9 ideas
22186 | Mental modules are specialised, automatic, and isolated [Fodor, by Okasha] |
Full Idea: Fodor argues that mental modules have three important featuresL 1) they are domain-specific, 2) their operation is mandatory, 3) they are informationally encapsulated. | |
From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (The Modularity of Mind [1983]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 6 | |
A reaction: Mandatory is interesting. When I hear an English sentence I can't decide not to process it. Modules cannot be too isolated or they couldn't participate in the team. Each one needs a comms manager. |
21733 | The right-wing conception of freedom is based on the idea of self-ownership [Cohen,GA] |
Full Idea: The right-wing conception of freedom is, I think, founded on the idea that each person is the morally rightful owner of himself, even if existing legal systems do not acknowledge it. Let us call that the 'self-ownership' thesis. | |
From: G.A. Cohen (Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? [1986], 1) | |
A reaction: He cites Nozick as articulating this view. At the end Cohen rejects self-ownership, though he agrees that no one would accept that the state could be the owner of your eyes. Do I own my hair after it is cut? |
21739 | Plenty of people have self-ownership, but still lack autonomy [Cohen,GA] |
Full Idea: Universal self-ownership fails to ensure autonomy, since it tends to produce proletarians, who lack it. | |
From: G.A. Cohen (Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? [1986], 3) | |
A reaction: The implication is that autonomy is not a property of individuals but a social phenomenon. Self-owning people can still be imprisoned. What about autonomy without self-ownership? A bright slave who is given extensive responsibility? |
21736 | It is doubtful whether any private property was originally acquired legitimately [Cohen,GA] |
Full Idea: It is easy to doubt that much actually existing private property was formed in what anyone could think was a legitimating way. | |
From: G.A. Cohen (Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? [1986], 2) | |
A reaction: What if I created an artificial island out of unwanted raw materials? What about the first humans to reach some remote territory? |
21734 | It is plausible that no one has an initial right to own land and natural resources [Cohen,GA] |
Full Idea: One may plausibly say of external things in their initial state, of raw land and natural resources, that no person has a greater right to them than any other does. | |
From: G.A. Cohen (Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? [1986], 1) | |
A reaction: How about if your group has lived on that plot for fifty generations, and some interlopers arrive and claim part of it. No one thought of 'owning' it till the interlopers arrived. Native Americans and Australians. |
21735 | Every thing which is now private started out as unowned [Cohen,GA] |
Full Idea: In the prehistory of anything that is now private property there was at least one moment at which something privately unowned was taken into private ownership. | |
From: G.A. Cohen (Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? [1986], 2) | |
A reaction: He is obviously talking about land and natural resources. Presumably a table which I made and own was always private property, although the land where the trees were grown was not. Though in some communities what I make could be automatically communal. |
17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
Full Idea: Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all. | |
From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins... |
17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
Full Idea: The signs are that the higher categories are not natural kinds and so the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. ...This is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether, it is not abandoning a tree of life. | |
From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 6) | |
A reaction: Devitt's underlying point is that the higher and more general kinds do not have an essence (a specific nature), which is the qualification to be a natural kind. They explain nothing. Essence is the hallmark of natural kinds. Hmmm. |
17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |
Full Idea: Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species. | |
From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 7) | |
A reaction: Devitt votes for it, and cites Dupré, among many other. Given the existence of rival accounts, all making good points, it is hard to resist this view. |