27 ideas
5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
Full Idea: One sense of 'reduction' is eliminative, in getting rid of a phenomenon by showing that it is really something else (as the earth's rotation eliminates 'sunsets'), but another sense does not get rid of it (as in the explanation of solidity by molecules). | |
From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: These are bad analogies. You can't 'eliminate' a sunset - you just accept that the event is relative to a viewpoint. If we are discussing ontology, we will not admit the existence of sunsets, but we won't have an ontological category of 'solidity' either. |
5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
Full Idea: Eliminative reductions require a distinction between reality and appearance; for example, the sun appears to set but the reality is that the earth rotates. | |
From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Concl 2.10) | |
A reaction: A bad analogy. You don't 'eliminate' sunsets. It is just 'Galilean' relativity - you thought it was your train moving, then you discover it was the other one. You don't eliminate hallucinations when you show that they don't correspond to reality. |
5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
Full Idea: An emergent property of a system is causally explained by elements of the system, but it is not a property of the elements, and cannot be explained by a summation of their properties. The behaviour of H2O explains liquidity, but molecules aren't liquid. | |
From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: The genie is 'emergent' from the lamp, and so (in Searle's meaning) is the lamp's solidity. I agree that the mind is 'emergent' in Searle's very weak sense, if that only means that one neuron can't be conscious, but lots together can. |
5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
Full Idea: The 'binding problem' is how to explain how the brain binds all our different stimuli into a single unified experience of an object. | |
From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This may be the best way of expressing what philosophers call (after Chalmers) the 'Hard Question'. Large objects are held together by gravity, and small objects by electro-magnetism. We don't see a 'binding problem' in the function of a leaf. |
5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
Full Idea: A system is either conscious or it isn't, but within the field of consciousness there are states of intensity ranging from drowsiness to full awareness. | |
From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: I think this all-or-nothing view is the last vestiges of Cartesian dualism, and is quite wrong. Heaps of neuroscience (about blindsight, subliminal awareness, neurosis etc.) says we will never understand the mind if we think it is only the conscious part. |
5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
Full Idea: Consciousness has a first-person or subjective ontology, by which I mean that conscious states only exist when experienced by a subject and they exist only from the first-person point of view of that subject. | |
From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Ch.5 App) | |
A reaction: I think this is nonsense, and I don't think Searle believes it. He ruthlessly attacks so-called 'eliminativists', but the definition he gives here would make him an eliminativist about other minds. There is no such thing as 'first-person' ontology. |
5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
Full Idea: There are not two kinds of consciousness, an information-processing consciousness that is amenable to scientific investigation and a phenomenal, what-it-subjectively-feels-like form of consciousness that will forever remain mysterious. | |
From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Concl.1) | |
A reaction: Fodor appears to be the main target of this remark. The view that we can explain intentionality but not qualia is currently very fashionable. I am sympathetic to Searle here. Consciousness isn't an epiphenomenon, it is essential to all thought. |
5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
Full Idea: I am hesitant to use the word 'quale/qualia', because it gives the impression that there are two separate phenomena, consciousness and qualia. | |
From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: He is trying to resist going back to 'sense-data', sitting uneasily between reality and our experience of it. Personally I am quite happy with qualia as an aspect of consciousness - just as I am happy with consciousness as an 'aspect' of brain. |
20657 | There are 23 core brain functions, with known circuit, transmitters, genes and behaviour [Watson] |
Full Idea: In 2014 the National Institutes of Mental Health published a list of 23 core brain functions and their associated neural circuitry, neurotransmitters and genes, and the behaviour and emotions that go with them. | |
From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 16 'Physics') | |
A reaction: They were interested in the functions behind mental health, but I am interested in the functions behind our belief systems, which might produce a different focus. Sub-functions, perhaps. |
5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
Full Idea: It seems to me now that syntax is not intrinsic to the physics of the system, but is in the eye of the beholder. | |
From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This seems right, in that whether strung beads are a toy or an abacus depends on the user. It doesn't follow that the 'beholder' stands outside the physics. A beholder is another physical system, of a particular type of high complexity. |
5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
Full Idea: Consciousness has a first-person or subjective ontology and so cannot be reduced to anything that has third-person or objective ontology. If you try to reduce or eliminate one in favour of the other you leave something out. | |
From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Concl 2.10) | |
A reaction: Misconceived. There is no such thing as 'first-person' ontology, though there are subjective viewpoints, but then a camera has a viewpoint which is lost if you eliminate it. If consciousness is physical events, that leaves viewpoints untouched. |
5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
Full Idea: The solidity of a table is explained causally by the behaviour of the molecules of which it is composed, but the solidity is not an extra event, it is just a feature of the table. This non-event causation models the relationship of mind and brain. | |
From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: He calls it 'non-event' causation, while referring to the 'behaviour of molecules'. Ask a physicist what a 'feature' is. Better to think of it as one process 'emerging' as another process at the macro-level. |
20656 | Traditional ideas of the mind were weakened in the 1950s by mind-influencing drugs [Watson] |
Full Idea: One development in particular in the 1950s helped to discredit the traditional concept of the mind. This was medical drugs that influenced the workings of the brain. | |
From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 16 'Intro') | |
