37 ideas
8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
Full Idea: I once wrote that there are three linguistic devices that make it possible for us to frame undecidable statements: quantification over infinity totalities, as expressed by word such as 'never'; the subjunctive conditional form; and the past tense. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 4) | |
A reaction: Dummett now repudiates the third one. Statements containing vague concepts also appear to be undecidable. Personally I have no problems with deciding (to a fair extent) about 'never x', and 'if x were true', and 'it was x'. |
8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
Full Idea: There is surely no number n such that "n grains of sand do not make a heap, although n+1 grains of sand do" is true. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 4) | |
A reaction: It might be argued that there is such a number, but no human being is capable of determing it. Might God know the value of n? On the whole Dummett's view seems the most plausible. |
8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The intuitionist account of the meaning of mathematical statements does not employ the notion of a statement's being true, but only that of something's being a proof of the statement. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 2) | |
A reaction: I remain unconvinced that anyone could give an account of proof that didn't discreetly employ the notion of truth. What are we to make of "we suspect this is true, but no one knows how to prove it?" (e.g. Goldbach's Conjecture). |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The idea of 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east'. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: The phrase was coined in Oxford. It is a useful label with which realists can insult solipsists, idealists and other riff-raff. Four Dimensionalists seem to see time in this way. Events sit there, and we travel past them. But there are indexical events. |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
Full Idea: In distinguishing between what can establish a statement about the past as true and what it is that that statement says, we are repudiating antirealism about the past. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: This is a late shift of ground from the champion of antirealism. If Dummett's whole position is based on a 'justificationist' theory of meaning, he must surely have a different theory of meaning now for statements about the past? |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The existence of a universe from which sentience was permanently absent is an unintelligible fantasy. What exists is what can be known to exist. What is true is what can be known to be true. Reality is what can be experienced and known. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as nonsense. The fact that we cannot think about a universe without introducing a viewpoint does not mean that we cannot 'intellectually imagine' its existence devoid of viewpoints. Nothing could ever experience a star's interior. |
19555 | People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee] |
Full Idea: Fluent speakers typically become increasingly hesitant about 'knowledge' attributions as the practical significance of the right answer increases. | |
From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested (and reply) [2005], 'Epistemic') | |
A reaction: The standard examples of this phenomenon are in criminal investigations, and in philosophical discussions of scepticism. Simple observations I take to have maximum unshakable confidence, except in extreme global scepticism contexts. |
19557 | Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee] |
Full Idea: Maybe variable knowledge ascriptions are just loose talk. This is shown when we ask whether weakly supported knowledge is 'really' or 'truly' or 'really and truly' known. Fluent speakers have a strong inclination to doubt or deny that it is. | |
From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested (and reply) [2005], 'Loose') | |
A reaction: [bit compressed] Conee is suggesting the people are tacitly invariantist about knowledge (they have a fixed standard). But it may be that someone who asks 'do you really and truly know?' is raising the contextual standard. E.g. a barrister. |
19556 | Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee] |
Full Idea: It may be that all 'knowledge' attributions have the same truth conditions, but people apply contextually varying standards. The most plausible standard for truth is very high, but not unreachably high. | |
From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested (and reply) [2005], 'Loose') | |
A reaction: This is the 'invariantist' alternative to contextualism about knowledge. Is it a standard 'for truth'? Either it is or it isn't true, so there isn't a standard. I take the standard to concern the justification. |
8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Verification is not an individual but a collective activity. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: This generates problems. Are deceased members of the community included? (Yes, says Dummett). If someone speaks to angels (Blake!), do they get included? Is a majority necessary? What of weird loners? Etc. |
8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
Full Idea: To demonstrate the necessity of a truth-conditional theory of meaning, a proponent of such a theory must argue that use cannot be described without appeal to the conditions for the truth of statements. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: Unlike Dummett, I find that argument rather appealing. How do you decide the possible or appropriate use for a piece of language, if you don't already know what it means. Basing it all on social conventions means it could be meaningless ritual. |
8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
Full Idea: It is not enough for the truth-condition theorist to argue that we need the concept of truth: he must show that we should have the same conception of truth that he has. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 2) | |
A reaction: Davidson invites us to accept Tarski's account of truth. It invites the question of what the theory would be like with a very robust correspondence account of truth, or a flabby rather subjective coherence view, or the worst sort of pragmatic view. |
23616 | Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan] |
Full Idea: The common legal practice is to distinguish three broad categories of excuse: duress, epistemic limitation, and diminished responsibility. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.2.1) | |
