'congruence'.
	From: C.I. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation [1946], 334), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 3.1
	A reaction: Lewis may be over-confident about this, and is duly attacked by Olson, but it seems to me roughly correct. How do you assess whether some unusual element in your memory was a dream or a real experience?

21501	If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: To doubt our sense of past experience as founded in actuality, would be to lose any criterion by which either the doubt itself or what is doubted could be corroborated.
	From: C.I. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation [1946], 358), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 3.3.1
	A reaction: Obviously scepticism about memory can come in degrees, but total rejection of short-term and clear memories looks like a non-starter. What could you put in its place? Hyper-rationalism? Even maths needs memory.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism

6556	If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain.
	From: C.I. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation [1946], 186), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Intro
	A reaction: Lewis makes this comment when facing infinite regress problems. It is a very nice slogan for foundationalism, which embodies the slippery slope view. Personally I feel the emotional pull of foundations, but acknowledge the very strong doubts about them.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

21498	Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: A set of statements, or a set of supposed facts asserted, will be said to be congruent if and only if they are so related that the antecedent probability of any one of them will be increased if the remainder of the set can be assumed as given premises.
	From: C.I. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation [1946], 338), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 2.2
	A reaction: This thesis is vigorously attacked by Erik Olson, who works through the probability calculations. There seems an obvious problem without that. How else do you assess 'congruence', other than by evidence of mutual strengthening?

18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension

5828	Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI]
	Full Idea: "The denotation or extension of a term is the class of all actual or existent things which the term correctly applies to or names; the connotation or intension of a term is delimited by any correct definition of it." ..And intension determines extension.
	From: C.I. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation [1946]), quoted by Stephen P. Schwartz - Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds §II
	A reaction: The last part is one of the big ideas in philosophy of language, which was rejected by Putnam and co. If you were to reverse the slogan, though, (to extension determines intension) how would you identify the members of the extension?

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter

16589	Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol]
	Full Idea: Prime matter has no essence, nor a nature that is determinate, distinct, and actual. Instead, it is pure potential, and determinable, so that it is indeterminately and indistinctly a material thing.
	From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], II.12.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
	A reaction: Pasnau thinks Auriol has the best shot at explaining the vague idea of 'prime matter', with the thought that it exists, but indeterminateness is what gives it a lesser mode of existence. It strikes me as best to treat 'exist' as univocal.

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds

17371	Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
	Full Idea: Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all.
	From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4)
	A reaction: He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins...

27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species

17372	The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
	Full Idea: The signs are that the higher categories are not natural kinds and so the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. ...This is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether, it is not abandoning a tree of life.
	From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 6)
	A reaction: Devitt's underlying point is that the higher and more general kinds do not have an essence (a specific nature), which is the qualification to be a natural kind. They explain nothing. Essence is the hallmark of natural kinds. Hmmm.

17373	Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
	Full Idea: Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species.
	From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 7)
	A reaction: Devitt votes for it, and cites Dupré, among many other. Given the existence of rival accounts, all making good points, it is hard to resist this view.

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions

16651	God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol]
	Full Idea: If someone says 'God could make straightness without a line, and roughness and lightness in weight without parts', …then show me the reason why God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction, yet cannot do these things.
	From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], IV.12.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 11.4
	A reaction: How engagingly bonkers. The key idea preceding this is that God can do all sorts of things that are beyond our understanding. He is then obliged to offer some examples.