Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds and Biological Realism', 'Review of 'Aenesidemus'' and 'Putnam's Paradox'

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10 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms

14212	A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
	Full Idea: A consistent theory is, by definition, one satisfied by some model; an isomorphic image of a model satisfies the same theories as the original model; to provide the making of an isomorphic image of any given model, a domain need only be large enough.
	From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Model')
	A reaction: This is laying out the ground for Putnam's model theory argument in favour of anti-realism. If you are chasing the one true model of reality, then formal model theory doesn't seem to offer much encouragement.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism

14213	Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Anti-realists say the only world is imaginary, or only has the parts or classes or relations we divide it into, or doubt that reference to the world is possible, or doubt that our interpretations can achieve truth.
	From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Anti-R')
	A reaction: [compression of a paragraph on anti-realism] Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist. A nice example of the rhetorical device of ridiculing an opponent by suggesting that they don't even know what they themselves believe.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts

14210	A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The mereological sum of the coffee in my cup, the ink in this sentence, a nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess of an object, yet its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints of nature.
	From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Might')
	A reaction: In that case they do, but if there are no atoms at the root of physics then presumably their could also be thoroughly jointless assemblages, involving probability distributions etc. Even random scattered atoms seem rather short of joints.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism

22062	Mental presentation are not empirical, but concern the strivings of the self [Fichte]
	Full Idea: The intelligence has as the object of its presentation not an empirical perception, but rather only the necessary striving of the self.
	From: Johann Fichte (Review of 'Aenesidemus' [1792], Wks I:22), quoted by Ludwig Siep - Fichte p.62
	A reaction: The embodiment of Fichte's idealism. The 'striving' is the spontaneous application of concepts described the Kant. Kant looks outwards, but Fichte sees only the striving.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism

22015	The thing-in-itself is an empty dream [Fichte, by Pinkard]
	Full Idea: Fichte said that the thing-in-itself (which both Reinhold and Schulze accepted) is only "a piece of whimsy, a pipe-dream, a non-thought".
	From: report of Johann Fichte (Review of 'Aenesidemus' [1792]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 05
	A reaction: This seems to be a key moment in German philosophy, and the first step towards the idealist interpretation of Kant.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

14215	Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Whatever happens in special cases, causal theories usually make it easy to be wrong about the thing we refer to.
	From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Is')
	A reaction: I suppose the point of this is that there are no checks and balances to keep reference in focus, but just a requirement to keep connected to an increasingly attenuated causal chain.

19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description

14209	Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families].
	From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc')
	A reaction: (The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference.

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds

17371	Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
	Full Idea: Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all.
	From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4)
	A reaction: He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins...

27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species

17372	The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
	Full Idea: The signs are that the higher categories are not natural kinds and so the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. ...This is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether, it is not abandoning a tree of life.
	From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 6)
	A reaction: Devitt's underlying point is that the higher and more general kinds do not have an essence (a specific nature), which is the qualification to be a natural kind. They explain nothing. Essence is the hallmark of natural kinds. Hmmm.

17373	Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
	Full Idea: Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species.
	From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 7)
	A reaction: Devitt votes for it, and cites Dupré, among many other. Given the existence of rival accounts, all making good points, it is hard to resist this view.