5 ideas
| 16252 | Metaphysics uses empty words, or just produces pseudo-statements [Carnap] |
| Full Idea: Since metaphysics doesn't want to assert analytic propositions, nor fall within the domain of physical science, it is compelled to employ words for which no criteria of application are specified, ..or else combine meaningful words..into pseudo-statements. | |
| From: Rudolph Carnap (Elimination of Metaphysics by Analysis of Language [1959]), quoted by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics 2.4 | |
| A reaction: A classic summary of the logical positivist rejection of metaphysics. I incline to treat metaphysics as within the domain of science, but at a level of generality so high that practising scientists become bewildered and give up. |
| 6624 | Dennett denies the existence of qualia [Dennett, by Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Dennett goes to the extreme of denying the existence of qualia altogether. | |
| From: report of Daniel C. Dennett (Quining Qualia [1988]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: I sympathise with Dennett. Once you know how physically complex and rapid a quale is (about nine billion connections, all firing continuously), the notion that it seems to be some new 'thing', while just being a process, seems fine. Like a waterfall. |
| 17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
| Full Idea: Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all. | |
| From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins... |
| 17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
| Full Idea: The signs are that the higher categories are not natural kinds and so the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. ...This is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether, it is not abandoning a tree of life. | |
| From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 6) | |
| A reaction: Devitt's underlying point is that the higher and more general kinds do not have an essence (a specific nature), which is the qualification to be a natural kind. They explain nothing. Essence is the hallmark of natural kinds. Hmmm. |
| 17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |
| Full Idea: Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species. | |
| From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 7) | |
| A reaction: Devitt votes for it, and cites Dupré, among many other. Given the existence of rival accounts, all making good points, it is hard to resist this view. |