A reaction: McMahan cites these with reference to soldiers in wartime, but they have general application. The third one seems particularly open to very wide interpretation. Presumably I can't be excused by just being irresponsible. |
23606 | Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan] |
Full Idea: There are two types of right. A Liberty right is merely a permission, meaning it is not wrong to do it. But a Claim right is a right against intervention, meaning no one has a liberty right to prevent it. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: There must also be a third type of right, which requires other people to perform actions on your behalf. If you pay for a book in a shop, you must then be given the book. |
23595 | The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan] |
Full Idea: The most serious reason why a war might be unjustified is that it lacks any justifying aim at all. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: It seems that Louis XIV invaded the Netherlands in around 1674 purely to enhance his own glory. That strikes me as worse. I supposed Ghenghis Khan invaded places simply because he enjoyed fighting. |
23598 | You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It is false that by posing a threat to another, one necessarily makes oneself liable to defensive action. A police officer who shoots an active murderer does not thereby by make herself liable to defensive action. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This is one of his arguments against the moral equality of combatants. It is not morally OK to shoot all the local soldiers when you unjustly invade a territory. Sounds right to me. |
23594 | Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan] |
Full Idea: Wars can be unjust despite having a just cause, because they are not actually needed, or they will cause excessive harm, or they also pursue some unjust causes. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The point is that older writers often think that a 'just cause' is sufficient. He is obviously right. |
23619 | A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It is possible for a defensive war to be unjust, when the defensive war to which it is a response is a just war. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.3.3) | |
A reaction: An example might be a state resisting an intervention from outside, when the state is in the process of exterminating some unwanted minority. Or perhaps the invaders are crossing the state's territory to achieve some admirable end. |
23620 | A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It is a necessary condition of liability to defensive attack that one be morally responsible for posing an objectively unjustified threat. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 4.1.1) | |
A reaction: This implies that one may not actually be doing the threatening (but merely ordering it, or enabling it). McMahan aims to have the same criteria for wartime as for peacetime. He denies Anscombe's claim that merely posing the threat is enough. |
23597 | Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan] |
Full Idea: In mainstream just war theory (Anscombe, Nagel, Walzer) the criterion of liability to attack is simply posing a threat. Since all combatants pose a threat to each other, they are morally liable to attack; because noncombatants do not, they are not liable. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.2) | |
A reaction: McMahan says that the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets rests mostly on this basis. The problem is that a huge range of unarmed people can also pose various degrees of threat. |
23600 | Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan] |
Full Idea: There is simply no satisfactory understanding of proportionality in war that can be applied independently of whether the acts that are evaluated support a just or an unjust cause. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.3) | |
A reaction: He rejects traditional just war theory, which sees both sides as morally equal in combat, and hence equally subject to the principles of proportional response. But the just can then be harsher, when their just principles should make them milder. |
23603 | Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan] |
Full Idea: There is a paradox if the unjust are justified in fighting the just in order to protect their own civilians who have been endangered by the starting of an unjust war. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [my summary of MacMahan pp.48-49] It suggests that in a war there may be local concepts of justice which are at odds with the general situation - which is the ad bellum/in bello distinction. But this is the justice of fighting, not how it is conducted. |
23611 | Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan] |
Full Idea: We must stop reassuring soldiers that they act permissibly when they fight in an unjust war, provided that they conduct themselve honorably on the battlefield by fighting in accordance with the rules of engagement. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.8) | |
A reaction: This culminates McMahan's arguments against the moral equality of combatants, and against the sharp division of justice of war from justice in war. How rare it is for philosophy to culminate in a policy recommendation! |
23612 | The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan] |
Full Idea: Unlike domestic criminal law, the law of war is designed not to protect moral rights but to prevent harm. …This means when unjust combatants attack just combatants they violate their moral rights, yet they act within their legal rights. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.1.1) | |
A reaction: He says we must bring the law of war much closer to the morality of war. If there is any hope of slowly eliminating war, it may lie in reforms such as these. |
23617 | If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan] |
Full Idea: If most unjust combatants are morally innocent because they are excused, and if it is wrong to intentionally kill morally innocent people, then a contingent form of pacificism may be inescapable. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.3.1) | |
A reaction: A very nice argument against the moral equality of combatants. If I think we are the good guys, and the opposing troops are no morally different from us, how can I possibly kill them? |
