Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Realism and Anti-Realism', 'Quodlibeta' and '12: Colossians'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy

8138	Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy [Paul]
	Full Idea: Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy.
	From: St Paul (12: Colossians [c.55], 2.8)
	A reaction: The same might be said of preaching. The two sorts of spoiling seem to be fanaticism and wickedness. While reason can lead to fanaticism, I believe (with Socrates) that it is unlikely to corrupt morally.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism

15049	Metaphysical realists are committed to all unambiguous statements being true or not true [Dummett]
	Full Idea: The anti-realist view undercuts the ground for accepting bivalence. ...Acceptance of bivalence should not be taken as a sufficient condition for realism. ..They accept the weaker principle that unambiguous statements are determinately true or not true.
	From: Michael Dummett (Realism and Anti-Realism [1992], p.467)
	A reaction: [cited by Kit Fine, when discussing anti-realism] I take it be quite an important component of realism that there might be facts which will never be expressed, or are even beyond our capacity to grasp or express them

7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories

16657	Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent]
	Full Idea: Among creatures there are only three 'res' belong to the three first categories: Substance, Quantity and Quality. All other are aspects [rationes] and intellectual concepts with respect to them, with reality only as grounded on the res of those three.
	From: Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], VII:1-2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.3
	A reaction: Pasnau connects with the 'arrangement of being', giving an 'ontologically innocent' structure to reality. That seems to be what we all want, if only we could work out the ontologically guilty bit.

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations

16658	The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent]
	Full Idea: There is beyond a doubt nothing real in the category of Relation, except what is a thing from another category.
	From: Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], VII:1-2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.3
	A reaction: This seems to have been the fairly orthodox scholastic view of relations.

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes

16645	Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent]
	Full Idea: Accidents are beings only in a qualified and diminished sense, because they are not called beings, nor are they beings, except because they are dispositions of an unqualified being, a substance.
	From: Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], XV.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.4
	A reaction: This is aimed to 'half' detach the accidents (as the Eucharist requires). Later scholastics detached them completely. Late scholastics seem to have drifted back to Henry's view. The equivocal use of 'being' here was challenged later.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism

22012	Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard]
	Full Idea: Kant claimed that things-in-themselves caused our sensations; but causality was a transcendental condition of experience, not a property of things-in-themselves, so the great Kant had contradicted himself.
	From: report of Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], Supplement) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 04
	A reaction: This early objection by the conservative Jacobi (who disliked Enlightenment rational religion) is the key to the dispute over whether Kant is an idealist. Kant denied being an idealist, but how can he be, if this idea is correct?