10 ideas
| 7823 | Lucretius was rediscovered in 1417 [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: Lucretius's 'De Rerum Natura' was rediscovered in 1417, after languishing forgotten for six centuries. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: A wonder. Is it the greatest book of the ancient world - because it partially preserves the lost philosophy of great Democritus? |
| 4577 | There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity [Quine] |
| Full Idea: In principle I see no higher or more austere necessity than natural necessity; and in natural necessity, or our attribution of it, I see only Hume's regularities | |
| From: Willard Quine (Necessary Truth [1963], p.76) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this allows logical necessity as a 'lower' necessity, but denies 'metaphysical' necessity, in line with Hume and other tough empiricists. Personally I adore metaphysical necessities, but they are a bit hard to establish conclusively. |
| 7809 | In an honour code shame is the supreme punishment, and revenge is a duty [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: An honour code is one in which the greatest punishment is shame, and in which revenge is a duty. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Is this really what Nietzsche wanted to revive? Shame isn't a private matter - it needs solidarity of values in the community, and contempt for dishonour, so that it becomes everyone's worst fear. |
| 7824 | If suicide is lawful, but assisting suicide is unlawful, powerless people are denied their rights [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: An anomaly created by England's 1961 Suicide Act is that it is lawful to take one's own life, but unlawful to help anyone else to do it. This means anyone unable to commit suicide without help is denied one of their fundamental rights. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: There is a difference, not really captured either by law or by reason, between tolerating an activity, and encouraging and helping it. I think the test question is "this activity is legal, but would you want your child to do it?" |
| 17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
| Full Idea: Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all. | |
| From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4) | |
| A reaction: He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins... |
| 17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
| Full Idea: The signs are that the higher categories are not natural kinds and so the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. ...This is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether, it is not abandoning a tree of life. | |
| From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 6) | |
| A reaction: Devitt's underlying point is that the higher and more general kinds do not have an essence (a specific nature), which is the qualification to be a natural kind. They explain nothing. Essence is the hallmark of natural kinds. Hmmm. |
| 17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |
| Full Idea: Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species. | |
| From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 7) | |
| A reaction: Devitt votes for it, and cites Dupré, among many other. Given the existence of rival accounts, all making good points, it is hard to resist this view. |
| 7819 | Religion gives answers, comforts, creates social order, and panders to superstition [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: The four standard explanations given for religion are that it provides answer, that it gives comfort, that it makes for social order, and that it rests on mere superstition. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: All four of these could be correct, though the first and fourth would be incompatible if religion gives correct answers. Why religion begins might be not the same as the reason why it continues. |
| 7817 | To make an afterlife appealing, this life has to be denigrated [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: It is remarkable how much the life of this world has to be denigrated to make the promise of happiness after death appealing. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be true of most religions, but it could be otherwise. Surely you want such a wonderful life to continue after death? But then you would not be obliged to do anything difficult to achieve immortality. Power comes into it... |
| 7818 | In Greek mythology only heroes can go to heaven [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: In Greek mythology only a hero like Hercules could hope to go to heaven (by becoming a god himself). | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This illustrates Nietsche's 'inversion of morality' most clearly, because Christianity says that the person most likely to go to heaven is the humblest person. |