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All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds and Biological Realism', 'Recent Debates on the A Priori' and 'works'

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5 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics

9226	If mathematical theories conflict, it may just be that they have different subject matter [Field,H]
	Full Idea: Unlike logic, in the case of mathematics there may be no genuine conflict between alternative theories: it is natural to think that different theories, if both consistent, are simply about different subjects.
	From: Hartry Field (Recent Debates on the A Priori [2005], 7)
	A reaction: For this reason Field places logic at the heart of questions about a priori knowledge, rather than mathematics. My intuitions make me doubt his proposal. Given the very simple basis of, say, arithmetic, I would expect all departments to connect.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature

4366	We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse]
	Full Idea: Williams has expressed pessimism about the project of Aristotelian naturalism on the grounds that his conception of nature, and thereby of human nature, was normative, and that, in a scientific age, this is not a conception that we can take on board.
	From: report of Bernard Williams (works [1971]) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Ch.11
	A reaction: I think there is a compromise here. The existentialist denial of intrinsic human nature seems daft, but Aristotelians must grasp the enormous flexibility that is possible to human behaviour because of the open nature of rationality.

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds

17371	Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
	Full Idea: Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all.
	From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4)
	A reaction: He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins...

27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species

17372	The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
	Full Idea: The signs are that the higher categories are not natural kinds and so the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. ...This is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether, it is not abandoning a tree of life.
	From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 6)
	A reaction: Devitt's underlying point is that the higher and more general kinds do not have an essence (a specific nature), which is the qualification to be a natural kind. They explain nothing. Essence is the hallmark of natural kinds. Hmmm.

17373	Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
	Full Idea: Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species.
	From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 7)
	A reaction: Devitt votes for it, and cites Dupré, among many other. Given the existence of rival accounts, all making good points, it is hard to resist this view.