23596 | If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It would be naïve to doubt that the widespread acceptance of the moral equality of combatants has facilitated the ability of governments to fight unjust wars. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: The point is that their armies are both compliant and seeing their actions as guiltless, which makes them perfect tools for evil. McMahan's ideal is an army which asks sharp questions about the justification of the war, before they fight it. |
23599 | You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It is hard to see how just combatants could become legitimate targets simply by offering violent resistance to unjust attacks by unjust coombatants. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.3) | |
A reaction: It is, however, hard to criticise a soldier who is dragged into fighting for an unjust cause, and then kills just defenders in the course of the fight. Once the bullets fly, normal morality seems to be suspended. Just survive. |
23604 | Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan] |
Full Idea: When soldiers go to war, they undoubtedly assume a certain risk. They voluntarily expose themselves to a significant risk of being attacked. But this is entirely different from consenting to being attacked. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is his response to Walzer's thought that soldiers resemble people who volunteer for a boxing match. The sailors at Pearl Harbour obviously didn't consent to the attack, or accept the Japanese right to kill them. |
23605 | Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan] |
Full Idea: When soldiers are commanded to fight, they cannot reasonably be expected to have the factual knowledge necessary to evaluate the war as just or unjust. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: This is part of the 'epistemic' justification for a soldier to fight in an unjust war. Sometimes soldiers do have enoough knowledge, especially if they join up late on in a war, when they have studied and observed its progress. |
23608 | If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan] |
Full Idea: If acting as an agent of a political collective justifies the combatants fighting an unjust war, that should also release the leaders from responsibility for their role in the fighting of that war. No one ever explains why this is not so. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.5) | |
A reaction: At the very least there seems to be a problem of the cut off point between innocent soldiers and culpable leaders. Which rank in the army or executive triggers the blame? |
23610 | If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan] |
Full Idea: There is a certain symmetry here. The permissibility of disobeying a command to fight in an unjust war suggests the permissibility of disobeying a command not to fight in a just war. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 2.7) | |
A reaction: The argument considered here is that since we could never allow soldiers to choose to fight in their own wars, we similarly cannot let them opt out of the official wars. Implying obedience is absolute. Soldiers don't get to 'choose' anything! |
23613 | Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan] |
Full Idea: Moral equality means either 1) because just combatants are permitted to fight in a just way, so are the unjust , or 2) because the just are justified, so are the unjust, or 3) because the just are justified, the unjust are therefore permitted. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.1.2) | |
A reaction: [summary] McMahan calls 1) the weak version, and 2) the strong. He suggests that although 3) is unusual, it is what most people believe - that if the good are justified, the bad are permitted to fight back. He rejects them all. |
23615 | Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan] |
Full Idea: It is said that combatants are compelled to fight; they have no choice. But duress is not a justification; nor does it ground a permission - not even a subjective permission. It is, instead, an excusing condition. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.1.2) | |
A reaction: The 'subjective' permission is believing you are just, even if you aren't. A nice, accurate and true distinction made by McMahan, I think. It is roughly our postwar attitude to the Nazi army. |
23602 | Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan] |
Full Idea: My alternative conception is that one is 'innocent' if one is neither morally responsible for nor guilty of a wrong. Classical theory focused on guilt, but I think we should focus on moral responsibility (which is something less). | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to make the supporters of evil equally liable to attack with its perpetrators. But you can observe perpetration a lot more easily than you can observe support. |
23618 | Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan] |
Full Idea: Achieving unconditional surrender can never be a justification for the continuation of war, since there are always conditions that a vanquished adversary, no matter how evil, can be justified in demanding. | |
From: Jeff McMahan (Killing in War [2009], 3.3.1) | |
A reaction: McMahan is particularly discussing Hiroshima, but this also applies to the European war in 1945. Presumably a civilised victor will grant the conditions which the losers would have demanded, and that probably happened in 1945. It's about power. |
8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Maybe both the past and the future are real, determined by our current temporal perspective. Past is then events capable of having a causal influence upon events near us, and future is events we can affect, but from which we receive no information. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: This is the Four-Dimensional view, which is opposed to Presentism. Might immediate unease is that it gives encouragement to fortune-tellers, whom I have always dismissed with 'You can't see the future, because it doesn't exist'. |
8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The idea that only the present is real cannot be sustained. St Augustine pointed out that the present has no duration; it is a mere boundary between past and future, and dependent on them. It also denies truth-value to statements about past or future. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: To defend Presentism, I suspect that one must focus entirely on the activities of consciousness and short-term memory. All truths, of past or future, must refer totally to such mental events. But what could an event be if there is no enduring time? |