24 ideas
9786 | Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard [Cartwright,R] |
Full Idea: The notion that philosophy can be done cooperatively, in the manner of scientists or engineers engaged in a research project, seems to me absurd. And yet few philosophers can survive in isolation. | |
From: Richard Cartwright (Intro to 'Philosophical Essays' [1987], xxi) | |
A reaction: This why Nietzsche said that philosophers were 'rare plants'. |
9784 | A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system [Cartwright,R] |
Full Idea: You do not improve the truth value of a false proposition by calling attention to a coherent system of propositions of which it is one. | |
From: Richard Cartwright (Intro to 'Philosophical Essays' [1987], xi) | |
A reaction: We need to disentangle the truth-value from the justification here. If it is false, then we can safely assume that is false, but we are struggling to decide whether it is false, and we want all the evidence we can get. Falsehood tends towards incoherence. |
21704 | 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The ban on 'impredicative' definitions says you can't define a class in terms of a totality to which that class must be seen as belonging. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 1) | |
A reaction: So that would be defining 'citizen' in terms of the community to which the citizen belongs? If you are asked to define 'community' and 'citizen' together, where do you start? But how else can it be done? Russell's Reducibility aimed to block this. |
21705 | Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility avoids impredicativity, by asserting that for any predicate of given arguments defined by quantifying over higher-order functions or classes, there is another co-extensive but predicative function of the same type of arguments. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 1) | |
A reaction: Eventually the axiom seemed too arbitrary, and was dropped. Linsky's book explores it. |
8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
Full Idea: I once wrote that there are three linguistic devices that make it possible for us to frame undecidable statements: quantification over infinity totalities, as expressed by word such as 'never'; the subjunctive conditional form; and the past tense. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 4) | |
A reaction: Dummett now repudiates the third one. Statements containing vague concepts also appear to be undecidable. Personally I have no problems with deciding (to a fair extent) about 'never x', and 'if x were true', and 'it was x'. |
21727 | Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The theory of definite descriptions may eliminate apparent commitment to such entities as the present King of France, but certainly not to the present Queen of England. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 7.3) |
21719 | Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: With the principle of extensionality anything true of one propositional functions will be true of every coextensive one. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 6.3) |
8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
Full Idea: There is surely no number n such that "n grains of sand do not make a heap, although n+1 grains of sand do" is true. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 4) | |
A reaction: It might be argued that there is such a number, but no human being is capable of determing it. Might God know the value of n? On the whole Dummett's view seems the most plausible. |
21723 | The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The problem for logicism was to find definitions of the primitive notions of Peano's theory, number, successor and 0, in terms of logical notions, so that the postulates could then be derived by logic alone. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 7) | |
A reaction: Both Frege and Russell defined numbers as equivalence classes. Successor is easily defined (in various ways) in set theory. An impossible set can exemplify zero. The trouble for logicism is this all relies on sets. |
21721 | Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The higher types are needed for intensional phenomena, cases where the same class is picked out by distinct propositional functions. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 6.4) | |
A reaction: I take it that in this way 'x is renate' can be distinguished from 'x is cordate', a task nowadays performed by possible worlds. |
21703 | Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The types is 'ramified' because there are further differences between the type of a function defined in terms of a quantifier ranging over other functions and the type of those other functions, despite the functions applying to the same simple type. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 1) | |
A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but it evidently created difficulties for dealing with actual mathematics, and Ramsey showed how you could manage without the ramifications. |
21714 | The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The original ramified theory of types ...furthern subdivides each of the types of the 'simple' theory according to the range of the bound variables used in the definition of each propositional function. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 6) | |
A reaction: For a non-intiate like me it certainly sounds disappointing that such a bold and neat theory because a tangle of complications. Ramsey and Russell in the 1920s seem to have dropped the ramifications. |
21713 | Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: It is often thought that Logicism was a failure, because after Frege's contradiction, Russell required obviously nonlogical principles, in order to develop mathematics. The axioms of Reducibility, Infinity and Choice are cited. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 6) | |
