11 ideas
17606 | Axioms reveal the underlying assumptions, and reveal relationships between different areas [Kline] |
Full Idea: The axiomatic method ....revealed precisely what assumptions underlie each branch [of mathematics] and made possible the comparison and clarification of the relationships of various branches. | |
From: Morris Kline (Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times [1972], p.1027), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Defending the Axioms 1.3 | |
A reaction: I take this to be the 'fruitfulness' which marks out the discovery of the essence of something. |
23513 | Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth] |
Full Idea: It is increasingly apparent that even single neurons are capable of carrying out highly complex functions all by themselves. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.1 n) | |
A reaction: Bang goes the simple connectionist account of consciousness. |
23514 | The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth] |
Full Idea: The cerebellum [at the back] has about four times as many neurons as the rest of the brain put together, but seems barely involved in consciousness. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.2) | |
A reaction: I wonder if it also has four times as many connections? |
23516 | Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth] |
Full Idea: The main claim of Tononi's 'integrated information theory' is that a system is conscious to the extent that its whole generates more information than its parts. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.3) | |
A reaction: Seth seems to present this as an 'interesting' proposal. I find it unlikely that consciousness could be explain in terms of information, or that a machine constructed on this principle would thus become conscious. (Databases pass this test). |
23519 | The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG] |
Full Idea: The elements of a self are 1) embodied - related directly to the body, 2) perspectival - having a viewpoint, 3) volitional - being an agent, 4) narrative - aware of past and future, and 5) social - as others perceive me. | |
From: report of Anil Seth (Being You [2021], III.8) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: [summarised] Seth says there are distinctive emotions associated with each of these aspects of the self. This list is very helpful, as a discouragement for anyone who wants to pick one of these as the sole true nature of the self. |
23518 | Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth] |
Full Idea: Much of today's AI is best described as sophisticated machine-based pattern recognition. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], IV.13) | |
A reaction: Personally I wouldn't want to underestimate the extent to which human intelligence is also pattern recognition (across time as well as in space). |
23517 | Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth] |
Full Idea: The experience of volition is defined by 1) the feeling that I am doing what I want to do, 2) that I could have done otherwise, and 3) that voluntary actions seem to come from within. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], III.11) | |
A reaction: Note that these can all be cited without reference to their feeling 'free'. |
23515 | Human exceptionalism plagues biology, and most other human thinking [Seth] |
Full Idea: Human exceptionalism has repeatedly plagued biology, and has darkened the history of human thought everywhere. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.2) | |
A reaction: I increasingly agree with this, as much in philosophy as in biology. We really need to get used to our place in evolution. |
17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
Full Idea: Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all. | |
From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins... |
17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
Full Idea: The signs are that the higher categories are not natural kinds and so the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. ...This is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether, it is not abandoning a tree of life. | |
From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 6) | |
A reaction: Devitt's underlying point is that the higher and more general kinds do not have an essence (a specific nature), which is the qualification to be a natural kind. They explain nothing. Essence is the hallmark of natural kinds. Hmmm. |
17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |
Full Idea: Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species. | |
From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 7) | |
A reaction: Devitt votes for it, and cites Dupré, among many other. Given the existence of rival accounts, all making good points, it is hard to resist this view. |