12729
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The cause of a change is not the real influence, but whatever gives a reason for the change [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
That thing from whose state a reason for the changes is most readily provided is adjudged to be the cause. ...Causes are not derived from a real influence, but from the providing of a reason.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Specimen inventorum [1689], A6.4.1620), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5
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A reaction:
Leibniz is not denying that there are real influences. He seems to be offering the thesis which I am pursuing, that the need for explanation is the crucial factor in shaping the structure of our metaphysics.
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19451
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When absorbed in deep reflection, is your reason in control, or is it you? [Feuerbach]
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Full Idea:
When, submerged in deep reflection, you forget both yourself and your surroundings, is it you who controls reason, or is it rather reason that controls and absorbs you?
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From:
Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], I)
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A reaction:
A delightful question, even if it looks like a false dichotomy. I'm not sure what to make of 'me', if my reason can be subtracted from it. Aquinas was one the same wavelength here.
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19450
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Reason, love and will are the highest perfections and essence of man - the purpose of his life [Feuerbach]
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Full Idea:
Reason, love and power of will are perfections of man; they are his highest powers, his absolute essence in so far as he is man, the purpose of his existence. Man exists in order to think, love and will.
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From:
Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], I)
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A reaction:
Feuerbach was a notable atheist, but adopts a religious style of language which modern atheists would find rather alien. Personally I love talk of ideals and perfections. Ideals have been discredited in modern times, but need a revival.
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17371
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Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
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Full Idea:
Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all.
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From:
Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4)
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A reaction:
He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins...
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19454
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A God needs justice, kindness and wisdom, but those concepts don't depend on the concept of God [Feuerbach]
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Full Idea:
The concept of God depends on the concepts of justice, kindness and wisdom - a God who is not kind, not just, and not wise is no God. But these concepts do not depend on the concept of God. That a quality is possessed by God does not make it divine.
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From:
Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], II)
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A reaction:
This is part of Feuerbach's argument for atheism, but if you ask for the source of our human concepts of justice, kindness and wisdom, no one, I would have thought, could cite God for the role.
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19453
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If love, goodness and personality are human, the God who is their source is anthropomorphic [Feuerbach]
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Full Idea:
If love, goodness, and personality are human determinations, the being which constitutes their source and ...their presupposition is also an anthropomorphism; so is the existence of God.
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From:
Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], II)
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A reaction:
It is certainly a struggle for the imagination to grasp a being which is characterised by idealised versions of human virtues, and yet has an intrinsic nature which is utterly different from humanity.
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