24 ideas
18405 | A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: In a 'teepee' argument, a number of argumentative planks intersupport each other. No plank is sufficiently strong to establish the position, but each lends credibility to the others because there is the appearance of a unified phenomenon. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 01.5) | |
A reaction: To attack it, they say, you have to identify the separate planks of the argument. It is a moot point whether the teepee might be so imprecise that it is better described as 'coherence'. There is a background support, as well as the planks. |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13) | |
A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy. |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5) | |
A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy. |
18422 | Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Proprioception is not focused single-mindedly on the self, but is focused on a number of objects - the component bodily parts that belong to the self. There is no obvious need for a concept of the self, or of indexicality. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 07.2) |
18425 | We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Imagine a being that learns everything about itself by watching itself in mirrors, rather than by proprioception and introspection. Surely it can get wet in a storm, even though allegedly distinctive routes of self-knowledge are not available to it? | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 09.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
18421 | Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: The guarantee of immunity from error in prioprioception is only as strong as the guarantee that proprioception only ever represents the proprioceiving agent. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 07.1) | |
A reaction: This is part of an interesting and sustained attack on the idea that self-knowledge is immune from error. They are thinking of science-fictiony situations where I am wired up to experience your leg movement. My experiences usually track me, that's all. |
18419 | Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: According to Folk Functionalism, mental states are theoretically defined by Ramsifying on our folk-psychological theory. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 06.2) |
18404 | It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Because our perceptual states typically represent the world as seen from a perspective, it is sometimes thought that some distinctively indexical kind of content is needed to characterise those states. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 01.4) | |
A reaction: They are summarising this view precisely so that they can oppose it, and I think they are right. |
18407 | Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: There are no interesting or distinctive explanatory connections between indexicality and agency. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 01.8) |
18427 | If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: It is bad news if some of our contents are essentially tied to particular contexts. ...If information needs to be assessed relative to some ur-context, later recipients won't know what to do with it. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 10) |
18426 | All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Fundamentally, all information is objective information. ...[176] What we want is fully portable information, and information that co-ordinates on the world, rather than on us, is best suited for the task. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 10) | |
A reaction: I agree entirely with their thesis. We just pick up information about ourselves, such as who and where we are, which is just like equivalent information about other people. It is isn't a special type of information. |
18428 | You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: When you recall the look of the inside of your house ....where things are relative to one another is what persists in memory, not where they were relative to you when seen. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 10) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a very telling example, though you could postulate some system which converts perspectival input into objective information. But why bother? We seek objective information, not perspectives. |
18429 | Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Our view on the world is not primarily a view from a perspective. Our beliefs and desires are not organized around us. They are instead organized around the world itself. Our view is a view from everywhere. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 10) | |
A reaction: Slipping in the claim that our desires are also organised around the world is not quite as persuasive as the claim about beliefs. If you want to draw a freehand straight line, focus on the far end of it. The world will guide your hand. |
18413 | Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: There is little agreement among Fregeans about what senses are. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 04.5) | |
A reaction: I don't take this to be sufficient grounds for dismissing Fregean senses. When we look into the workings of the linguistic mind, there seems little prospect of clarity or agreement. |
18417 | Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained. They fail to distinguish between logical or mathematical truths, ..between metaphysical equivalences, ..between coreferentials, ..and between indexicals and non-indexicals. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 05.5) | |
A reaction: [A nice summary, very compressed] |
18408 | Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Once the non-constant characters of expressions has been characterised, there is no further need for additional devices like 'first-person concepts' or 'demonstrative concepts'. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 01.7) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be a wonderfully liberating attack on this issue. There is a kind of creepy mysticism that has been allowed to accrue around indexicals, and it's nonsense. |
18414 | Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Fregeans tend to treat as a fundamental tenet that sense determines reference; same sense, same reference. From that it follow trivially that indexicals don't have the same sense: different uses of 'I' have different referents, so sense must differ. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 04.6) | |
A reaction: Interesting. Since it seems implausible that 'I' is profoundly different when two people use it, this seems to be a strong argument against Frege's distinction. But I rather like Frege's distinction, while being sceptical about 'I', so I'm baffled.... |
18423 | All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Whatever can be expressed indexically could be expressed by non-indexical means. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 08.1) | |
A reaction: This is the best summary of the thesis of their book. Indexicality in non-essential. |
18406 | The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: In what we label 'Basic Kaplanianism', each of the sentences 'Smith is happy' and 'I am happy', as uttered by Smith, has two levels of meaning. The 'content' is a truth-conditional representation. The 'character' is a function from contexts to contents. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 01.6) | |
A reaction: They give this as a minimal and plausible account of the situation, without reading huge significance into the indexical. I'm inclined to see the situation in terms of the underlying proposition containing both ingredients. |
18411 | It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: An enormous amount has been written about whether 'all', 'know', 'might', 'delicious', 'good', 'if, then', 'and', 'red', 'just', 'justified', 'probable', 'local', 'ready', and 'left-right' are context-sensitive. | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 02.3) | |
A reaction: The clearest way to approach these things is ask what the (informal) domain of quantification is for that particular context. The domain can shift in the course of a sentence. |
18420 | We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever] |
Full Idea: Maybe there is a class of beliefs that plays a special role in the explanation of action. We have argued against the existence of such a class (or at least any interesting such class). | |
From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 06.2) | |
A reaction: The main class which has been proposed is the one that involves indexical beliefs. I agree with this idea. |
17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
Full Idea: Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all. | |
From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins... |
17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
Full Idea: The signs are that the higher categories are not natural kinds and so the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. ...This is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether, it is not abandoning a tree of life. | |
From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 6) | |
A reaction: Devitt's underlying point is that the higher and more general kinds do not have an essence (a specific nature), which is the qualification to be a natural kind. They explain nothing. Essence is the hallmark of natural kinds. Hmmm. |
17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |
Full Idea: Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species. | |
From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 7) | |
A reaction: Devitt votes for it, and cites Dupré, among many other. Given the existence of rival accounts, all making good points, it is hard to resist this view. |