A reaction: Infinity and Choice remain as axioms of the standard ZFC system of set theory, which is why set theory is always assumed to be 'up to its neck' in ontological commitments. Linsky argues that Russell saw ontology in logic. |
21715 | For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: ZF set theory is seen as a rival to logicism as a foundational scheme. Set theory is for those who have given up the project of reducing mathematics to logic. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 6.1) | |
A reaction: Presumably there are other rivals. Set theory has lots of ontological commitments. One could start at the other end, and investigate the basic ontological commitments of arithmetic. I have no idea what those might be. |
8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The intuitionist account of the meaning of mathematical statements does not employ the notion of a statement's being true, but only that of something's being a proof of the statement. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 2) | |
A reaction: I remain unconvinced that anyone could give an account of proof that didn't discreetly employ the notion of truth. What are we to make of "we suspect this is true, but no one knows how to prove it?" (e.g. Goldbach's Conjecture). |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The idea of 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east'. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: The phrase was coined in Oxford. It is a useful label with which realists can insult solipsists, idealists and other riff-raff. Four Dimensionalists seem to see time in this way. Events sit there, and we travel past them. But there are indexical events. |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
Full Idea: In distinguishing between what can establish a statement about the past as true and what it is that that statement says, we are repudiating antirealism about the past. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: This is a late shift of ground from the champion of antirealism. If Dummett's whole position is based on a 'justificationist' theory of meaning, he must surely have a different theory of meaning now for statements about the past? |
21729 | Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: Rather than directly constructing properties as sets of objects and proving neat facts about properties by proxy, we can assert biconditionals, such as that an object has a property if and only if it is in a certain set. | |
From: Bernard Linsky (Russell's Metaphysical Logic [1999], 7.6) | |
A reaction: Linsky is describing Russell's method of logical construction. I'm not clear what is gained by this move, but at least it is a variant of the usual irritating expression of properties as sets of objects. |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The existence of a universe from which sentience was permanently absent is an unintelligible fantasy. What exists is what can be known to exist. What is true is what can be known to be true. Reality is what can be experienced and known. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as nonsense. The fact that we cannot think about a universe without introducing a viewpoint does not mean that we cannot 'intellectually imagine' its existence devoid of viewpoints. Nothing could ever experience a star's interior. |
8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Verification is not an individual but a collective activity. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: This generates problems. Are deceased members of the community included? (Yes, says Dummett). If someone speaks to angels (Blake!), do they get included? Is a majority necessary? What of weird loners? Etc. |
8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
Full Idea: To demonstrate the necessity of a truth-conditional theory of meaning, a proponent of such a theory must argue that use cannot be described without appeal to the conditions for the truth of statements. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 1) | |
A reaction: Unlike Dummett, I find that argument rather appealing. How do you decide the possible or appropriate use for a piece of language, if you don't already know what it means. Basing it all on social conventions means it could be meaningless ritual. |
8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
Full Idea: It is not enough for the truth-condition theorist to argue that we need the concept of truth: he must show that we should have the same conception of truth that he has. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 2) | |
A reaction: Davidson invites us to accept Tarski's account of truth. It invites the question of what the theory would be like with a very robust correspondence account of truth, or a flabby rather subjective coherence view, or the worst sort of pragmatic view. |
8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Maybe both the past and the future are real, determined by our current temporal perspective. Past is then events capable of having a causal influence upon events near us, and future is events we can affect, but from which we receive no information. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: This is the Four-Dimensional view, which is opposed to Presentism. Might immediate unease is that it gives encouragement to fortune-tellers, whom I have always dismissed with 'You can't see the future, because it doesn't exist'. |
8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The idea that only the present is real cannot be sustained. St Augustine pointed out that the present has no duration; it is a mere boundary between past and future, and dependent on them. It also denies truth-value to statements about past or future. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: To defend Presentism, I suspect that one must focus entirely on the activities of consciousness and short-term memory. All truths, of past or future, must refer totally to such mental events. But what could an event be if there is no enduring time? |