Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds and Biological Realism', 'On the Reality of Accidents' and 'Letters to Hegel'

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5 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism

19382	Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I consider abstracta not as real things but as abbreviated ways of talking ...and to that extent I am a nominalist, at least provisionally ...It suffices to posit only substances as real things, and, to assert truths about these.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Reality of Accidents [1688]), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz
	A reaction: I am a modern nominalist, in my hostility to a serious ontological commitment to abstracta. You get into trouble, though, if you say there are only objects or substances. Physics says reality may all be 'fields', or something.... 'Truths' is good.

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self

22073	The basis of philosophy is the Self prior to experience, where it is the essence of freedom [Schelling]
	Full Idea: The highest principle of all philosophy is the Self insofar as it is purely and simply Self, not yet conditioned by an object, but where it is formulated by freedom. The alpha and omega of all philosophy is freedom.
	From: Friedrich Schelling (Letters to Hegel [1795], 1795 02 04), quoted by Jean-François Courtine - Schelling p.83
	A reaction: A common later response to this (e.g. in Schopenhauer) is that there is no concept of the Self prior to experience. The idealists seem to adore free will, while offering no reply to Spinoza on the matter, with whom they were very familiar.

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds

17371	Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
	Full Idea: Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all.
	From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4)
	A reaction: He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins...

27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species

17372	The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
	Full Idea: The signs are that the higher categories are not natural kinds and so the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. ...This is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether, it is not abandoning a tree of life.
	From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 6)
	A reaction: Devitt's underlying point is that the higher and more general kinds do not have an essence (a specific nature), which is the qualification to be a natural kind. They explain nothing. Essence is the hallmark of natural kinds. Hmmm.

17373	Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
	Full Idea: Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species.
	From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 7)
	A reaction: Devitt votes for it, and cites Dupré, among many other. Given the existence of rival accounts, all making good points, it is hard to resist this view.