16618
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Intellectual and moral states, and even the soul itself, depend on prime matter for their existence [Blasius, by Pasnau]
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Full Idea:
Blasius argued that prime matter is the subject of all our intellectual and moral states. This implies that such states cannot exist apart from the body, which seems to imply further that the soul itself cannot exist apart from the body.
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From:
report of Blasius of Parma (Les quaestiones de anima (lectures on the soul) [1385], I.8 p.65) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.3
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A reaction:
It seems that, under pressure, Blasius recanted this view in lectures given eleven years later.
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17371
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Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
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Full Idea:
Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all.
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From:
Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4)
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A reaction:
He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins...
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8433
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There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards [Lewis, by Horwich]
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Full Idea:
Lewis claims that most events are over-determined by subsequent states of the world, but not by their history. That is, the future of every event contains many independent traces of its occurrence, with little prior indication that it would happen.
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From:
report of David Lewis (Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow [1979]) by Paul Horwich - Lewis's Programme p.209
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A reaction:
Lewis uses this asymmetry to deduce the direction of causation, and hence the direction of time. Most people (including me, I think) would prefer to use the axiomatic direction of time to deduce directions of causation. Lewis was very wicked.
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