A reaction: This explains Ryle's 1949 book, and the Australian physicalists emerging in the late 1950s. Philosophers don't grasp how their subject is responsive to other areas of human knowledge. Of course, opium had always done this. |
5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
Full Idea: The pattern of molecules in the ocean is vastly more complex than any pattern of neurons in my brain. | |
From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Concl 2.6) | |
A reaction: A nice warning for anyone foolish enough to pin their explanatory hopes simply on 'complexity', but we would not be so foolish. A subtler account of complexity (e.g. by Edelman and Tononi) might make brains much more complex than oceans. |
5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
Full Idea: You could say that tree-rings contain information about the age of a tree, but you could as well say that the age of a tree in years contains information about the number of rings in a tree stump. ..'Information' is not a real causal feature of the world. | |
From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Concl 2.5) | |
A reaction: A nice point for fans of 'information' to ponder. However, you cannot deny the causal connection between the age and the rings. Information has a subjective aspect, but you cannot, for example, eliminate the role of DNA in making organisms. |
20655 | Humans have been hunter-gatherers for 99.5% of their existence [Watson] |
Full Idea: Anthropology shows that the hunter-gathering lifestyle has occupied 99.5 per cent of the time humans have been on earth. | |
From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 13 'Emergence') | |
A reaction: If you are trying to understand humanity, you ignore this fact at your peril. Even agriculture is only a tiny part of our history, and that only disappeared as a major human activity (in many nations) in the last hundred years. |
17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
Full Idea: Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all. | |
From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins... |
20650 | The Uncertainty Principle implies that cause and effect can't be measured [Watson] |
Full Idea: The Uncertainty Principle implied that in the subatomic world cause and effect could never be measured. | |
From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 05 'Against') | |
A reaction: The fact that it can't be measured does not, presumably, entail that it doesn't exist. Physicists seem to ignore causation, rather than denying it. Can causation be real if it only exists at the macro-level, as an emergent phenomenon? |
20649 | The interference of light through two slits confirmed that it is waves [Watson] |
Full Idea: Thomas Young in 1803 confirmed the idea of Huyghens that light is waves, showing how light passing through two slits produces an interference pattern that resembles water waves sluicing through two slits. | |
From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 04 'Conception') | |
A reaction: The great puzzle emerges when it also turns out to be quantised particles. |
20661 | Electrons rotate in hyrogen atoms 10^13 times per second [Watson] |
Full Idea: In the hydrogen atom the electron rotates some 10,000 billion times per second. | |
From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 18 'Evolutionary') | |
A reaction: That's an awful lot. Is it at the speed of light? |
20647 | Quantum theory explains why nature is made up of units, such as elements [Watson] |
Full Idea: Planck's quantum idea explained so much, including the observation that the chemical world is made up of discrete units - the elements. Discrete elements implied fundamental units of matter that were themselves discrete (as Dalton had said). | |
From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 4 'Intro') | |
A reaction: The atomic theory was only finally confirmed by Einstein in 1905. This idea implies that the very lowest level of all must have distinct building blocks, but so far we have got down to 'fields', which seem to be a sort of 'foam'. |
20654 | Only four particles are needed for matter: up and down quark, electron, electron-neutrino [Watson] |
Full Idea: We need twelve particles in the master equation of the standard model, but it is necessary to have only four to build a universe (up and down quarks, the electron and the electron neutrino (or lepton). The existence of the others is 'a bit of a mystery'. | |
From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 11 'First Three') |
20651 | The shape of molecules is important, as well as the atoms and their bonds [Watson] |
Full Idea: Pauling showed that the architecture - the shape of molecules was relevant (as well as the bonds). This meant that molecules were just as important as atoms in the understanding of matter. Molecules were not just the sum of their parts. | |
From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 05 'Three') | |
A reaction: If Aristotle struggled to understand matter, then so should modern philosophers. This involves thermodynamics and chemistry, as well as quantum theory. |
20652 | In 1828 the animal substance urea was manufactured from inorganic ingredients [Watson] |
Full Idea: In 1828 Wöhler, in an iconic experiment, had manufactured an organic substance, urea, hitherto the product solely of animals, out of inorganic materials, and without any interventions of vital force. | |
From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 06 'Inorganic') | |
A reaction: For reductionists like me, the gradual explanation of life in inorganic terms is the great role model of explanation. I take it for granted that the human mind will go the same way, despite partisan resistance from a lot of philosophers. |
20658 | Information is physical, and living can be seen as replicating and preserving information [Watson] |
Full Idea: In passing information, physical changes take place, and information is thus physical. On this account, the act of living can be seen as replicating and preserving the information that a living body is comprised of. | |
From: Peter Watson (Convergence [2016], 17 'Dreams') | |
A reaction: [He emphasises 'the act' of living, rather than a life] |
17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
Full Idea: The signs are that the higher categories are not natural kinds and so the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. ...This is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether, it is not abandoning a tree of life. | |
From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 6) | |
A reaction: Devitt's underlying point is that the higher and more general kinds do not have an essence (a specific nature), which is the qualification to be a natural kind. They explain nothing. Essence is the hallmark of natural kinds. Hmmm. |
17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |
Full Idea: Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species. | |
From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 7) | |
A reaction: Devitt votes for it, and cites Dupré, among many other. Given the existence of rival accounts, all making good points, it is hard to resist this view. |