Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds and Biological Realism', 'Against Dryness: a polemical sketch' and 'Metaphysics'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


5 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
A composite is a true unity if all of its parts fall under one essence [Scheibler]
     Full Idea: A composite entity is a unum per se if the partial entities that are in it are contained under one common essence. …In water, all those parts are contained under one essence of water.
     From: Chistoph Scheibler (Metaphysics [1650], I.4.1 n9), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671
     A reaction: Water mixed with wine is said to be an 'ens per accidens'. This is an unusual but possible view, that all the water there is is a single thing, united by its compositional essence. When we talk about 'water', we include possible water, and past water.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Man is a brave naked will, separate from a background of values and realities [Murdoch]
     Full Idea: Existentialists no longer see man against a background of values, of realities, which transcend him. We picture man as a brave naked will.
     From: Iris Murdoch (Against Dryness: a polemical sketch [1983], p.46), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 7 'Subjectivism'
     A reaction: It is one thing to deny the values, and another to deny the realities. This piece is a 'polemic', and reads more like an exhortation than a truth. Many of us are, at best, cowardly naked wills.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
     Full Idea: Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all.
     From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4)
     A reaction: He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins...
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
     Full Idea: The signs are that the higher categories are not natural kinds and so the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. ...This is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether, it is not abandoning a tree of life.
     From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 6)
     A reaction: Devitt's underlying point is that the higher and more general kinds do not have an essence (a specific nature), which is the qualification to be a natural kind. They explain nothing. Essence is the hallmark of natural kinds. Hmmm.
Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
     Full Idea: Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species.
     From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 7)
     A reaction: Devitt votes for it, and cites Dupré, among many other. Given the existence of rival accounts, all making good points, it is hard to resist this view.